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If uncertainty is an intrinsic feature of the human condition, as many existential thinkers argue, 
then how can we claim to know anything at all? The main theme running through this portfolio 
is uncertainty; specifically how, in the context of life’s intrinsic uncertainty, we can construct – 
or co-construct – knowledge. Spinelli (2015) argues that certainty and uncertainty are 
inseparably interconnected. He articulates the tantalising and somewhat dizzying idea that “no 
certainty (including the certainty of uncertainty) can ever be wholly certain; there can only be 
uncertain certainties and uncertain uncertainties” (p.25). This is one of the fundamental 
assumptions underpinning my approach to living – that uncertainty pervades the human 
experience, but that when faced with difficult questions we must avoid throwing our hands up 
in the air and retreating to the certainty of uncertainty as much as we must avoid retreating to 
the sanctuary of any other certainty: in other words, that we must develop a way of knowing 
that is infused with – but not overwhelmed by – the uncertainty of our existence. 
 
This portfolio represents my attempt to do just this – to engage deeply and meaningfully with 
uncertainty while constructing what I hope is valid and useful knowledge about its place in 
health care. The portfolio is comprised of three parts: the presentation of my thesis, which 
develops the concept of existential uncertainty in the context of people living with cancer (Part 
A); the presentation of a client study and process report in which I describe my work with a 
person who is living with HIV (Part B); and the presentation of an article published in the 
Journal of Evaluation in Clinical Practice in which I use the knowledge constructed in my thesis 
to begin a conversation with the research community about the nature of existential uncertainty 
(Part C). I will begin by offering some general comments on the approach I have adopted 
across the three parts of the portfolio, before reflecting briefly on how the different parts of the 
portfolio relate to each other and to the overarching theme. 
 
General approach 
Although many of the questions with which this portfolio engages are directly concerned with 
epistemology and ontology, and are therefore philosophical in nature, the portfolio itself is 
decidedly a work of psychology rather than philosophy. This is to say that I am interested in 
questions such as ‘what can I know?’ or ‘who am I?’ as they relate to the sub-discipline of 
applied psychology, not as starting points for a philosophical treatise on justified true belief or 
the finer points of existential metaphysics. Therefore, when I engage with the theoretical and 
conceptual questions underpinning this portfolio, I do so always with an eye to praxis – my 
aim is not so much to provide answers that would pass muster with a philosopher, but rather 
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to explore how health care professionals might engage with these questions in a clinical 
context in a way that is practically useful. 
 
My engagement with the topics addressed is pluralistic insofar as it does not subscribe 
exclusively to one epistemological framework. This is discussed further at the appropriate 
points (notably Part A, 2.1 and Part B, 1.1, 1.3), but two frameworks warrant mention at this 
stage due to their centrality to the enterprise: existentialism and constructivism. My approach 
to this piece of work is heavily influenced by the theoretical framework developed by Spinelli 
(2015), which posits uncertainty as one of the foundational principles of existential therapy: 
the assumption is that although death is an inevitability, when and how we die – and everything 
that happens in the meantime – remain uncertain. The human tendency to search for meaning 
must be seen within this context (Landau, Greenberg & Kosloff, 2010). The assumption I have 
adopted throughout the portfolio is that meaning is constructed (rather than discovered) in a 
social setting. As Neimeyer (2009) puts it: 
 
“Far from viewing the ‘construction of reality’ as a project undertaken by an isolated 
subjectivity, constructivism sees meaning making as relational, social and cultural to the 
core.” (p.ix) 
 
It is for this reason that the word ‘perspectives’ is included in the title of the portfolio, 
acknowledging as it does that when we look at something, we do so from a particular time and 
place – I have tried throughout the portfolio to make this explicit, whether it is my own 
perspective or that of other researchers or research participants (in Part A), or my client (in 
Part B). In other words, context is key. 
 
The context in which I chose to situate this portfolio is health care: in Parts A and C, the focus 
is on people living with cancer; in Part B the focus is on a person living with HIV. My choice of 
health care reflects an interest stemming from my own personal experience of a health 
challenge, of which I give an account at the beginning of Part A. I also chose health care 
because of its fundamental connection with uncertainty. As Han, Klein and Arora (2011) argue: 
 
“Uncertainty pervades and motivates every activity related to health care. At the most 
fundamental level, it is uncertainty of one form or another that fuels medical research, 
prompts patients to seek care, and stimulates medical intervention. The inability to 
abolish uncertainty, furthermore, promotes the perpetuation of these activities and 




Although the topic of clinician uncertainty is a fascinating one worthy of research attention, I 
chose in the research components of this portfolio to focus on the uncertainty experienced by 
patients. However, this is not to suggest that clinician and patient uncertainty exist 
independently of one another – in the client study and process report I reflect on how my own 
uncertainties as a clinician interact with those of my client in a way that exemplifies the social 
constructivist nature of uncertainty. And, of course, whether one is being a clinician or a patient 
in a given encounter is largely a matter of happenstance – clinicians can be patients too. I 
have tried, as much as the strictures of language permit, not to express things in a way that 
implies exclusively isolationist subjectivities, but rather to see the concepts and challenges 
addressed in this portfolio more broadly as aspects of Heidegger’s being-in-the-world (Cohn, 
1997; Cooper, 2003). 
 
Part A: Doctoral thesis 
Existential uncertainty in health care: Developing the concept 
The first part of the portfolio is concerned with developing the concept of existential uncertainty 
in the context of an established taxonomy of uncertainty in health care (Han et al., 2011). It 
does this by exploring two related questions: how might existential uncertainty be usefully 
conceptualised? And: how might the relationship between existential uncertainty and other 
aspects of uncertainty be understood in the experience of people living with cancer? 
 
There are two points I would like to make here. The first is that this research is conceptual 
rather than phenomenological in nature, which is to say that I am interested in the concept of 
existential uncertainty rather than the experience of existential uncertainty (a point further 
discussed in Part A, 2.3.1, 3.2.1). I make this point to help orient readers because conceptual 
research methods such as the hybrid model of concept development (Schwartz-Barcott & Kim, 
2000) used in the thesis are less closely associated with counselling psychology than, for 
instance, phenomenological research methods, and may therefore be less familiar to readers. 
With this in mind, I have tried to outline my methodology as clearly, thoroughly and concisely 
as possible (see Part A, 2.2). 
 
The second point is that I conceive of the thesis as being driven by a series of conversations 
– conversations that I have had with my research supervisor, colleagues, friends and, most 
importantly, the participants who agreed to talk to me about their experiences of cancer-related 
uncertainty. This is very much in keeping with the constructivist approach mentioned above. 
In conceiving of it in this way, I drew inspiration from Mair’s (2000) description of psychology 
as a discipline of discourse and of psychologists as professional conversationalists. Nor do 
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the conversations end with the writing of the thesis – they flow into Parts B and C of the 
portfolio too, as I explain below. 
 
Part B: Client study and process report 
Co-constructing meaning with a gay man who is HIV positive 
In Part B of the portfolio, I present a client study and process report in which I explore some 
of the issues and themes that emerged in my clinical work with a gay man living with HIV. 
Identity was one of the main themes that recurred in our sessions – he felt that he had spent 
so long concealing his sexuality from those around him that he had lost touch with who he 
really was: ‘who am I?’ he asked (see Part B, 3.2). My conversations with this client helped 
sensitise me to the importance of identity in the concept of existential uncertainty, which 
informed my thinking in the thesis, where I raise the possibility that a HIV diagnosis might be 
an antecedent of existential uncertainty since it carries with it the threat of rejection and social 
alienation, and therefore a threat to one's identity (see Part A, 3.1.5.1 and Part C, 4.2). This is 
just one example of how there was an ongoing ‘conversation’ between my research and my 
clinical work to mutual benefit. 
 
I reflect in this part of the portfolio on some of the challenges I experienced as a clinician 
engaged in an endeavour of co-constructing meaning with a client in the face of existential 
uncertainty. The challenge, as I saw it, was to offer my client something useful (a different 
perspective, a framework for making sense of his experience) without imposing a meaning on 
his experience. The question I grapple with is whether as therapists we can ever be sure that 
we are not subtly imposing our own preferred meaning on our clients’ experiences, try as we 
might to avoid it. This, for me, is an illustration of uncertainty in the clinical encounter, and a 
question that continues to preoccupy me. 
 
Part C: Published paper 
Existential uncertainty in health care: A concept analysis 
The final part of the portfolio represents the beginning of a wider conversation with the 
research community on the subject of existential uncertainty. Part of the reason for aligning 
the thesis with an established taxonomy of uncertainty in health care (Han et al., 2011) was 
because I wanted to contribute to an existing conversation – I thought that this stood a greater 
chance of generating an impact in terms of research and practice than adopting a less theory-
driven approach. I decided to develop one phase of the research – the initial concept analysis 
of existential uncertainty (see Part A, 3.1) – into an article, which I submitted to the Journal of 





I chose this journal for two reasons. Firstly, I wanted to reach out beyond the psychology 
community (narrowly conceived) so that the psychological insights generated by my research 
might infiltrate and influence in some small way other, related disciplines, such as medicine 
and nursing. Secondly, this journal was already home to an ongoing conversation about the 
taxonomy on which my research was based (e.g. Pomare, Churruca, Ellis, Long & Braithwaite, 
2019; Han & Djulbegovic, 2019), so I felt that this was an appropriate channel through which 
to communicate to an interested audience some of the initial insights from my research. I was 
pleased that my article was accepted and published by the journal (Dwan & Willig, 2021), and 
that the conversations which drove the research described within the pages of this portfolio 
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PART A: DOCTORAL THESIS 




Rationale, aims and objectives 
According to an influential taxonomy of uncertainty in health care (Han, Klein & Arora, 2011), 
existential uncertainty is a key aspect of uncertainty for patients alongside more heavily 
researched aspects such as uncertainty around diagnosis, prognosis, treatment 
recommendations, etc. Although the term ‘existential uncertainty’ appears across a number of 
disciplines in the research literature, its use is diffuse and inconsistent. To date there has not 
been a systematic attempt to define it. The aim of this research is to construct a theoretically-




The concept of existential uncertainty was analysed and further developed using a 
methodology known as the hybrid model of concept development (Schwartz-Barcott & Kim, 
2000), which was pioneered by nursing scholars. The analysis involved three phases: an 
analysis of the concept of existential uncertainty in existing literature; a thematic analysis of 
semi-structured interviews carried out with six people who reported experiencing uncertainty 
in relation to their cancer diagnosis; and a synthesis of these two analyses. The synthesis 
yielded a list of defining attributes of existential uncertainty, a list of features that distinguish it 
from other concepts within the taxonomy, and a narrative conceptualisation. 
 
Results 
Existential uncertainty is conceptualised as a bodily awareness at cognitive or precognitive 
levels that is focused on the undetermined but finite nature of one’s future, as well as on 
identity and meaning. This awareness is argued to be a consequence of living with the spectre 
of dying in a context characterised by questions of control and agency. The analysis suggests 
that existential uncertainty is concerned with: meaning rather than discoverable facts; the 
person rather than the disease; and the fundamental principles of existence rather than the 
practicalities of living. The thesis concludes with a discussion of the implications of this 
conceptualisation for the taxonomy on which the research was based; for psycho-oncology 







This research project was born out of a long interest in health-related uncertainty and is best 
understood in the context of this interest. Given the importance of reflexivity in social science 
research (Finlay & Gough, 2003), I will begin this thesis with an account of my relationship 
with uncertainty, and its evolution from a personal to an academic interest. I will proceed from 
there to describe how this relationship shaped my engagement with the research literature on 
uncertainty, and led ultimately to the formulation of the fundamental question underpinning 
this research: how might we usefully conceptualise existential uncertainty? 
 
 
1.1 Personal interest 
When I was about nine years old, I began to develop headaches. There was no obvious reason 
why. As time went on, the headaches became more frequent until they were constant – a dull, 
uncomfortable feeling in my head. I also began feeling nauseous and would spend perhaps a 
day a week at home in bed because the nausea made it too difficult to go to school. Nobody 
knew why I was experiencing these things, including the GP to whom I paid frequent visits 
over the course of three years. She suggested a range of possible explanations for the 
nausea, none of which I thought likely: perhaps it was something I ate, perhaps it was because 
I wasn’t eating enough, or perhaps it was something to do with a build-up of phlegm? 
Notwithstanding my young age, I knew intuitively it was none of these things. In any case, 
what about the headaches? More attention was paid to the nausea than the headaches since 
the nausea was incapacitating in a way the headaches weren’t, and so I was referred to a 
gastroenterologist, who couldn’t find anything wrong. I briefly saw a child psychologist, who 
also couldn’t find a reason for these symptoms. Eventually, when I began to develop 
numbness on one side of my body, the GP acceded to my mother’s increasingly desperate 
demands for a brain scan. At the age of 12, I was diagnosed with a brain tumour. I remember 
quite clearly the huge relief I felt at being given an explanation for my symptoms. I did not 
experience the worry that my parents did on receipt of the results of the scan because I was 
not aware of the implications of the diagnosis – I was just delighted that we now knew why I 
had been sick for three years, that the uncertainty had been resolved. The brain tumour was 
surgically removed a few days later and found to be ‘benign’. The headaches and nausea 
soon receded, and have not returned in the 30 years since. 
 
I start with this story because living for three years with the symptoms of an undiagnosed brain 
tumour is a formative experience that continues to loom large in my mind – it has undoubtedly 
shaped my attitude to medical uncertainty. I recently reviewed my medical notes from that 
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time and was interested to read some of the correspondence between doctors. For example, 
the gastroenterologist was of the view that my symptoms were ‘non-organic in nature’ – he 
wrote: ‘I have reassured his mother however that there is unlikely to be major organic 
pathology underlining [sic] this’, before recommending a psychiatric assessment. The 
following year, the neurosurgeon who ended up removing the tumour reported the results of 
an MRI scan showing ‘an extremely large midline cerebellar tumour and massive 
hydrocephalus with periventricular lucency indicative of high intracranial pressure and 
seepage of spinal fluid into the brain substance’. These two snippets illustrate the uncertainty 
that arises when there is a gap between what exists (in this case an ‘extremely large’ brain 
tumour) and our ability to know about it (in this case the attempts of the GP and various 
specialists to diagnose the cause of the symptoms). For three years, I lived in this gap, and 
this experience taught me that in spite of the rigorous training and good intentions of doctors, 
sometimes they simply don’t know, and we are left alone to grapple with our unexplained 
symptoms. In other words, I developed an appreciation from a young age of the limitations of 
human knowledge, and the isolation and suffering entailed in this. This made me receptive to 
the ideas of existential writers when I first encountered them as a teenager, and perhaps goes 
some way to accounting for the existential orientation of this research. 
 
Although my own illness experience inevitably informed the way in which I approached this 
research, and arguably sensitised me to aspects of the illness experiences of participants that 
would not be so salient for someone who never had to reckon with such an unsettling 
experience, the reflexivity required of qualitative research means “mov[ing] beyond the 
partiality of our previous understandings and our investment in particular research outcomes” 
(Finlay, 2003, p.108). At the most basic level, this means acknowledging that my perspective 
is not the perspective of the participants in this study, and that we might even have conflicting 
perspectives. For example, I feel a strong ambivalence towards the medical profession – on 
the one hand, the awesome stores of knowledge and expertise contained therein made 
possible the complex operation that restored my health, while on the other hand, for three 
years I saw a range of doctors whose attempts to explain my symptoms felt like poor 
guesswork to me, even at the time. It was important for me to be aware that my resignation to 
the limitations of medicine is very much shaped by my own experience and may not have 
been shared by participants. With this in mind, I tried not just to remain open to views that 
might have contradicted my own, but to welcome such views as a way of keeping my pre-






1.2 Academic interest 
I can pinpoint precisely the genesis of my academic interest in uncertainty – I awoke on 26th 
October, 2015 to the news on the radio that the World Health Organization had made the 
decision to classify red meat consumption as “probably carcinogenic to humans” (World Health 
Organization, 2015). I was struck by the use of the word probably – why the uncertainty? 
Presumably it either was or it wasn’t. However, I was interested not just in why scientists 
couldn’t say one way or the other whether red meat consumption was carcinogenic, but also 
in what we – the population at large – might make of this uncertainty. As a keen consumer of 
red meat, I was curious to know how my fondness for red meat might influence my 
interpretation of the uncertainty, and how my interpretation might differ from the interpretation 
of others. This question became the topic of the research component of a master’s degree in 
psychology that I was doing at the time. One of the key findings of this study (Dwan & Miles, 
2018) was that the ambivalence of a person’s attitude to red meat (e.g. believing that red meat 
contains important nutrients and that its consumption is bad for the environment) might 
influence their perception of the risk attached to its consumption. The article argues: 
 
“The attempt to accommodate conflicting perspectives is at the heart of what lay people 
do every day as they try to negotiate the risks associated with modern life, and the 
interaction between sources [of evidence] is likely to play a particularly important role in 
situations where there is a great discrepancy between those sources.” (p.157) 
 
The article concludes that people use a mix of rational strategies (thought, calculation), non-
rational strategies (belief, hope, faith), and in-between strategies (trust, intuition, emotion) to 
achieve this accommodation (Zinn, 2008). 
 
The reason I highlight my previous work on uncertainty is because it informs my approach to 
this research in important ways. The emphasis on ambivalence in the red meat study reflects 
the ambivalence I feel not just towards medical science (described above), but towards any 
question pertaining to humanity. My ambivalent disposition is one of the things that first drew 
me to counselling psychology and its openness to a pluralistic philosophy that admits of a 
range of valid answers to any substantial human question, even when those answers conflict 
with one another (Cooper & McLeod, 2007). How people make sense of the uncertainty they 







1.3 Taxonomy of health-related uncertainty 
It was in the course of the research just described that I first encountered a taxonomy of health-
related uncertainty developed by Han, Klein and Arora (2011). This taxonomy was developed 
in response to a perceived lack of systematicity in the existing literature on uncertainty in 
health care – the authors argued that “the body of knowledge on the uncertainties faced by 
clinicians and patients is fragmented and incomplete, and important insights have not been 
translated to clinical practice” (p.829). The intention of the taxonomy was to guide research 
and improve clinical practice. What appealed to me most about it was that it provided “an 
organizing conceptual framework” (ibid.) for a complex and interesting topic – health-related 
uncertainty – and this dovetails with the kind of research I most enjoy: applying an organising 
principle to a complex topic with the aim of generating clarity. 
 
The taxonomy itself comprises three dimensions. The first dimension specifies three sources 
for any health-related uncertainty: probability, which is described as “the indeterminacy of 
future outcome” (Han et al., 2011, p.834); ambiguity, which is concerned with the imprecision 
of evidence, e.g. when there is conflicting evidence; and complexity, which is relevant to 
situations where there is a multiplicity of factors to be taken into account. The second 
dimension specifies eight issues1 of uncertainty (see Figure 1), which is to say eight aspects 
of the illness experience in relation to which a person might experience uncertainty – these 
range from scientific aspects such as prognosis and treatment recommendations to practical 
aspects concerned with accessing care to personal aspects, comprising psycho-social 
uncertainty and existential uncertainty. The third dimension specifies the locus of uncertainty, 
which is to say the person who is experiencing uncertainty (patient, clinician, family member, 
etc.). According to the taxonomy, it should be possible to classify any instance of uncertainty 
in health care according to these three dimensions, e.g. the ambiguity of the evidence (first 
dimension) associated with a certain treatment option (second dimension) might be 
associated with uncertainty in the patient (third dimension). 
 
                                                          
1 Although Han et al. (2011) refer to these as ‘issues’ of uncertainty, I have chosen in this thesis to call them 
‘aspects’ of uncertainty as this describes what they are in a way that is clearer and more consistent with my 




Figure 1: The second dimension of the Han et al. (2011) taxonomy of uncertainty in health care, comprising 
scientific, practical and personal aspects. 
 
 
One of the things that stood out for me when I first came across the taxonomy was the 
inclusion of ‘existential uncertainty’ in the second dimension. My curiosity was immediately 
piqued as to what existential uncertainty might mean. Whereas I thought scientific and 
practical aspects of uncertainty were specific and easy to grasp, personal aspects of 
uncertainty seemed neither – for instance, it did not make sense to me to say that existential 
uncertainty is uncertainty about one’s existence in the same way that diagnostic uncertainty 
is uncertainty about one’s diagnosis. At the very least, the term ‘existential uncertainty’ 
required further explication in a way that other aspects of uncertainty within the taxonomy did 
not. Han et al. (2011) suggest that existential uncertainty is “related to patients’ sense of 
meaning in life” (p.833) before offering the following elaboration: 
 
“Personal uncertainty pertains to psychosocial and existential issues including the effects 
of one’s illness or treatment on one’s goals or outlook on life, one’s personal 
relationships, the welfare of loved ones, or one’s sense of meaning in life.” (ibid.) 
 
My assumption was that the first and fourth examples here (effect of illness on goals or outlook 
on life and sense of meaning in life) were existential whereas the second and third (effects on 
personal relationships and welfare of loved ones) were psycho-social. However, a list of 
examples is not the same as a definition, and it surprised me that there wasn’t a more explicit 
























When it came to choosing a research topic for my doctorate in counselling psychology, I 
returned to the questions that had been sparked by my original engagement with the 
taxonomy, and set out on an exploratory mission to track down a definition of existential 
uncertainty in the literature that would satisfy my liking for clarity, precision and rigour. Before 
embarking on this mission, however, I jotted down some notes as to what intuitively I felt 
existential uncertainty might be. I wrote: 
 
‘When I think of existential uncertainty, I think of the future and the idea that the future is 
unknowable (although we can guess at what might happen), and the idea that no amount 
of thinking, planning, researching, reassurance or comforting is going to change this. 
There is no parent figure or ‘grown-up’ to tell me that everything is going to be alright 
because nobody knows for sure. And what would it mean anyway to say that everything 
is going to be alright, given we are all certainly going to die? The implications of this are 
dizzying and at times nauseating, and sometimes manifest as a little turning of the 
stomach that occasionally intrudes on my day-to-day experience before quickly 
dissipating and allowing me to get back to whatever I was occupied with.’ 
 
This is to acknowledge that before engaging with the literature in any systematic way, I already 
had hunches as to what domains the concept of existential uncertainty might cover, notably 




1.4 Existential uncertainty – the literature 
When I set out to locate a definition of existential uncertainty in the literature, I fully expected 
to find one. In other words, I was not aware when I began my exploration of the literature that 
the quest to define existential uncertainty would become the entire focus of this research. A 
more formal, comprehensive literature review is reported as part of the concept analysis (see 
Analysis 3.1.2 and 3.1.3), so my intention in this section is not to provide a thorough analysis 
of the existing literature, but rather to give a narrative account of what I found when I began 
my search, and how this led me to the conclusion that there was a need for a study whose 
aim was to define and develop the concept of existential uncertainty in a systematic way. 
 
I conducted a preliminary search of articles indexed in Academic Search Complete, CINAHL 
Complete, MEDLINE Complete and APA PsychInfo between 1997 (the earliest date permitted 
by the EBSCOhost interface) and 2020 that had ‘existential uncertainty’ in the title. My 
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rationale was that the most likely source of a considered definition of existential uncertainty 
would be an article with that term in the title (implying a focus on that concept in the article). 
 
There are other search strategies I might have adopted. For example, I might have included 
related concepts, e.g. existential anxiety, in my search. I decided against this strategy because 
fundamentally I was interested in uncertainty rather than existential experiences per se. I might 
also have searched for published studies grounded in the Han et al. (2011) taxonomy on the 
basis that these might have shed light on the various aspects of uncertainty and the 
differences between them. I considered this a less direct route to a formal conceptualisation 
of existential uncertainty since the search I conducted would presumably have yielded such a 
conceptualisation, if one had existed. In any case, published articles citing the Han et al. 
taxonomy were included in the formal concept analysis reported in the Analysis chapter (see 
3.1.2.2). 
 
My preliminary search returned 11 results. Three of these were specifically related to health. 
I will begin by discussing how these three articles conceptualise existential uncertainty before 
turning my attention to the other articles. 
 
1.4.1 Existential uncertainty in the health literature 
The most recent article (Røysland & Friberg, 2016) was entitled: ‘Unexplained chest pain and 
physical activity – balancing between existential uncertainty and certainty.’ The stated aim of 
the study was to develop an understanding of the meaning of physical activity for people with 
unexplained chest pain using a phenomenological hermeneutic approach. I expected that the 
first time existential uncertainty was mentioned in the article, it would be accompanied by a 
brief definition to establish a clear understanding of the term. The first time it appears is in the 
results section, and it does so in the following way: 
 
“Out of this [analysis], a comprehensive understanding was formulated: being physically 
active while living with unexplained chest pain means balancing between existential 
uncertainty and existential certainty.” (p.221) 
 
At no point do the authors offer a clearer sense of what they mean when they refer to 
existential uncertainty (or certainty). They talked about physical activity as representing a 
threat to life: “Exposed to existential aspects such as vulnerability during physical activity, the 
respondents bring themselves in the vicinity of illness and even death.” (ibid.) They also 
invoked the ideas of the philosopher Paul Ricoeur, emphasising the role of choice and 
responsibility in living a good life. But I found myself frustrated that while they seemed to point 
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to certain conceptual terrain (the body, threat to life, death, choice, responsibility), there was 
no attempt to specify precisely what was meant by existential uncertainty. 
 
The second article (Karlsson, Friberg, Wallengren & Öhlen, 2014) was entitled: ‘Meanings of 
existential uncertainty and certainty for people diagnosed with cancer and receiving palliative 
treatment: a life-world phenomenological study.’ As with the Røysland and Friberg (2016) 
article, I hoped to find a definition of existential uncertainty at the first mention of the term. This 
is how the concept is referenced in the introduction: 
 
“…when a person becomes ill with cancer, the bodily experience involves becoming 
aware of one’s own mortality and this awareness means to live in existential uncertainties 
due to the mortal threat of the body. It follows that the existential uncertainty of individuals 
in this situation is about the uncertainty of the prospect of the disease trajectory, about 
being able to survive or not and how life will be before death.” (p.2) 
 
While one might not dispute the validity of this statement, it is unclear whether the authors 
mean to say that awareness of mortality is the only dimension of existential uncertainty or one 
of many. Furthermore, I found it interesting to notice that the authors seemed to regard 
existential uncertainty and uncertainty about disease progression as one and the same thing, 
whereas Han et al. (2011) make a distinction in their taxonomy between existential uncertainty 
and uncertainty about prognosis. Reading this article left me with more questions than 
answers. 
 
The third article (Stockl, 2007) was entitled: ‘Complex syndromes, ambivalent diagnosis, and 
existential uncertainty – the case of systemic lupus erythematosus (SLE).’ This was a 
sociological study combining methods of ethnography and grounded theory to explore the 
relationship between complex syndromes and clinical practice. Stockl argued that ambivalent 
diagnosis leads to existential uncertainty amongst patients, where existential uncertainty is 
the patient’s realisation that the “future life of his or her mind, body, and self is in jeopardy” 
(p.1551). This – the only definition offered – is, in fact, a direct quotation from Adamson’s 
(1997) idiographic account of an illness trajectory defined by inflammatory bowel disease and 
avascular necrosis, which distinguished between existential uncertainty and clinical 
uncertainty. It was a relief to me to locate the Adamson article, because this was the first time 





“I follow existentialist usage in using the term existential uncertainty to refer to the 
individual's awareness that his or her future is open and undetermined. In the medical 
encounter, existential uncertainty is that form of uncertainty which is experienced 
privately by the individual patient upon the realisation that the future life of his or her 
mind, body, and self is in jeopardy.” (p.134) 
 
Adamson distinguished between existential uncertainty (the uncertainty of the individual 
patient) and clinical uncertainty (the uncertainty of the clinical scientist whose responsibility it 
is to diagnose and treat the illness). None of the other authors mentioned in this section had 
distinguished existential uncertainty from any other form of uncertainty, so it was useful to 
have Adamson lay out not just what to his mind existential uncertainty was, but also what it 
was not. My mind immediately went to the Han et al. (2011) taxonomy and the distinction it 
makes in the second dimension between scientific aspects of uncertainty and personal 
aspects of uncertainty (including existential uncertainty), as well as the locus of uncertainty 
specified in the third dimension (patient or clinician). 
 
1.4.2 Existential uncertainty beyond the health literature 
Of the other articles returned by the preliminary search, five were drawn from diverse fields 
(psychoanalysis, politics, cultural anthropology, geoscience, sociology), while the remaining 
three were drawn from the psychological literature (two from the literature on terror 
management theory, which is based on the idea that the inevitability of death generates a 
terror from which we spend our lives trying to distract ourselves, and one from the literature 
on personality). Although the literature review reported in the Analysis chapter at 3.1.2 and 
3.1.3 will adopt an interdisciplinary approach, for now I will confine myself to observations on 
the three articles drawn from the psychological literature. 
 
In one of the articles drawn from the terror management theory literature, Landau, Rothschild 
and Sullivan (2012) define existential uncertainty as “uncertainty about life’s significance” 
(p.132), arguing that we invest in cultural worldviews as a way of mitigating the terrifying 
possibility that life is insignificant. This pithy definition is consistent with the suggestion in the 
Han et al. (2011) paper that existential uncertainty is related to our sense of meaning in life. 
An emphasis on death is more explicit in the second article drawn from the terror management 
theory literature, in which Rubin (2018) presents a measure for ‘fear of existential uncertainty’, 
which he describes as “fear about uncertainty regarding what happens after death” (p.301). 
The four items in the measure require participants to rate the extent to which they are 
frightened by the following death-related issues: ‘the uncertainty of what to expect’; ‘the 
uncertainty of any sort of existence after death’; ‘its mysteriousness’; ‘the unknowns 
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associated with it’. It is interesting to note that this measure of existential uncertainty is focused 
on what happens after death, whereas the health literature described in the section above 
seemed much more focused on the uncertainty of life before death. 
 
The final article in the psychological literature returned by the preliminary search (Lewis & 
Bates, 2013) was entitled: ‘Common genetic influences underpin religiosity, community 
integration, and existential uncertainty.’ These authors present a measure for ‘existential 
uncertainty’ that is comprised of two items on which participants rated their level of agreement: 
‘the world is too complex for me’; ‘I cannot make sense of what’s going on in the world’. These 
items represent a marked contrast with the items used by Rubin (2018) in his measure – while 
Rubin’s measure was concerned with what happens after death, this measure was concerned 
with making sense of the world. It was interesting to observe that while the preliminary search 
returned two measures of existential uncertainty, these did not seem to me to be measuring 
the same concept. 
 
1.4.3 My conclusion 
This preliminary review of the existential uncertainty literature yielded no published concept 
analysis of existential uncertainty. This was enough to convince me that there was some 
potentially valuable work to be done in carrying out a formal analysis to define and delineate 
the concept. The lack of explicit definition offered by researchers seemed to imply that the 
meaning of ‘existential uncertainty’ is self-evident and not in need of definition. However, the 
fact that the concept was being used by researchers in a variety of ways (without any 
acknowledgement of this variety) suggested otherwise to me. Although the various uses 
seemed to share conceptual terrain (something to do with the future, threat, mortality, death, 
sense making, meaning, etc.), this terrain ranged broadly, with different researchers 
emphasising different aspects, sometimes in a manner that raised questions, e.g. is existential 
uncertainty about what happens before death or after death or both? Furthermore, with the 
exception of Adamson (1997), none of the researchers made an attempt to delineate the 
concept, i.e. to distinguish it from non-existential uncertainties by setting out where existential 
uncertainty might be said to begin and end. 
 
In arguing for the importance of analysing concepts, Wilson (1963) makes a case for 
“becom[ing] self-conscious about words which hitherto we had used without thinking – not 
necessarily used wrongly, but used unselfconsciously” (p.14). I concluded from my preliminary 
review of the literature that health research could benefit from a more self-conscious use of 
the term ‘existential uncertainty’, and that the work required to facilitate this change was well 




1.5 Research rationale and aims 
The question is why it is important to become more self-conscious about our use of terms such 
as ‘existential uncertainty’. My answer is that our theories are only as good as the components 
with which they are constructed, and concepts are “the basic building blocks in theory 
construction” (Walker & Avant, 2019, p.167) – if we are unthinkingly using the same term to 
mean different things, then the confusion that inevitably follows will limit the capacity of our 
theories to deepen our understanding of important psychological issues. Nor is this a concern 
that is particular to a certain approach to research – whether one’s orientation is realist, 
phenomenological or social constructionist, a failure to take explicit account of the meaning 
(or possible meanings) of basic concepts will thwart the development of theory within research 
as well as the translation of research into clinical practice. 
 
Given that research is driven in part by “the need to link theory and empirical observation” 
(Yardley & Bishop, 2008, p.363), there is a strong rationale for bridging the gap between 
empirical research on existential uncertainty (e.g. Røysland & Friberg, 2016; Karlsson et al., 
2014; Stockl, 2007) and theoretical models of uncertainty (e.g. Han et al., 2011), starting with 
a clarification of the concepts that underpin both. 
 
1.5.1 Why uncertainty? 
Uncertainty is an intrinsic aspect of human existence (Spinelli, 2015). It is salient when we are 
faced with a serious threat to our health (Han et al., 2011), and its impact on health outcomes 
can be negative (Wright, Afari & Zautra, 2009). When it comes to ill health, some people 
struggle to come to terms with the uncertainty that remains once they are in receipt of all 
available information, and these are the people who are likely to be referred for psychological 
support (McCormack et al., 2011). It is important that psychologists know how to work with 
irreducible uncertainty, which necessitates having some framework for conceptualising 
different aspects of uncertainty as a basis for distinguishing between reducible and irreducible 
uncertainty. 
 
Uncertainty is a particularly prominent aspect of the cancer experience because of the life-
threatening nature of the disease (Nissim et al., 2012). However, UK guidelines for improving 
supportive and palliative care for adults with cancer (National Institute for Health and Care 
Excellence, 2004) suggest that health professionals working in cancer care may not feel 
adequately trained in exploring uncertainty, particularly uncertainty around the future course 
of the disease. Developing a better understanding of the way uncertainty features in the cancer 




Han et al. (2011) draw attention to the fact that existential uncertainty has not traditionally 
received a great deal of attention and yet may be a bigger concern for patients than scientific 
aspects of uncertainty, which are more heavily researched. This is consistent with Penrod’s 
(2007) claim that “despite the breadth of experiences and research contexts explored in the 
scientific literature related to uncertainty, the conceptual definition [of uncertainty] failed to 
specify the more existential characteristics of the concept” (p.660). This research is a way of 
beginning to redress this imbalance. 
 
1.5.2 Relevance to counselling psychology 
The modernist scientific paradigm, driven by positivist principles, has tended to focus more on 
the unknown (which is to say the not-yet-known) than the unknowable – Gordon (2003) 
characterises the epistemological assumption on which this paradigm is based as follows: “if 
we keep to the scientific project – ask the right questions, gather enough information, solve 
the problems – then finally we will run out of problems to solve.” (p.101) This quest for certainty 
is particularly evident in clinical medicine (Gillett, 2004), which is underpinned by an “ideology 
of uncertainty reduction” (Babrow & Kline, 2000, p.1805). It ignores the possibility that while 
greater quantities of information can lead to increased knowledge and scientific 
breakthroughs, they also lead to commensurate increases in uncertainty and doubt because 
they inevitably raise more questions (Michael, 2000). 
 
The postmodern paradigm that informs counselling psychology has a different philosophical 
perspective on uncertainty. In her discussion of the relationship between counselling 
psychology and research, Rafalin (2010) writes of a paradigm shift that fuelled the birth and 
growth of the profession: 
 
“Counselling psychology values a search for understanding, rather than demanding 
universal truths. Through this profession, psychology’s historical fetish for insisting on 
answers has seen an evolution to a valuing of questions.” (p.41) 
 
A research study on uncertainty is really a research study on questions. I would argue that 
counselling psychology, committed as it is to the scientific model while at the same time 
recognising the intrinsic value of questions (rather than seeing them merely as the precursor 
to an answer), is in a strong position to develop valuable insights into the nature of uncertainty. 
 
In clinical terms, existential interventions that focus on meaning making rather than uncertainty 
reduction have been shown to be effective for cancer patients (Bauereiß, Obermaier, Özünal 
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& Baumeister, 2018), and counselling psychologists are well placed to deliver existentially-
informed interventions given counselling psychology and existential psychotherapy share a 
humanistic ethic (Cooper, 2009). Although the research presented in this thesis is conceptual 
rather than clinical in nature, it is reasonable to suggest that a deeper theoretical 
understanding of uncertainty in health care might helpfully inform the development of more 
effective psychological support for people living with health-related uncertainty. 
 
It is important to acknowledge that existential uncertainty is not a concern unique to the health 
context (as the preliminary literature review attests). Writing from a psychoanalytic 
perspective, Brothers (2008) suggests that existential uncertainty makes its presence felt in 
the consulting room itself: 
 
“Nowhere do I experience what I shall call existential uncertainty more starkly than in my 
own consulting room. It is there, as waves of this nightmarish dread wash over me and 
my patients, that I feel most tempted to dig my heels into the dry shore of analytic 
certitude.” (p.13) 
 
Given the importance of reflexivity within the practice of counselling psychology (Rizq & 
Target, 2008), it is crucial that counselling psychologists consider how their own relationship 
with existential uncertainty might shape their encounters with clients. This, of course, requires 
an understanding of existential uncertainty, which this research aims to provide. 
 
1.5.3 Research questions 
On the basis of what I have discussed above, I aim in this research to answer two related 
questions: 
 
1) How might existential uncertainty be usefully conceptualised? 
2) How might the relationship between existential uncertainty and other aspects of 




In this chapter, I have set out how I came to the concept of existential uncertainty and how my 
own experiences have shaped my engagement with it. Through a preliminary search of the 
most relevant literature, I established that the term ‘existential uncertainty’ is used by different 
researchers to mean different things in the health literature and beyond, but that there are 
common threads running through the various usages. I have argued that a clearer definition 
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and delineation of the concept would contribute to a deeper understanding of health-related 
uncertainty, and that counselling psychology’s postmodern orientation provides an opportunity 
to approach this task in a way that has perhaps been neglected in the past by researchers 
who are more committed to a positivist orientation. I concluded by setting out the two questions 
that this thesis will endeavour to answer. 
 
In the next chapter, I will give a detailed account of the methodological approach I developed 
in order to answer these questions, addressing some of the epistemological issues I 








This research is conceptual in nature, which is to say it is concerned with the concept rather 
than the experience of existential uncertainty. It is my intention in this chapter to establish a 
clear theoretical position as a means of clarifying what kind of knowledge conceptual research 
can hope to generate. I will begin by setting out the kinds of knowledge implicated in 
conceptual research on uncertainty. I will then proceed to describe the methodology used, the 
procedure followed, and my role in shaping these. Finally, I will introduce the participants I 
recruited to the study, and explore some of the issues I encountered in seeking to ensure the 
research was ethically sound as well as epistemologically valid. 
 
 
2.1 Theoretical position 
In order to establish a coherent theoretical position for this research from the outset, I had to 
decide on the extent to which the analytic approach would be driven by theory, i.e. the extent 
to which it should be ‘top down’ rather than ‘bottom up’. To counteract the diffuseness and 
heterogeneity of the existential uncertainty literature (see Introduction 1.4), I decided that the 
analytic approach should have a strong theoretical underpinning. I chose the taxonomy 
developed by Han et al. (2011) as the theoretical framework on which to base this research 
for three main reasons. Firstly, because it integrates principles and insights from earlier 
approaches in a comprehensive and systematic manner rather than representing a radically 
different way of conceptualising uncertainty from pre-existing approaches – its purview is 
therefore broad and inclusive. Secondly, between the date of its publication and 2020, it has 
generated considerable research and discussion around the nature of health-related 
uncertainty – according to Scopus, it had been cited 264 times by July 2020 (the time of my 
search), with 56 citations in 2019, up from 34 in 2018. This corresponds to a field-weighted 
citation impact of 7.64, which is in the 98th percentile. I felt that by situating this study within a 
“deliberate, coordinated, integrated program of work” (Han et al., 2019, p.1757) on uncertainty, 
I was more likely to achieve a meaningful impact with my results than if I had added to “the 
plethora of disconnected – and either redundant or unnoticed – findings, concepts, and 
theories” (ibid.) that are a feature of the literature. Finally – and crucially – the taxonomy 
includes the concept of existential uncertainty (which other models do not), and identifies it as 
a key but under-researched aspect of uncertainty. 
 
This study aims to generate knowledge about uncertainty, where uncertainty is broadly defined 
as “the subjective perception of ignorance” (Han et al., 2011, p.830). According to this 
definition, uncertainty is a metacognition in that it describes a type of knowing about not 
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knowing. In concrete terms, the aim is to find out how (conceptually) people living with cancer 
might make sense of the things related to their cancer experience that they do not (yet) know. 
This means that three different types of knowledge are implicated in the study: (i) a knowledge 
deficit, i.e. what is unknown; (ii) the knowledge that people have when they become aware of 
this deficit, i.e. uncertainty; and (iii) the knowledge the study seeks to generate, i.e. what is 
presented in this thesis. It is important to distinguish these different types of knowledge and 
their underlying assumptions when clarifying the theoretical position adopted by the research, 
as I will now briefly discuss. 
 
2.1.1 The knowledge deficit – what is there to (not) know? 
This research is underpinned by an existential ontology (Hersch, 2015), which assumes the 
existence of a world characterised by “non-fixed phenomena whose significances and 
meanings are continuously in flux” (p.111). Central to the idea of an existential ontology is that 
within the context created by existential ‘givens’ such as death, isolation and meaninglessness 
(Yalom, 1980), the non-fixedness of phenomena results in unavoidable uncertainty (Spinelli, 
2015). 
 
This is not to say that certainty does not exist at all. On the contrary, this study follows Spinelli 
(2015) in positing a real, material basis for the world about which much can be known, but 
arguing that within the constraints imposed by the world’s material basis, there will always be 
much that is unknown – the knowledge deficit referred to above. In the case of cancer, this 
means acknowledging that what we call cancer has a basis in cell division, for example, but 
we cannot know for sure how this cellular activity is going to eventuate in any individual case. 
As Spinelli puts it: “I can never fully determine with complete and final certainty or control not 
only what will present itself as stimulus to my experience, but also how I will experience and 
respond to stimuli.” (p.22) This amounts to a critical realist position (Willig, 1999). 
 
Uncertainty is often oriented towards the future, particularly in the case of cancer where people 
are understandably occupied with the question of disease progression. This study assumes 
that “the future is not already in existence waiting for scientific methods to reveal that future”, 
but rather that “time moves toward a future that exists only as potential” (Staley, 2017, p.41). 
In effect, this makes the future a function of aleatory uncertainty, i.e. fundamentally 
unpredictable, rather than epistemic uncertainty, i.e. knowable in principle if not in practice 
(Spiegelhalter, 2008). This position is consistent with the emphasis on freedom, choice and 
responsibility in existential theory (Spinelli, 2015) – the future is undetermined in the present, 




It is important to state that uncertainty is assumed to be a given of human existence and does 
not exist in any absolute sense. This point can be obscured by the way we often talk about 
uncertainty surrounding such and such a thing or the idea that we live in an uncertain world, 
as if uncertainty exists somewhere out there for us to discover. On the contrary, uncertainty is 
taken to be “a state of mind rather than a feature of the objective world” (Han et al., 2011, 
p.829). This is not to endorse the dualistic subject/object view implied by that statement, but 
rather to make the point that uncertainty is inextricably tied up with what it is to be human. This 
study regards uncertainty as a function of our uniquely human being-in-the-world (Heidegger, 
1996/1927). This requires that we see uncertainty in relational terms – in other words, not as 
existing out there in the world, nor as existing inside our heads as an “exclusively isolationist 
subjectivity” (Spinelli, 2015, p.16), but as emerging from our being-in-the-world-with-others 
(Cohn, 1997), which cannot be determined or controlled ahead of time since it implicates me 
but also extends beyond me and what is in my gift to control. 
 
Although the study allows that the uncertainty experienced by people living with cancer will be 
characterised by highly idiosyncratic elements unique to their particular circumstances, there 
is also an assumption that there exists a relatively stable and enduring meaning structure that 
underlies this uncertainty. In other words, notwithstanding individual differences between 
people living with cancer, there will be commonalities in the way they seek to make sense of 
their experience. These commonalities are the focus of this study’s investigation. 
 
2.1.2 Awareness of the knowledge deficit – knowing about not knowing 
While the section above was primarily concerned with questions of ontology, what follows 
focuses on the study’s epistemological position. This section describes the epistemological 
position being adopted in relation to the human capacity for metacognition, i.e. knowing that 
we know/don’t know. 
 
It is not the knowledge deficit itself but rather the awareness of the knowledge deficit that 
generates a sense of uncertainty, and it is the meaning structure of this knowing about not 
knowing that is the primary focus of the study. The following four categories of meta-
knowledge, drawn from the risk analysis literature (Daase & Kessler, 2007), are assumed: 
known knowns – things we know we know; known unknowns – things we know we do not 
know; unknown unknowns – things we do not know we do not know; and unknown knowns – 
“the knowledge we do not want to know” (p.412) and are motivated to turn away from. The 
latter three categories are relevant to this research in the following ways: there are many 
known unknowns in the cancer experience, often manifesting as uncertainty about the future; 
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and as people are introduced to a new biomedical discourse2 with talk of white blood cell 
counts, obscure anatomical structures, treatment side effects, etc., they may begin to feel 
uncertain about things they never even knew existed before; but as people living with cancer 
“pass from a relatively stable, taken-for-granted, pre-illness world to a reconstituted uncertain 
world” (Cohen, 1993, p.82), they may also become aware of things they previously preferred 
not to know and therefore kept out of awareness, such as the reality of life’s finitude. No 
assumption is made that people will always want to reduce the knowledge deficit, if doing so 
is perceived as a bigger threat than the uncertainty they are experiencing, e.g. in the case of 
a very poor prognosis (Mishel, 1988). 
 
The approach I have taken in this study is informed by literature that recognises both “cognitive 
and precognitive ways of knowing” (Penrod, 2007, p.662). It draws on the embodied 
phenomenology of Merleau-Ponty (1998/1962) in conceptualising knowledge/knowing as 
encompassing that which is intuitive, experiential and somatic as well as cognitive, rational 
and conceptual (Peile, 1998; Barbour, 2004). It is particularly important that a study focusing 
on cancer-related uncertainty be sensitive to embodied ways of knowing, since the cancer 
experience is somatic by definition. 
 
One of the key epistemological assumptions made in the study is that the uncertainty we 
experience is socially constructed (Babrow, Kasch & Ford, 1998). A moderate position is 
adopted such that uncertainty is conceptualised as being an indirect response to something 
real in the world, i.e. a response that is mediated through language, culture and social 
interaction (Willig, 1999, 2012). For example, a woman who detects a lump in her breast might 
initially experience an uncertainty that is mediated by what she already knows from external 
sources about the possible implications of such a lump; if she visits a GP, this interaction will 
shape the uncertainty she feels; and if she is diagnosed with breast cancer, she will use her 
interactions with the specialist medical team, family and friends as well as her own sense of 
agency and bodily knowledge to make sense of what is happening, and the uncertainty she 
experiences as a result. In doing so, she is assumed to be drawing on “socially available ways 
of talking about” (Willig, 2012, p.12) cancer and uncertainty, whether that be the oncologist’s 
                                                          
2 Throughout this thesis, the word ‘discourse’ does not imply any commitment to the analytic strategies 
associated with methodologies such as discursive psychology or Foucauldian discourse analysis. I use it in a 
looser sense to refer to “anything spoken or written (including stories of all kinds), talk, narrative, narrating, 
telling, conversation” (Mair, 2000, p.335), encompassing both the vocabularies associated with specific domains 
of knowledge and the philosophical assumptions that underpin them. For example, a biomedical discourse might 
conceptualise pain within a positivist scientific framework using the vocabulary of “tissue damage”, “sensory 
neurons”, “hyperalgesia”, etc., whereas a religious discourse might conceptualise it within a theological 
framework using the vocabulary of “suffering”, “mercy”, “redemption”, “a cross to bear”, etc. 
34 
 
estimate of the probability of treatment efficacy, the Western cultural conception of cancer as 
a battle to be won or lost, spiritual beliefs that might emphasise personal responsibility and 
divine determinism to differing degrees, or some other discourse for constructing uncertainty. 
 
In epistemological terms, this amounts to a social constructivist approach, which Crotty (1998) 
describes as “primarily an individualistic understanding of the constructionist position” (p.58). 
This is logically consistent with a critical realist position (Willig, 1999, 2016; Elder-Vass, 2012). 
It also fits well with an existential ontology in that it balances the role of the particular social 
and material context within which meaning making takes place (Braun & Clarke, 2006) – what 
in existential terms is labelled facticity (Spinelli, 2015) – with the fact that “each person 
perceives the world differently and actively creates their own meanings from events” (Burr, 
2015, p.21). In both cases, the notion of essential meaning is rejected in favour of an emphasis 
on the role of individual agency and choice in the meaning-making process. 
 
2.1.3 Knowledge about awareness of the knowledge deficit 
In seeking to generate a better understanding of the meaning structure of uncertainty for 
people in the context of health care, this study will draw on insights from extant literature as 
well as newly gathered empirical data from people living with cancer. The methodology chosen 
as most appropriate to the aims of the research is concept development, which has its origins 
in Wilson’s (1963) concept analysis and subsequent work by researchers in nursing (Rodgers 
& Knafl, 2000; Fitzpatrick & McCarthy, 2016; Walker & Avant, 2019). It encompasses a range 
of approaches, methods and techniques that aim “to distinguish between concepts, and thus 
to clarify the relationships and the distinguishing characteristics between concepts” 
(Fitzpatrick & McCarthy, p.3). If one accepts that concepts are “the basic building blocks of a 
theory” (Schwartz-Barcott & Kim, 2000, p.130), then concept development offers the potential 
for the generation of valuable new theoretical knowledge within the discipline of psychology, 
where concept development is not widely used or even known. 
 
In the next section, I will describe the concept development methodology in greater detail, 
addressing its epistemological implications, and the ways in which I adapted it for the specific 
purposes of this study. Before embarking on a full account of this methodology, however, I 
would first like to address a fundamental question, an answer to which is necessary in order 
to establish what kind of knowledge this research can hope to generate: what is a concept? 
In explicating the taxonomy that provides the theoretical framework for this research, Han et 
al. (2011) state that the taxonomy’s “categories and concepts, like those of existing 
taxonomies, are theoretical and have no definite grounding at an ontological level” (p.834). 
The authors do not explain exactly what they mean by this, but my interpretation of it is that 
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we should think of concepts in this context not as entities or essences, i.e. ontological, but 
rather as ways of looking at or understanding phenomena, i.e. epistemological. Wilson (1963) 
makes the point clearly when he writes: “We tend to think as if abstract nouns – particularly 
those which are connected with strong feelings on our part, like ‘justice’, ‘love’, ‘truth’, etc. – 
are the names of abstract or ideal objects: as if there were somewhere, in heaven if not on 
earth, things called ‘justice’, ‘love’, and ‘truth’.” (p.40) Put simply, existential uncertainty is not 
a thing. 
 
Philosophical perspectives on concepts have changed through history from the classical view 
associated with Aristotle, Descartes, Kant and Locke, which is based on an entity theory of 
concepts (i.e. they have an essence that is independent of their context), to the more 
pragmatic view of recent thinkers like Wittgenstein (in his later works) and Ryle, who 
emphasise the use of concepts – as Rodgers (2000) summarises:  
 
“[…] a concept for Ryle is an abstracted feature of the world and is directly related to the 
ability to perform certain tasks. One of these tasks, and a critical one, is the effective use 
of language. In his view, concepts are neither objects nor the names of objects; they are 
not inherently true or false, nor are they the components of creating truths or falsehoods. 
Instead, they constitute the ability to move effectively through the world. As a result, 
concept development, the clarification and elaboration of concepts, can be viewed as the 
creation of improved abilities and new ways to function effectively.” (p.25) 
 
The implication here is that the knowledge generated by this research should not be evaluated 
against some notional standard of truth or accuracy, but rather against the criterion of 
usefulness – in other words, is the conceptualisation of existential uncertainty that this 
research will produce useful in understanding the uncertainty experienced by people in the 
health care context? To the extent that it is possible, I have avoided the use of language that 
objectifies the concepts included in the Han et al. (2011) taxonomy. Therefore I have preferred 
to talk about prognostic uncertainty, diagnostic uncertainty, psycho-social uncertainty, 
existential uncertainty, etc. not as ‘types’ of uncertainty or ‘issues’ of uncertainty (the term 
favoured by Han et al.), since this implies that they are discrete, categorical and thing-like, but 
rather as ‘aspects’ of uncertainty, since this implies that they are ways of looking at the 
phenomenon of uncertainty that can be more or less useful. 
 
Finally, the approach to concepts taken in this research follows Toulmin (1972) in assuming 
that “the particular sets of concepts we pick up reflect forms of life and thought, understanding 
and expression current in our society” (p.38, emphasis added). The idea that concepts are a 
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reflection of our social world makes them contextually bound and therefore ever evolving 
(Rodgers, 2000) – a stance that is very much in keeping with an existential ontology (Spinelli, 
2015). An evolutionary approach to concept development “indicates a direction for further 
research and does not provide a definite conclusion” (Tofthagen & Fagerstrøm, 2010, p.22) – 
this means that the conceptualisation of existential uncertainty generated by this research 




For this study, I adapted the hybrid model of concept development (Schwartz-Barcott & Kim, 
2000) to fit the specific questions under investigation and the concerns of psychology as a 
discipline. The hybrid model is so named because it integrates insights from philosophy of 
science, sociology of theory construction and field research to combine analysis of a concept 
in existing theory with the collection and analysis of new empirical data. 
 
The hybrid model sets out three consecutive but overlapping and mutually influencing phases, 
which manifest in this study as follows: 
 
Phase 1 – concept analysis (existing literature) 
Phase 2 – analysis of new empirical data (interviews with people living with cancer) 
Phase 3 – synthesis of first two phases 
 
I will now proceed to outline each of these phases in greater detail. 
 
2.2.1 Phase 1 – concept analysis 
The first phase aimed to produce a rigorous, systematic definition of the concept of existential 
uncertainty using the technique of concept analysis (Walker & Avant, 2019). This technique 
involved eight steps: 
 
Step 1: Select a concept. 
Step 2: Determine purpose of the analysis. 
Step 3: Identify all uses of the concept that can be found. 3 
Step 4: Determine defining attributes. 
Step 5: Identify antecedents and consequences. 
                                                          
3 Steps 3 and 4 used the immersion/crystallisation technique set out by Borkan (1999), which was also used in 
the Phase 2 analysis and is described below at 2.2.2.3. 
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Step 6: Define empirical referents. 
Step 7: Identify model case. 
Step 8: Identify other cases (borderline, related, contrary). 
 
Phase 1 concluded by offering a tentative yet systematic definition of existential uncertainty, 
which drew on published academic literature from psychology, nursing, medicine, sociology 
and philosophy, but also on autobiography (for Step 7 and Step 8). 
 
Although Schwartz-Barcott and Kim (2000) recommend that Phase 1 be limited to “drafting an 
initial, very loose definition” (p.132), a systematic definition was justified in this case on two 
counts. Firstly, existential uncertainty is a highly specific concept in that it is assumed to be a 
constituent aspect of the superordinate category of what I will call ‘global’ uncertainty (i.e. all 
aspects of uncertainty), and therefore must be differentiated from other aspects of uncertainty. 
The problem with developing a loose definition is that in its looseness it may not be sufficiently 
differentiated from other aspects of uncertainty to serve the required purpose. Secondly, 
because a systematic definition of existential uncertainty is missing from the literature, it 
seemed reasonable that Phase 1 should offer one, even if it ended up being challenged by 
the empirical data gathered in Phase 2. Schwartz-Barcott and Kim argue quite reasonably that 
there is a danger of becoming attached to the Phase 1 definition if it is too fully developed, 
and Phase 2 then becomes more about validating this definition than “probing and 
questioning” (p.132) the nature of the concept. I therefore made a deliberate effort to analyse 
the empirical data gathered in Phase 2 with an open mind (see Epistemological reflexivity 
below at 2.5). 
 
As the presentation of the results of Steps 1 and 2 of the concept analysis technique requires 
some discussion of methodological issues, I will for the sake of clarity postpone further 
discussion of specific methodological considerations relating to the Phase 1 analysis until I 
present the results of this analysis – see Analysis 3.1.1 and 3.1.2. 
 
2.2.2 Phase 2 – analysis of interviews 
In the second phase, people living with cancer were invited to explore their experience of 
uncertainty in an interview lasting up to 90 minutes. The aim of this stage of the research was 
to gather rich accounts of cancer-related uncertainty that might yield insights into the meaning 
structure of uncertainty, including the nature of existential uncertainty and its relationship with 
other aspects of uncertainty in the cancer experience. The interview had two integrated 




i. Object elicitation exercise 
The interviews began with an object elicitation exercise (Willig, 2017): when I was 
screening participants, I invited them to prepare for the interview by identifying two 
objects that were linked in their mind with the uncertainty associated with their cancer 
experience and that they would be happy to talk about in the interview. The only 
guidance I gave them was as follows: ‘These objects can be anything at all and there 
are no right or wrong answers – so they can be anything from everyday objects like 
clothing and household items to documents, photographs and artwork. The most 
important thing is that you somehow associate the object with your uncertainty and are 
able to say something about that.’ 
 
This technique offers three advantages. Firstly, it gave participants time ahead of the 
interview to focus their mind on the meaning of uncertainty in their lives, about which it 
might have been difficult to formulate thoughts spontaneously. Secondly, introducing 
objects with personal meaning into the interview facilitates the concretising of an 
abstract concept, which may have made it easier for participants to talk about it 
(particularly in the early part of the interview). Finally, and arguably most importantly, 
engaging in an object elicitation exercise at the beginning of the interview allowed 
participants to frame the meaning that uncertainty has for them in their own terms 
before responding to my questions, which inevitably reflected my frame of reference. 
 
ii. Semi-structured interview 
Once we had explored the meaning associated with the objects (which lasted up to 30 
minutes), I began to ask participants a number of open questions that were designed 
to help them describe different aspects of their uncertainty experience. I tried to move 
as seamlessly as possible between the first and second components of the interview 
schedule, taking account of what we had just been discussing rather than sticking 
rigidly to the questions set out in the schedule. Throughout the interviews, I avoided 
specific terms from the Han et al. (2011) taxonomy such as ‘scientific uncertainty’ or 
‘existential uncertainty’, as although these may be helpful ways of conceptualising the 
meaning structure of uncertainty, they were unlikely to correspond to how participants 
thought of their own experience of uncertainty and therefore risked imposing a 
structure on their accounts at the data collection stage. 
 
There were three interlocking strands to the analysis of these interviews, which I will describe 





2.2.2.1 Transcription of interviews 
After I completed the interviews in July 2020, I transcribed them verbatim, spending a 
considerable amount of time listening and re-listening to them as a way of familiarising myself 
as intimately as possible with the data and allowing participants’ testimony to percolate in my 
mind. This strand overlaps with immersion/crystallisation (below). 
 
2.2.2.2 Coding and chunking of the data 
The theoretical position detailed above at 2.1 pointed firmly in the direction of a top-down 
approach to coding, and the development of “a preliminary code manual […] based on an 
initial conceptual model” (Crabtree & Miller, 1999, p.168) that would underpin the coding 
procedure. I decided to use the eight aspects of uncertainty specified by the Han et al. (2011) 
taxonomy’s second dimension as the basis for the manual since this is the dimension in which 
existential uncertainty is included, which is to say existential uncertainty is classified as an 
‘aspect’ of uncertainty rather than a ‘source’ of uncertainty (first dimension) or a ‘locus’ of 
uncertainty (third dimension). In other words, I decided to use the eight topics that people 
might be uncertain about as a way of organising the interview data before defining and 
delineating the concept of existential uncertainty. 
 
I expanded the eight aspects of uncertainty specified by the Han et al. (2011) taxonomy into 
the coding manual set out in Appendix 2 as a way of making explicit my approach to coding, 
and as a tool for determining practically what aspect of uncertainty might lie behind any given 
section of interview text. The aim of this was to ensure clarity and consistency across 
interviews. The third column in the table (‘operative question’) is a heuristic – if one accepts 
that uncertainty is always associated with a question, then it is useful to ask at any given point 
in the text: what is the implied question underlying the participant’s testimony at this point in 
the interview? The operative questions were helpful because the way they are expressed is 
closer to the lay terms in which participants are likely to describe their experience than the 
technical terms of the taxonomy. In other words, people are more likely to say ‘I didn’t know 
how much confidence I could have in my medical team’ than ‘I was experiencing uncertainty 
in relation to structures of care’. My intention here was to make it easier to identify the aspect 
of uncertainty implicated at different points in the interview. 
 
Once I had finalised the coding manual, I went through each of the six interviews and coded 
participants’ testimony according to the eight aspects of uncertainty contained therein – in 
other words, asking myself: at this point in the interview, is the participant talking about 
diagnostic uncertainty, prognostic uncertainty, psycho-social uncertainty, existential 
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uncertainty, etc.? In accordance with the procedure described by Crabtree and Miller (1999), 
once each of the interviews had been coded, all the text that had been coded for each of the 
individual aspects was chunked and gathered together in one place in preparation for the 
immersion/crystallisation stage of the analysis. 
 
2.2.2.3 Immersion/crystallisation 
Once the related segments of text had been chunked and gathered together, I used the 
immersion/crystallisation technique set out by Borkan (1999) to construct themes that 
reflected my interpretation of the segments as a whole. This approach involves “cycles 
whereby the analyst immerses him- or herself into and experiences the text, emerging after 
concerned reflection with intuitive crystallizations, until reportable interpretations are reached” 
(p.180). I also drew on the guiding principles of thematic analysis set out by Braun and Clarke 
(2006), which allow for a balancing of material ‘reality’ with the broader social context within 
which meaning making occurs. On a practical level, the approach suggested by Braun and 
Clarke is consistent with Borkan’s approach in describing a recursive (rather than linear) 
process, involving movement back and forth between phases. The themes generated by this 
analytic procedure were then used as the basis for defining attributes of the concepts in the 
taxonomy. 
 
2.2.3 Phase 3 – synthesis of concept analysis and analysis of interviews 
The third phase was the final analytic phase in which findings from the first two phases were 
synthesised to offer: (i) a more fully developed and refined set of defining attributes of 
existential uncertainty than the one proposed in Phase 1; (ii) a revised and expanded 
conceptualisation of existential uncertainty as compared with the one offered at the end of 
Phase 1; and (iii) an account of how existential uncertainty might be delineated from those 
aspects of uncertainty in the taxonomy with which it shares some conceptual terrain within the 






When it comes to the gathering of empirical data in the hybrid model of concept development, 
Schwartz-Barcott and Kim (2000) assert that a large number of cases is undesirable, and 
suggest doing an in-depth study of three to six individuals. I therefore chose to recruit six 




A relatively small number of participants is justified on the basis that this research is 
conceptual rather than phenomenological. The assumption underlying the research is that the 
meaning structure of uncertainty, of which the concept of existential uncertainty is a constituent 
aspect, is relatively stable, enduring and consistent across people (unlike the experience of 
existential uncertainty, which one would expect to vary considerably across people). 
According to Heidegger (1996/1927), human being-in-the-world is “distinguished by the fact 
that in its being this being is concerned about its very being” (p.10). On a conceptual level, the 
uncertainty implicated in this uniquely human being-in-the-world is assumed to transcend 
demographics or the specifics of any given situation. One would expect the experience, by 
contrast, to be very much tied to such specifics. Guest, Bunce and Johnson (2006) argue that 
“the more widely distributed a particular experience or domain of knowledge, the fewer the 
number of participants required to provide an understanding of the phenomenon of interest” 
(p.75). The domain of knowledge to which the concept of existential uncertainty belongs, i.e. 
the domain of knowledge concerned with what it means to exist as a human being, is assumed 
by definition to be distributed across all of humanity, so the testimony of six participants is 
likely to yield sufficient data to tell us something meaningful about the concept of existential 
uncertainty. Furthermore, there is evidence that six interviews are sufficient to generate 
meaningful themes in qualitative analysis (Morse, 1994). 
 
To be eligible for inclusion in the study, potential participants had to: (i) be in receipt of a cancer 
diagnosis within the last five years; (ii) be experiencing uncertainty; and (iii) be willing to 
explore that uncertainty in the context of a semi-structured interview. The capacity to reflect 
on the uncertainty of one’s own existence is an intrinsic human capacity, but this uncertainty 
is assumed to be particularly salient for (and therefore accessible to) people living with a life-
threatening illness like cancer. This is why the study targeted people living with cancer. The 
requirement for the diagnosis to be within the last five years was to ensure the experience of 
diagnosis, treatment, etc. would be relatively fresh in participants’ minds and therefore more 
easily accessible. There were no inclusion/exclusion criteria relating to type or stage of cancer 
because, as outlined above, the concept of existential uncertainty was assumed to be stable 
across such specifics. Anyone who fulfilled the criteria above was assumed to be aware of the 
fundamental uncertainty of human existence, and this ensured sample homogeneity.  
 
2.3.2 Recruitment 
Recruitment took place online via Twitter. I adopted a two-pronged strategy: firstly, I tweeted 
the recruitment poster (see Appendix 3) publicly from my personal account, and relied on my 
followers to share it; secondly, I sent a private message to a small number of people who 
tweet about cancer or who are involved in support initiatives for people living with cancer, and 
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asked them to share the poster with their followers. I used this as an opportunity to reach out 
to LGBT groups, which are underrepresented in psychological research (Pérez-Stable, 2016; 
Institute of Medicine, 2011). I believe it is important to incorporate the views of 
underrepresented groups into psychological research across the board, not just research that 
pertains specifically to an issue with which that group is closely associated. Therefore, even 
though this research is not explicitly concerned with sexuality or gender, I wanted it to be 
informed by LGBT voices (above and beyond my own), as well as the voices of the 
heterosexual majority. This is consistent with counselling psychology’s mission to give voice 
to underrepresented groups and to challenge normative assumptions (Woolfe, 2016). 
 
I had originally investigated the possibility of recruiting participants through the NHS. At the 
time of initial planning, I was working in a specialist cancer hospital and began to explore this 
with the relevant people at the trust. I decided ultimately not to pursue this route because the 
research sponsor at the trust wanted to make changes to the design of the study that would 
have altered the project in fundamental ways. I therefore decided to recruit participants 
independently. This worked out well for two reasons: firstly, the Covid-19 pandemic would 
have scuppered the plans to recruit through the NHS if I had continued down that route; and 
secondly, I believe the interviews I conducted would have been different if they had been 
carried out in a health service setting – participants may have focused more on the medical 
aspects of their uncertainty experience and may not have felt able to express themselves as 
freely if they perceived a connection between me and their medical team (Marks & Yardley, 
2004). 
 
I recruited participants and carried out the interviews in July 2020. I secured three participants 
through the first prong of the recruitment strategy and three through the second. Once 
prospective participants got in touch (either via Twitter or via e-mail), I arranged a time for a 
screening phone call. During the screening call, I gave prospective participants more detail on 
what would be involved if they chose to take part, and asked a series of questions designed 
to minimise the risk that participation would harm them in any way (see Appendix 4 for 
screening call protocol, and 2.4 Ethical considerations below). At the end of the screening call, 
I arranged a time for us to carry out the interview (since all participants fulfilled the criteria and 
were deemed unlikely to be harmed by participation). I then e-mailed them the participant 
information sheet (see Appendix 5) and the consent form (see Appendix 6), which I asked 
them to complete and return to me before the interview. 
 
All interviews were carried out via Zoom. This enabled me to reach people across a greater 
spread of geographical locations than would have been possible if I had carried out the 
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interviews in person. All participants were based in the UK (north of England, south-east of 
England and Wales) – see Table 1 for further details. 
 
Table 1: Details of participants in the study (with pseudonyms used to ensure anonymity) 
Name Age Gender Diagnosis Time since diagnosis 
‘Liz’ 62 Female Bilateral breast cancer 2 years 
‘Jane’ 59 Female Bladder cancer 7 weeks 
‘Eddie’ 64 Male Lung cancer 3 years 
‘Sam’ 32 Non-binary Chronic myeloid leukaemia 3.5 years 
‘Brian’ 61 Male Prostate cancer 2 years 
‘Jim’ 67 Male Prostate cancer 4 years 
 
Following the interview, I sent participants a debrief sheet (see Appendix 7) inviting them to 
get in touch with me or my supervisor if they had any questions, and signposting them to 
Macmillan Cancer Support or Maggie’s, if they felt at any point that they might need 
psychological support. In accordance with confidentiality requirements and data protection 




2.4 Ethical considerations 
The life-threatening nature of cancer and the uncertainty with which it is associated make the 
disease a suitable context for a study exploring the concept of existential uncertainty. However 
there are also important ethical questions raised by such a study. One of the assumptions 
underpinning this research is that uncertainty is socially constructed (see 2.1.2 above), so 
there was a possibility that the interview would itself generate an awareness of uncertainty in 
participants that did not exist previously (if unknown knowns and/or unknown unknowns were 
to become known unknowns). This could lead to harm if participants were left feeling uneasy 
or distressed after the interview. In accordance with the ethical guidelines set out by the British 
Psychological Society (2014), the wellbeing of participants took priority over all other 





Although it would not have been right to exclude any groups as a rule (e.g. people with a 
mental health diagnosis), thereby depriving those groups of the opportunity to contribute to 
psychological science and to have their stories heard, it was important to minimise the risk 
that the interview would lead to harm for any of the participants. The main purpose of the 
screening call was to make sure that potential participants were not already experiencing 
acute psychological distress, which might have put them at greater risk of harm from the 
interview itself. In such a case, I would have signposted them to appropriate support services, 
but in the event, none of the participants reported experiencing acute distress, and all six 
people who responded to the recruitment drive were deemed eligible to take part. 
 
If participants who had been deemed eligible on ethical grounds to take part in the research 
project were to become distressed during the interview and struggle to regain composure, I 
would have offered them the following options: (i) to stop the interview temporarily; (ii) to end 
the interview for that day but potentially rearrange for another day; or (iii) to withdraw from the 
study altogether. In all cases, I tried to ensure that participants were feeling stable before the 
meeting ended. I did this by inviting them to reflect a little on how the experience of the 
interview was for them, and helping them to reorient themselves to the world outside and the 
day ahead. Although some participants became emotional at times during the interview, 
nobody reported feeling distressed at the end – in fact, they all said it had been an interesting 
and positive experience. 
 
From an ethical point of view, it was necessary for me to be clear at all times that the purpose 
of the interview was to collect data for a research project rather than to provide therapeutic 
support. It was particularly important to clarify this given the similarities in format between the 
two, i.e. a one-to-one meeting in which someone is invited to reflect on their experiences. As 
I began recruitment, I was coming to the end of a clinical placement in a specialist cancer 
hospital, so there was the potential for a blurring of boundaries on my part as much as on the 
part of participants. In one way, my work at the hospital was a great benefit to the research, 
as I had just spent nine months having in-depth conversations with people about their cancer 
experiences, so was already comfortable with that situation and the emotions to which it can 
give rise. Nevertheless, I needed to find a way to distinguish clearly between my role as 
researcher and my role as therapist (Rowling, 1999). The fact that the interviews took place 
in a different location (my home) and in a different medium (videoconferencing) from my 
clinical work helped me to make this distinction. I also did a short mindfulness exercise before 
each interview as a way of signalling to myself that I was stepping into my researcher role. I 
also took some time after each interview to bring to awareness the emotional impact the 
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interview had on me as a way of managing this impact and not carrying it with me unawares 
for the rest of the day. I found many of the interviews moving, and they did stay with me in the 
following days and weeks, but I felt they did so in a productive way in the sense that they 
began to spark thoughts and connections that I brought to the analysis. 
 
Ethical approval was granted by the Psychology Research Ethics Committee at City, 
University of London – reference ETH1920-1358. 
 
 
2.5 Epistemological reflexivity 
Before giving an account of the results of the three phases of the analysis in the next chapter, 
I would like to conclude this chapter by reflecting on my engagement with some of the 
epistemological issues thrown up by Phase 2 of the research. Phase 2 was the most complex 
and demanding phase of this research since it involved the recruitment of participants, deep 
engagement with them during the interviews, transcription of the interviews and finally 
analysis. This required a lot from me, not just practically and intellectually, but also in terms of 
the emotional processing that went with having people share what are extremely personal and 
challenging experiences. I will now offer some thoughts on the issues and questions that arose 
during this phase, and how they might have shaped the outcome of the research. 
 
It is clearly the case that people living with cancer experience uncertainty irrespective of any 
researcher’s attempts to engage with it. However, it is also true that if uncertainty is socially 
constructed, as this research assumes it is, my interviews with participants (including the 
questions I asked and the rapport I established) will have shaped this uncertainty to some 
degree and, by extension, both the collection and analysis of the data. While this is not a 
problem per se insofar as a social constructivist approach rejects the notion of an objective 
truth, it is important to acknowledge the inevitability that my feelings and preconceived ideas 
will have foreclosed certain avenues of exploration at the data collection stage (i.e. through 
the questions I did not ask in the interviews), and will have made me less sensitive at the 
analysis stage to potential insights that would have been supported by the data I did end up 
gathering. For example, as described in the Introduction (see 1.4.1), when I first engaged with 
the existential uncertainty literature, I was frustrated that there was no proper definition of the 
term, but instead a wide range of sometimes inconsistent uses. My aim in this research was 
to impose a structure on the concept of existential uncertainty. Although this is surely a 
legitimate aim, there is a risk that my analytic strategy in Phase 2 could have amounted to a 
Procrustean attempt to fit participants’ testimony to a pre-determined structure (i.e. my own 
ideas, including the Phase 1 conceptualisation), thereby disregarding important aspects of 
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their accounts of uncertainty that would have relevance to the concept of existential 
uncertainty. This is a greater risk in a top-down conceptual study than in a phenomenological 
study where the primacy of participants’ experiences is baked into the methodological 
approach. 
 
This risk was amplified by the fact that the analysis operated at the level of latent meaning, 
allowing for the examination of “the underlying ideas, assumptions, and conceptualizations – 
and ideologies – that are theorized as shaping or informing the semantic content of the data” 
(Braun & Clarke, 2006, p.84). It was therefore interpretative in nature. Moreover it was a form 
of “suspicious interpretation” (Willig, 2013, p.42), grounded in existential theory and the 
literature around uncertainty in health care. This is appropriate to a critical realist approach, 
wherein “it is not necessary (in fact, we would not usually expect) that research participants 
be aware of the underlying mechanisms or conditions that inform their overt behaviours and 
experiences” (Willig, 2012, p.13). For example, there was no expectation that participants 
would use the term ‘existential uncertainty’ to describe any aspect of their experience, so it 
was up to me to decide what (if anything) in their accounts constituted ‘existential uncertainty’. 
There is an ethical question here given my position of power relative to participants – it was I 
who asked the questions and I who am now writing the thesis, so it was my responsibility to 
ensure that participants’ testimony was not obscured by my desire to produce a neat account 
of the meaning structure of uncertainty. 
 
It was to reduce the risk of participants’ testimony becoming a mere tool to validate the Han 
et al. (2011) taxonomy and/or the Phase 1 conceptualisation that I began the interviews with 
the object elicitation exercise, as described above. When it came to coding the interviews, I 
made an effort to maintain an awareness that the coding manual informed by the taxonomy 
was but one way of organising the data, and an inductive approach starting from the data 
rather than the taxonomy would constitute a different, equally valid approach to coding. 
Furthermore, when I became aware during the analysis of being more drawn to the accounts 
of some participants than others (because these accounts chimed with my pre-conceived 
ideas), I deliberately reoriented myself towards the accounts I was less drawn to on the basis 
that these arguably had greater potential to illuminate my blind spots than the testimony that 
chimed more obviously with me. During the immersion/crystallisation process, for example, I 
looked for elements within the data that did not seem to fit so neatly with the codes and/or my 
own theoretically-informed ideas, and tried to remain open to what they might indicate about 
the relevant concepts. This meant that although the coding was predominantly deductive, 
there was allowance made for the possibility of fresh insights derived from an inductive 




The primarily top-down analytic strategy outlined above is justified on the basis that the 
research is concerned with the concept of uncertainty rather than the experience of 
uncertainty, and is seeking to bridge the gap in the existing literature between theoretical and 
empirical accounts of uncertainty. This is not to say that I was uninterested in the way 
participants described their experience of uncertainty – on the contrary, I explicitly asked them 
to describe and elaborate on this. The point is that in conceptual research such as this, the 
experience is valuable insofar as it tells us something about the concept, and it was equally 
important to elicit participants’ attitudes to, thoughts about and theories on uncertainty, 
informed (as they will inevitably be) by their experiences. An analysis strategy embedded 
within a concept development framework is more appropriate to these aims than a 
phenomenological methodology that would illuminate aspects of experience but not concept, 
or grounded theory, which has the potential to yield a valuable fresh theoretical perspective, 
but would not bridge the gap between existing theories and empirical accounts in the literature. 
 
When it came to analysing the Phase 2 interviews, my assumption was that everything 
participants said in their interviews was relevant to uncertainty, even if this was not always 
explicit. This is, on the face of it, a reasonable assumption: participants volunteered to take 
part in a study investigating uncertainty in the cancer experience; they confirmed in a 
screening call that they had personal experience of cancer-related uncertainty and were 
prepared to talk about it; and in the interview itself they talked about two objects that they 
associated with their experience of uncertainty before answering my questions, the aim of 
which was to draw out their thoughts and feelings on uncertainty. On this basis, I felt it was 
legitimate to assume that everything they said in the interviews was somehow related to 
uncertainty. 
 
However, this relationship was not always immediately evident. The reason for this is that it is 
extremely difficult to talk directly about uncertainty for an extended period of time. This is 
because uncertainty is a meta-cognition that specifies a knowing-about-not-knowing. It is 
surely easier to talk about knowing something than not knowing something, and talking about 
not knowing something is inevitably going to involve talking around the thing that is not known. 
My assumption was that the stories participants chose to tell about their cancer experience in 
the context of an interview about uncertainty said something about the meanings they made 
out of their uncertainty experience, and therefore said something about uncertainty itself – it 
is easier to talk about how we cope with our not knowing, how we respond to our not knowing, 
how others respond to our not knowing, etc. than it is to talk about the not knowing itself, 
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which, as well as being highly conceptual, is elusive and fuzzy – like trying to describe the 
negative of a photograph. 
 
Of course it is possible that participants might have talked so far around the thing that is not 
known that they were no longer really talking about the not knowing, and the challenge in this 
analytic strategy was to decide where the boundary lay. There were two ways to err: to include 
sections of text in the analysis that are not actually about uncertainty; or to exclude sections 
of text from the analysis that are about uncertainty. In seeking to tread the line between these 
errors, I adopted an inclusive approach in the coding phase, i.e. assuming that everything said 
in the interview context was relevant to uncertainty, while also allowing for the later exclusion 
of some sections of text during the immersion/crystallisation phase if, once the segments 
across all the interviews relating to a particular aspect of uncertainty had been gathered 
together, the connection with uncertainty was deemed to be non-existent rather than just 
implicit. 
 
It is important to be clear about what the interviews could reasonably be expected to capture. 
The aim of the interviews was not to obtain for analysis an ‘accurate’ description or ‘objective’ 
account of the uncertainty the participants experienced at different points in their cancer 
experience. This would be impossible given the ephemeral nature of uncertainty, which – as 
with all human experiences – is not a fixed entity but rather part of the ever-changing flow of 
human existence (Spinelli, 2015). Instead, the interviews were a co-construction of the sense 
participants made of their uncertainty in respect of their cancer experience (past, present and 
future) at the time of the interview. There are two important points to make here: firstly, the co-
construction is inevitably tied to the time at which the interview took place, and a different co-
construction would have emerged if we had conducted the interview at a different time; 
secondly, the interviews are a co-construction between the participant and me, and a different 
co-construction would have emerged if someone other than me had conducted the interview. 
This is very much in keeping with the emphasis on contextual factors within evolutionary 




In this Methodology chapter, I began by setting out the theoretical position adopted in my 
research. In so doing, I justified my use of the Han et al. (2011) taxonomy as a framework for 
conceptualising existential uncertainty before identifying the three different types of knowledge 
implicated in the research: a knowledge deficit, an awareness of this knowledge deficit, and 
my conceptual construction of this awareness. I then proceeded to describe the three phases 
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of the hybrid model of concept development (Schwartz-Barcott & Kim, 2000), and the ways in 
which I adapted them to the specific requirements of this research project. I concluded by 
exploring some of the ethical and epistemological issues thrown up by this study, and how I 
tried to address and mitigate them. 
 






In this chapter, I will give a detailed account of the outcome of the three phases of the research 
described in outline in the last chapter. I will begin with the concept analysis of existential 
uncertainty, proceeding through each of the eight steps until I am in a position to propose a 
preliminary conceptualisation of existential uncertainty derived from the existing literature. I 
will then move on to the second phase of the research and my analysis of the interviews I 
carried out with six people living with cancer. I will consider what these interviews might tell us 
about the concept of existential uncertainty, and its relationship with other aspects of 
uncertainty in the cancer experience. In the third and final phase of the analysis, I will discuss 
how the insights of the first two phases might be integrated to offer a more nuanced and better 
delineated conceptualisation of existential uncertainty than the one proposed at the end of the 
first phase, informed by the empirical data gathered in the interviews as well as by the existing 
literature. 
 
3.1 Phase 1 – concept analysis 
 
3.1.1 Step 1: Concept selection 
The concept selected for analysis was existential uncertainty. On the basis of the preliminary 
literature search reported in the Introduction (see 1.4), I deemed existential uncertainty to be 
an immature concept (Penrod, 2001) in that it had never been systemically defined, 
delineated, or reliably operationalised; its use was not consistent across contexts; and it was 
not integrated with related concepts within any theoretical framework. If a concept is “still 
nebulous and has not been well explicated” (Morse, 1995, p.36), as with existential 
uncertainty, then methods of concept development are appropriate for the clarification of its 
attributes, its boundaries and its manifestations. 
 
3.1.2 Step 2: Purpose of the analysis 
My aim in the concept analysis was to establish a tentative but theoretically-informed 
conceptualisation of existential uncertainty within the context of the Han et al. (2011) taxonomy 
of varieties of health-related uncertainty. That is to say I wanted to develop an understanding 
of how existential uncertainty might be defined as distinct from other aspects of uncertainty 
specified in the taxonomy, not how it might be defined as distinct from other existential 
experiences (for instance existential certainty, existential distress, existential anxiety, etc.), or 
from any other reference point one might reasonably choose. I deliberately made the decision 
to use this taxonomy as a framework within which to conduct the analysis, notwithstanding the 
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limitations a predetermined framework might impose on the development of a relatively 
immature concept. The decision was justified on the following grounds: 
 
i. In calling for a “more deliberate, coordinated, integrated program of work” on 
uncertainty, Han et al. (2019) argue that the organic, piecemeal manner in which the 
research on uncertainty has evolved up to this point has generated “[a] plethora of 
disconnected – and either redundant or unnoticed – findings, concepts, and theories” 
(p.1757). The existing literature in which the concept of existential uncertainty is 
invoked supports this description, as evidenced in the preliminary literature search. I 
therefore felt that developing this concept in the context of an established and 
systematic research programme would constitute a greater contribution to this area of 
research than developing it outside of such a programme. 
 
ii. Rodgers (2000) argues that there is no absolute or universal truth when it comes to 
concepts – their value lies in their pragmatic utility within a given context. This is 
undoubtedly true in an applied discipline like counselling psychology, where concepts 
must have some clinical utility. In order for a concept to have clinical utility, it must be 
understood as part of a theoretical framework. The Han et al. (2011) taxonomy was 
chosen because it offers a clear and comprehensive account of health-related 
uncertainty, and because crucially it acknowledges the importance of existential 
uncertainty in the patient experience (where others do not). I felt that developing the 
concept of existential uncertainty in this context would be most likely to yield insights 
that can be applied in practice. 
 
iii. There are precedents for concept analysis that focuses on a specified framework. For 
example, Firth et al. (2015) conducted a concept analysis of healing within a care-
delivery framework known as ‘optimal healing environments’. 
 
 
3.1.2.1 Scope of source material 
Where there is a large body of literature on a given concept that contains detailed but confused 
or overlapping accounts, the primary purpose of an analysis might be to clarify or delineate 
the concept (Morse, 1995). In such cases, it may suffice to identify all uses of the concept as 
they exist within that body of literature, and to synthesise the common elements in a way that 
serves to clarify the concept or differentiate it from related concepts. For example, in their 
concept analysis of healing, Firth et al. (2015) state that healing is “a commonly used term”, 
but “understanding of the concept remains confusing and inexact” (p.44). They identify five 
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published concept analyses of healing, and only include in their analysis research that relates 
to healing in humans – “healing in relation to political relationships, conflict, the environment, 
and so forth were reviewed but not included in the analysis” (p.45). In other words, when there 
is much data on the concept of interest, it is legitimate and often necessary to limit the literature 
search to a specific context. 
 
However when the literature on a given concept is limited or impoverished in some way, it is 
necessary to go beyond simply identifying all existing uses of the concept and to seek possible 
uses of the concept too, supplementing empirical accounts of the concept with insights from 
theoretical research that, while not focused explicitly on the concept of interest, is relevant to 
the field of research to which the concept belongs. The justification for this is that a body of 
literature that is impoverished will necessarily yield an impoverished concept analysis. This is 
relevant to the case of existential uncertainty. Existential uncertainty is not a commonly used 
term in the way that healing or many other concepts subjected to analysis are. The preliminary 
literature search did not yield any published concept analysis, and the literature in which the 
term does feature is diffuse and inconsistent. This means that in order to develop the concept 
of existential uncertainty, it was necessary not simply to synthesise existing accounts as with 
more mature concepts in need of clarification or delineation, but to cast the net wider in terms 
of search strategy. 
 
As the preliminary literature search showed, surprisingly little attention has been paid in the 
existing research to what exactly we mean when we say uncertainty is existential. This is true 
of the uncertainty literature, but it is true too of the broader literature on existential concepts. 
For example, in a recent concept analysis of the existential experience of adults with advanced 
cancer, Tarbi and Meghani (2019) write: “To avoid perpetuating linguistic ambiguity, in this 
analysis ‘existential experience’ will encompass all of the existential needs, issues, concerns, 
and aspects of patient experience, including existential suffering and existential health.” 
(p.541) Ironically, while acknowledging the linguistic ambiguity that exists, they do not go on 
to specify exactly what makes an experience existential – curiously, the meaning of the word 
‘existential’ seems to be taken for granted. Given linguistic clarity is one of the determinants 
of concept maturity (Penrod, 2001), I felt it was important that this concept analysis address 
the persistent ambiguity around the word, and to propose some theoretical framework for its 
use. Thus, although the concept analysis was situated within the superordinate category of 
‘global’ uncertainty, I thought it necessary to extend the search strategy beyond the confines 
of the uncertainty literature to a body of literature that might help explicate the force of 




3.1.2.2 Search strategy 
There were three strands to the strategy that was used to identify the relevant literature. 
 
 Strand 1: existential uncertainty 
Searches were conducted in Academic Search Complete, CINAHL Complete, MEDLINE 
Complete, APA PsychInfo and Scopus using the terms (i) ‘existential uncertainty’, (ii) ‘personal 
uncertainty’ AND ‘existential’, and (iii) ‘existential doubt’ as keywords from the earliest possible 
date (1997) to the time of the search (July 2020). Search term (i) was chosen because 
existential uncertainty is the subject of the concept analysis; (ii) because existential uncertainty 
is classified in the Han et al. (2011) taxonomy under the subordinate category of ‘personal 
uncertainty’, so it was important to investigate whether there was relevant research on the 
concept of personal uncertainty that included an existential aspect; and (iii) because doubt 
and uncertainty are closely related in meaning (Concise Oxford Thesaurus, 1997), so it made 
sense to take into account the possibility of relevant literature about existential doubt. 
 
The chosen databases were selected to capture research from as broad a range of disciplines 
as possible, including: the social sciences, specifically psychology, sociology, anthropology 
and politics; medicine, nursing and allied health professions; and the humanities. Walker and 
Avant (2019) advocate this broad, interdisciplinary approach to concept analysis to guard 
against any bias that might emerge from a narrow focus on disciplines that may seem more 
immediately relevant to the concept (such as health-related disciplines in the current analysis). 
 
Following the removal of duplicates and results that were deemed not directly relevant to the 
concept analysis, there were 42 articles and book chapters. Results were removed according 
to the following criteria: (i) they were not available in English; (ii) they were from highly 
technical disciplines (e.g. geoscience, data mining, etc.) that were not relevant to human 
relations; and (iii) the focus of the article or book chapter was not uncertainty and contained 
only a passing mention of existential uncertainty without any attempt at definition – this was 
established by searching the document for the term ‘uncertainty’ to see how many times it was 
mentioned. 
 
The 42 articles and book chapters were read in their entirety and any research cited therein 
that had potential relevance was sourced and reviewed. A further 7 articles were identified in 
this manner. These 49 articles were then re-read carefully in order to extract key themes and 





 Strand 2: uncertainty theory 
Since the aim of this analysis was to explicate the concept of existential uncertainty in the 
context of ‘global’ uncertainty as a superordinate category, it was necessary to ensure that 
key insights from the theoretical literature on uncertainty more broadly were included in the 
analysis. Given that uncertainty pervades every aspect of human existence, the research 
literature on uncertainty is vast and spans multiple disciplines ranging from physics and 
engineering to medicine and psychology. The aim here was not to do a systematic review of 
all theories of uncertainty that may have relevance to the concept of existential uncertainty, 
but rather to take account of the theoretical underpinning of the Han et al. (2011) taxonomy 
and the research this taxonomy has spawned. This was justified for two reasons: 
 
i. The Han et al. (2011) taxonomy does not represent a radically different way of 
conceptualising uncertainty from pre-existing approaches, but rather seeks to integrate 
principles and insights from earlier approaches in a more comprehensive and 
systematic manner. Therefore the Han et al. paper, including the earlier models it 
references, is broad and inclusive in its conceptualisation of ‘global’ uncertainty as a 
category, and these qualities make it an appropriate springboard from which to begin 
a concept analysis. 
 
ii. The Han et al. (2011) taxonomy continues to generate considerable research and 
discussion around the nature of health-related uncertainty (see 2.1 Theoretical 
position). To ensure this concept analysis was informed by the ongoing research and 
discussion generated by the taxonomy, the titles and/or abstracts of articles and book 
chapters citing the taxonomy were reviewed to identify the literature most relevant to 
the current study. The review sought to identify health-related research that was 
theoretically oriented, specifically reviews and proposed models of uncertainty that are 
broadly applicable to the uncertainty experienced by people living with illness. Items 
were excluded if they were not related to health care, or if they focused on a specific 
aspect of, or situation in, health care that was not immediately relevant to the current 
study, e.g. the evolution of uncertainty in second opinions, the ethics of uncertainty in 




 Strand 3: existential theory 
Given the failure to locate any rigorous, theoretically-derived definition of the term ‘existential’ 
in the initial literature search, I deemed it necessary to venture further afield in order to develop 
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a deeper understanding of the meaning that might be carried by ‘existential’ in the concept of 
interest. This raised the question of where to turn in the search for such a meaning. I decided 
to turn to the field of existential therapy for possible insights into the meaning of the word and 
the relevance of its theoretical underpinnings to uncertainty in the health context. This was 
justified on the basis that a field of academic enquiry defined by a given word is likely to have 
a more fully developed sense of the meaning of that word than one that uses the word in a 
more incidental manner. There are two related fields to which the word existential belongs 
intrinsically: existential philosophy and existential therapy. Although existential philosophy 
emerged before existential therapy (Cooper, 2003), the latter is more aligned with the 
purposes of this concept analysis given that existential therapy is an applied discipline that 
shares many of the concerns and interests of counselling psychology (Spinelli, 2014). Given 
this is a counselling psychology research study, I decided to turn to the existential therapy 
literature. 
 
The chief difficulty in trying to glean insights from a field of inquiry as rich, varied and vast as 
existential therapy is deciding how to do so in a way that is practically manageable and 
theoretically coherent. The task is made more difficult by the fact that existential therapy itself 
seems to resist definition – as Cooper (2003) writes, “it is best understood as a rich tapestry 
of intersecting therapeutic practices, all of which orientate themselves around a shared 
concern: human lived existence” (p.1). I therefore decided to focus on one approach within 
the rich tapestry – the existential-phenomenological approach. This decision was taken on the 
following grounds: 
 
i. The existential-phenomenological approach is argued to be the “most philosophical of 
all existential approaches” (van Deurzen, 2019, p.130), and aligns itself closely with 
the movement of existential philosophy developed in Europe in the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries. By contrast, the existential-humanistic approach in the USA, for 
example, was heavily influenced by the philosophies of humanism and pragmatism, 
and incorporated the principles of existential philosophy in a diluted form (Cooper, 
2003; Cohn, 1997; van Deurzen-Smith, 1984). In this sense, the existential-
phenomenological approach strikes a balance between the principles of existentialism 
in their purely philosophical form and the application of these in a therapeutic context. 
 
ii. One of the hallmarks of the existential-phenomenological approach is, according to 
van Deurzen (2019), that it adopts “the philosophers’ habit of questioning definitions of 
concepts and of the assumptions that people carry with them” (p.128). Likewise, 
Cooper (2003) points to the approach’s rejection of diagnostic categories and 
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normative judgments of ‘healthy’ and ‘pathological’ functioning. This questioning and 
critical perspective is appropriate to a concept analysis, and is important in the context 
of uncertainty research, for instance in resisting the tendency to see uncertainty as 
pathological. 
 
I hoped that drawing on insights from a single approach to existential therapy would yield a 
consistency and coherence to the existentially oriented insights brought to bear on the concept 
analysis. It is important to state, however, that existential-phenomenological therapy is not 
narrow in its theoretical outlook, but rather encapsulates a diverse range of views (Cooper, 
2003). For this reason, it was deemed to have the potential to introduce valuable new ideas 
and insights into the analysis. The analysis drew primarily on the theoretical overviews of the 
approach as formulated by Cooper (2003) and Hayes and Adams (2019), as well as the 
particular theories expounded by three of the approach’s most influential theorist-practitioners 
(as identified in these overviews): Emmy van Deurzen, Hans Cohn and Ernesto Spinelli. As a 
detailed survey of the entire written output of these three existential therapists was beyond the 
scope of this analysis, emphasis was placed on the theories and ideas contained in what might 
be regarded as their manifesto works: Cohn (1997); van Deurzen (2012); and Spinelli (2015). 
 
3.1.3 Step 3: Uses of the concept 
I will begin this section by reviewing the existing conceptualisations of existential uncertainty 
in the literature captured by Strand 1 of the search strategy, and using Borkan’s (1999) 
immersion/crystallisation technique (see 2.2.2.3) to draw out the commonalities between 
conceptualisations. I will then proceed to consider how these conceptualisations, which are 
often informed by accounts of people’s lived experiences, relate to the more theoretically 
oriented literature captured by Strands 2 and 3. 
 
3.1.3.1 Existing uses of the concept 
Although the term ‘existential uncertainty’ is not often defined explicitly in the literature, some 
researchers do offer a definition, or – perhaps more accurately – some terms of reference. 
What follows is a distillation of the commonalities I discerned between these terms of reference 
across the literature. 
 
 Existential uncertainty is an awareness. 
Adamson (1997) and Brothers (2012a) describe existential uncertainty as an awareness, and 
the word also features in the conceptualisations of Karlsson et al. (2014), Parry (2003), Penrod 
(2007) and Warran, Fancourt and Perkins (2019). The word was even used by one of the 
participants in the Karlsson et al. study to describe her own experience of living in a palliative 
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phase of cancer: “I have a completely different awareness now.” (p.6) When it comes to 
identifying specifically what constitutes this awareness, there are a range of possibilities. 
When Hoffman (2009) refers to “the existential uncertainty that accompanies the realization 
that there are multiple good ways to be” (p.1043), his use of the word ‘realisation’ implies he 
is talking about an awareness that is conscious, cognitive and elaborated. Likewise, when 
Cohen (1993) writes that “thinking about the future seems to invite the threat of loss” and 
refers to “a normless world of ambiguous boundaries, unclear rules, probabilistic predictions, 
and sinister possibilities” (p.83), she too seems to be talking about a form of uncertainty that 
is available to conscious deliberation. 
 
This is not the case elsewhere in the literature. While acknowledging the importance of 
cognitive processing, Penrod (2007) points to the role of “precognitive sensations (e.g. a 
feeling in your gut that this is right)” (p.663) in the experience of existential uncertainty. She 
writes: 
 
“Uncertainty is possible only when evidence (cognitive and/or precognitive forms) 
permeates being to a level of awareness that prompts a tallying and conclusion of doubt 
or of not knowing that challenges the sense of confidence and/or control. This is why 
distraction and other forms of blocking of authentic being in the world (i.e. a state in which 
the precognitive and cognitive evidence are embraced into awareness rather than held 
away from being) are effective barriers to sensing uncertainty.” (p.661) 
 
Elsewhere she describes uncertainty as “not simply a set of probabilities, but a state of being” 
(Penrod, 2001, p.241), and argues that “states of uncertainty are uniquely determined by an 
individual’s perception of being in the world – while opportunities for uncertainty may abound, 
the state is highly individualized” (Penrod, 2002, p.60). This ties in to the idea of saliency – 
what is salient for one person will not necessarily be salient for another (Cohen, 1993; Kasper, 
Geiger, Freiberger & Schmidt, 2008). The idea that existential uncertainty cannot be reduced 
to a cognitive state, and may be more to do with an individual’s unique sense of being in the 
world, is reflected in the inclusion of ‘feeling’, ‘sensing’ and ‘emotion’ in many of the 
conceptualisations in the literature, e.g. Soroka (2007), Yair (2007), Karlsson et al. (2014), 
Sperry (2016). Van den Bos (2009) refers to personal uncertainty as “a hot-cognitive social 
psychological process […] [which] more often than not involves visceral and intuitive (instead 
of more reasoned and rationalistic) reactions” (p.198). He refers to both cognitive and affective 




The point here is that existential uncertainty seems to be conceptualised as an awareness 
that manifests at different levels, sometimes simultaneously. In their study exploring the 
experience of men living with cancer who were in a singing group, Warran, Fancourt and 
Perkins (2019) write that “participants described the choir as providing a distraction from 
thinking about death, in addition to an awareness of death in the rehearsal room which 
heightened the connection between choristers” (p.4). This suggests that members of the choir 
had an awareness of death while not thinking about death. 
 
I was conscious while carrying out this part of the analysis that the idea of existential 
uncertainty as an awareness chimed closely with my own preconceived sense of it as ‘a little 
turning of the stomach that occasionally intrudes on my day-to-day experience’ (see 
Introduction 1.3), i.e. an intrusion into awareness. While my preconception almost certainly 
made ‘awareness’ salient for me as I engaged with the literature, I also felt that it was a 
sufficiently prominent feature of the literature to warrant being highlighted as a key 
commonality between accounts. 
 
 Existential uncertainty is associated with a threat to survival. 
Explicit references to death and mortality are common in the literature reviewed, e.g. Cohen 
(1993), Gullick et al. (2017), Karlsson et al. (2014), Landau et al. (2010), Landau et al. (2012), 
Parry (2003), Pascal & Endacott (2010), Røysland & Friberg (2016), Røysland et al. (2016), 
van den Bos (2009), Warran, Fancourt & Perkins (2019), Wegleitner, Schuchter & Prieth 
(2018). However there is some variation in the extent to which different researchers conceive 
of death as being central to the concept of existential uncertainty. For some, such as Landau 
et al. (2010), the inevitability of death and the possibility of annihilation are the driving force 
behind all of life’s existential anxieties, threatening the idea that life is meaningful and 
significant. In a similar vein, Rubin (2018) conceptualises existential uncertainty narrowly as 
uncertainty about what happens after death. 
 
For other researchers, the emphasis of existential uncertainty is on living in the shadow of 
death – a nuance that is captured in the word ‘survival’, with its suggestion of threat (Abulof, 
2009; Brothers, 2009; Pascal & Endacott, 2010). This balancing of life and death is common 
to many conceptualisations, e.g. “unbearable doubt about one's going-on-being” (Brothers, 
2012b, p.392), “the uncertainty of […] how life will be before death” (Karlsson et al., 2014, p.2), 
“how do I lead my life after diagnosis?” (Pascal & Endacott, 2010, p.279). Seppola-Edvardsen, 
Andersen and Risør (2016) associate existential uncertainty with not knowing “how to take 
part in, enjoy, and fulfil a role in everyday social life” (p.368). For participants in the Belpame 
et al. (2019) study who had completed cancer treatment, existential uncertainty was less about 
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the risk of death from relapse and more about “having to repeat the entire cancer experience 
again: the intensive treatment, the pain and discomfort” (p.e33). 
 
 Existential uncertainty is concerned with temporality. 
Cohen (1993) writes of the families of sick children: “Suddenly, family relationships take on a 
temporal quality and thinking about the future seems to invite the threat of loss. Present time 
becomes discontinuous with past and future time.” (p. 83) This is mirrored by Gullick et al. 
(2017) when they say that “acute coronary syndrome disrupts lived temporality” (p.393), and 
by Penrod (2007) when she writes about “the shifting temporality of uncertainty. Uncertainty 
is a present-oriented state that is influenced by perceptions of the past and future.” (p.663) 
 
Outside of the health literature, Abulof (2009, p.229) is concerned with existential uncertainty 
at the level of the state, and contrasts Israeli Jews, who are uncertain about the future survival 
of their state, with French Canadians, who are uncertain about their ethnic identity: “The former 
asks: ‘do we have a future?’ – the latter: ‘do we have a past?’” The idea that existential 
uncertainty is tied up with past (Abulof, 2009), present (Penrod, 2007) and future time 
(Adamson, 1997) suggests a possible connection with identity and relationality. This 
connection is made explicitly by Seppola-Edvardsen et al. (2016), who report that participants 
in their study who had completed treatment for cancer “talked about striving to stay in their 
present, everyday life situations. Central to this was being able to maintain their roles in 
important relationships to family, friends and colleagues.” (p.380) 
 
 Existential uncertainty is experienced privately by the individual while also being intrinsically 
relational. 
The notion that the concept of existential uncertainty is relevant beyond the level of the 
individual emphasised by Adamson (1997) is supported by the conceptualisation offered in 
the psychoanalytic literature, which describes the relational aspect of the concept – in 
particular Hoffman’s (2009) invocation of the influence of culture, socio-political mind-set and 
personal values in the context of the analytic relationship, and Brothers’ (2012b) belief that 
“feeling that one is a welcome and familiar member of the human family goes a long way 
toward mitigating the anguish of what I have called ‘existential uncertainty’” (p.391). Even as 
Adamson writes of existential uncertainty as being “experienced privately by the individual 
patient” (p.134), he acknowledges that this experience takes place within the context of a 
“medical encounter” (ibid.), so even here there is a relational aspect. The relationality of 
existential uncertainty is also emphasised by Seppola-Edvardsen et al. (2016) – they suggest 
that “managing this form of existential uncertainty is inherently a social process and [people’s] 
considerations of whether or not to share worries are part of the everyday management of 
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social relationships” (p.367). This is echoed by Pascal and Endacott (2010), who refer to the 
“questioning of self, family and place in the social world” (p.279) that follows an existential 
crisis. 
 
In politics, economics and sociology, existential uncertainty is often conceptualised in 
collective terms. For example, in the context of political conflict, Hammack (2010) writes that 
young people “perceive the need to internalize a master narrative of collective identity that 
provides a sense of security and solidarity in the midst of existential uncertainty” (p.173). In 
economics, Kyriacou and Trivin (2020) argue that “individuals turn towards identifiable in-
groups to reduce uncertainty in social interaction” (p.26), which they equate with existential 
uncertainty. A similar conceptualisation is found in Kinnvall (2004), who writes that “one main 
response to [ontological] insecurity is to seek reaffirmation of one’s self identity by drawing 
closer to any collective that is perceived as being able to reduce insecurity and existential 
anxiety” (p.741). A sense of belonging is seen as a bulwark against the threat of exile or social 
exclusion, which some researchers (Soroka, 2007; Brothers, 2008, 2009; Tersbøl, 2006) have 
associated with existential uncertainty. 
 
 Existential uncertainty is about meaning, significance and sense-making, and is distinct 
from scientific, clinical or informational uncertainty. 
The issue of identity discussed above is intimately tied up with the issue of meaning which, for 
Han et al. (2011), is central to the concept of existential uncertainty: Landau et al. (2012) argue 
that people minimise their existential uncertainty by investing in a cultural worldview as a 
source of meaning in the face of mortality, while van den Bos (2009) argues that “persons or 
events that bolster one’s cultural worldviews provide the existential meaning one is looking for 
under conditions of personal uncertainty; an effect one could label as the existential 
uncertainty effect” (p.203). 
 
Miké (2000) asserts that “the question of meaning, the greatest mystery, is beyond the scope 
of science” (p.357), echoing the distinction made by Adamson (1997) between existential 
uncertainty and clinical uncertainty, which seems to parallel the distinction made by van den 
Bos (2009) between personal uncertainty and informational uncertainty. Adamson writes that 
within a scientific paradigm, the assumption is that “the source of the clinical uncertainty can, 
in principle, be solved” (p.135) in a way that existential uncertainty cannot. This is consistent 
with ideas expressed elsewhere in the literature: Furtak (2019) points to instances of 
existential uncertainty where “the kind of knowledge that we can gain does not remove the 
fundamental uncertainty of our predicament” (p.383), while Persson et al. (2012) suggest that 
information is of limited use (and can actually be unhelpful) in cases of existential uncertainty 
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because people cannot take it in. Cohen (1993) refers to the “countless unanswerable 
questions and fears” (p.84) experienced by the parents of a child diagnosed with cancer. 
 
What this research may be pointing to is the inadequacy of an exclusively medico-scientific 
discourse when it comes to existential uncertainty. Friberg and Öhlen (2007) refer to the 
limitations imposed by the “strict frames of the medical discourse” in the palliative cancer 
setting, and suggest that “another discourse has to be adopted which involves openness 
towards existential dimensions” (p.225). Similarly, Seppola-Edvardsen et al. (2016) 
emphasise “the symbolic and existential dimension of [uncertainty] – something that a risk 
discourse departing from clinical risk does not fully encompass” (p.368). There is a consensus 
that existential uncertainty is not a question of information per se. 
 
A number of alternatives to a scientific discourse are proposed in the literature. Friberg and 
Öhlen (2007) report that the subject of their case study who was receiving palliative care 
“reflectively explored the situations he went through and turned to literature in order to get an 
answer” (p.222). Miké (2000) suggests that “to come to terms with the uncertainty of meaning, 
the ethics of evidence counsels a look at all the evidence, and this includes the insights of 
religion” (p.358). The potential relevance of a religious discourse to existential uncertainty is 
also highlighted by Ahmed, Terrill and Sherry (2019), Mrdjenovich (2019) and Lewis and Bates 
(2013), who suggest that religiosity is “a source of existential certainty, generating a sense of 
agency and control” (p.399). Nature too is identified as a source of existential certainty – 
Karlsson et al. (2014) write of the participants in their study who were receiving palliative 
treatment following a cancer diagnosis that they “described different kinds of experiences with 
nature and related that in close proximity to nature they could find existential certainty in their 
existential uncertainty” (p.5). 
 
 Existential uncertainty is bound up with limitations and choice. 
Pascal and Endacott (2010) refer to existential angst as “a confrontation with the limitations of 
one’s own mortality” (p.279), which mirrors Furtak’s (2019) concern with the limitations of 
human existence. Furtak is more concerned with our persistent desire to be freed from “the 
cognitive limits that are a structural feature of the human condition” (p.383) than he is with the 
physical limits imposed by death. However the combination of physical limits and cognitive 
limits means both that choosing is necessary (which is to say we cannot physically choose 
every option that presents itself to our experience), and that we can’t know for sure when 
choosing that we are making the right choice. In discussing the meanings of existential 
uncertainty for people living with cancer, Karlsson et al. (2014) report that “existential 
uncertainty had raised the question of what was important in [participants’] individual lives and 
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promoted the insight that there is no point in wasting time on boring things – it was more 
important to choose things that were interesting and fun” (p.5, emphasis added). Penrod 
(2007) writes of “consciously choosing a path to meet a desired outcome” (p.663), and 
Hoffman (2009) refers to the choices one makes from the range of possible “ways to be” 
(p.1043). Ultimately, however, the necessity of choosing a way to be leads to uncertainty as 
to the right way to be. 
 
3.1.3.2 Theoretical insights 
Having established some of the commonalities between the various conceptualisations of 
existential uncertainty in the existing literature, I will now draw on insights from the more 
theoretically oriented literature to establish the extent of the concordance between these 
conceptualisations and established theory. I will begin by surveying some of the relevant 
principles underpinning the existential-phenomenological approach to therapy, before turning 
to the theoretical literature on uncertainty. 
 
What does it mean to say that something is ‘existential’? In spite of the frequency with which 
the word appears in the literature on existential uncertainty, scant attention is paid to its 
particular lexical properties. Even in the literature on existential therapy, Cohn (1997) bemoans 
“a rather imprecise and almost colloquial use of words like ‘existential’” (p.vi). I found this lack 
of precision both curious and frustrating – how can its meaning be so much taken for granted 
when it is so far from clear? For this reason, I decided to begin this analysis by considering 
the properties of the word itself. 
 
The basic definition of ‘existential’, according to the Oxford English Dictionary (2020), is: ‘of or 
relating to existence; involving or relating to the existence of a thing.’ The dictionary 
distinguishes between a general use, which is covered by this basic definition, and a more 
technical use, which is qualified in important ways: ‘of, relating to, or concerned with individual 
human existence, esp. as seen from the point of view of existentialism; of, relating to, or 
characteristic of existentialism; having, or prompted by, a keen awareness of individual 
freedom and responsibility.’ It would seem important to differentiate between the general use 
such as one sees in the phrase ‘existential threat’, referring straightforwardly to a threat to the 
existence of something, and the more technical and abstract use that is seen in a phrase like 
‘existential crisis’, referring to a crisis that is concerned with individual existence and that is 
prompted by the givens of human existence, including freedom and responsibility. 
 
For the purposes of this analysis, ‘existential uncertainty’ falls quite clearly into the technical 
category, concerned as it is with uncertainty relating to human existence. The implications of 
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this are important. It means that the concept being analysed here encapsulates not just 
uncertainty about one’s existence, but also uncertainty prompted by the particular nature of 
one’s existence: Heidegger’s being-in-the-world (Cohn, 1997; Cooper, 2003). In this sense, 
human existence is both the source and the object of existential uncertainty. In existential 
terms, there is no actual distinction between the two because they cannot be disentangled, 
and are perhaps more helpfully seen as two sides of the same coin – I am uncertain about my 
being-in-the-world due to the self-conscious nature of my being-in-the-world. 
 
It is possible to draw parallels between this conceptualisation of existential uncertainty and 
ways of thinking about human concerns presented in the literature on existential therapy. Cohn 
(1997), drawing on Heidegger, distinguishes between ontic issues, which relate to “the specific 
individual ways in which each of us is in the world” (p.3), and ontological issues, which are 
concerned with “those intrinsic aspects of Being which are ‘given’ and unescapable” (ibid.). 
The interrelationship between existence as the source of our uncertainty and existence as the 
object of our uncertainty is reflected in the interrelationship between the ontological and the 
ontic, bound up as they are with one another. In a similar vein, in trying to tease out what 
distinguishes existential therapy from other forms of therapy, Spinelli (2015) draws attention 
to the thematic emphasis of many existential thinkers in the field, which implies that existential 
therapy is therapy about certain thematic existence concerns such as death, meaning, choice, 
etc. Spinelli is critical of this approach as it fails to distinguish existential therapy in any 
meaningful way from other modalities that would claim equally to concern themselves with 
such fundamentally human concerns. He suggests that “it is necessary to step beyond – or 
beneath – thematic existence concerns themselves and instead highlight the existential 
‘grounding’ or foundational Principles from which they are being addressed” (p.10). In other 
words, just as ontic concerns must be addressed with ontological issues in mind, Spinelli 
argues that existential therapy needs to address existence concerns in a way that is 
intrinsically informed by the fundamental existential principles that set it apart from other 
therapeutic modalities. 
 
Spinelli (2015) posits three foundational principles of existential therapy, which follow one from 
the other. These are: existential relatedness, uncertainty and existential anxiety. In challenging 
the Western view of the individual self as separate and boundaried, he argues that “it is only 
via its prior grounding in relatedness that the self’s distinctive and unique sense of being 
becomes possible” (p.17). The fundamental nature of this relatedness gives rise to the 




“…our reflections upon existence, be they in general or having to do with ‘my own’ 
existence, can no longer be held solely by me or exist in some way exclusively ‘within’ 
me. Instead, relatedness exposes the many uncertainties that impinge upon every 
attempt at reflection. The Principle of uncertainty asserts that I can never fully determine 
with complete and final certainty or control not only what will present itself as stimulus to 
my experience, but also how I will experience and respond to stimuli.” (p.22) 
 
Existential anxiety follows from the first two principles in the form of a “generally felt experience 
of incompleteness and perpetual potentiality which is expressive of an inherent openness to 
the unknown possibilities of life experience” (p.29). These three foundational principles are 
reflected in some of the recurring themes in the literature on existential uncertainty reviewed 
above, in particular the emphasis on relationality and on the openness of the future. 
 
Another prominent feature of Spinelli’s (2015) theoretical framework that has parallels in the 
literature on existential uncertainty is the concept of the worldview. In existential-
phenomenological terms, Hayes and Adams (2019) describe worldview as “a synonym for 
both selfhood and meaning-creation. The worldview is the set of fundamental beliefs about 
self, others, and the world on which the individual seeks to base her life choices and actions.” 
(p.162) The worldview acts as a way of structuring “the flow of experience and the activity of 
the human being in living in her relational world” (ibid.), which is termed worlding. Worlding is 
a process, characterised by instability, ambiguity and chaos, whereas the worldview is a more 
substantial entity, characterised by stability, identity and order. Spinelli writes (p.61): “If 
worlding offers us the certainty of uncertainty and the worldview provides us with uncertain 
certainties, then, together, worlding and worldview elicit uncertain uncertainty.” 
 
These ideas are relevant to this concept analysis for two main reasons. Firstly, they chime 
with the literature that focuses on the relationship between worldview, identity and existential 
uncertainty, most notably the work of terror management theorists such as Landau et al. 
(2012, p.131), who write: “People normally minimize existential uncertainty by investing in their 
cultural worldview’s bases for viewing life as significant. However, people remain existentially 
uncertain to varying degrees because they can never be certain that the mainstream cultural 
worldview is absolutely true.” Although there are differences in the way terror management 
theorists and existential therapists conceptualise ‘worldview’, their conceptualisations share 
an understanding of the worldview as a way of containing and making sense of our being-in-




Secondly, Spinelli’s (2015) reference to “uncertain uncertainty” (p.61) points to the complexity 
of uncertainty as a phenomenon. He highlights the paradox that because uncertainty is so 
deeply embedded in the human experience, one cannot even be certain that something is 
uncertain – “there can only be uncertain certainties and uncertain uncertainties” (p.25). 
Spinelli’s rejection of the dualism that pervades Western thought is expressed in his call for 
mutually exclusive polarities – certainty vs uncertainty – to be replaced with “mutually 
influencing continuum polarities” (p.14) – certainty and uncertainty co-existing in unified if 
paradoxical interrelation. This is consistent with certain conceptualisations in the literature 
identified in Strand 1, such as Parry’s (2003) suggestion that “uncertainty and certainty might 
not be oppositional forces; instead, they might be dialectic, reflexive, and inextricably linked” 
(p.239). She argues that certainties can emerge from uncertainties, something that is 
supported by the Karlsson et al. (2014) study in which participants “related that in close 
proximity to nature they could find existential certainty in their existential uncertainty” (p.5). 
Nor should it be assumed that uncertainty is uniformly negative – as Hayes and Adams (2019) 
argue: “The unresolvable paradox of our situation is not a conclusion of defeatist passivity, but 
rather an acknowledgment that our impossible desire for certainty and solidity is the source of 
human activity and production, personal identity, and relationship.” (p.157) 
 
Perhaps the idea that we can experience certainty and uncertainty at the same time makes 
more sense when we take into account van Deurzen’s (2012) existential framework, which 
sets out the four domains of the ‘personal worldview’ – the physical, the social, the personal 
and the spiritual/philosophical. Drawing on this framework, Gulbrandsen et al. (2016) propose 
that in the health context, attention needs to be paid to uncertainty around bodily needs, sense 
of belonging, views about self, and meaning. In medicine, bodily needs are (understandably) 
prioritised and an “ideology of uncertainty reduction” prevails (Babrow & Kline, 2000, p.1805). 
The fundamental problem with this approach is “the assumption that the successful 
management of uncertainty – and the most valid indicator of this outcome – consists of 
knowledge or care processes related to the provision or acquisition of information alone” (Han 
et al., 2011, p.10). As discussed above, the literature on existential uncertainty suggests that 
this aspect of uncertainty is not informational. In other words, traditional conceptualisations of 
uncertainty as being either epistemic, i.e. due to deficient knowledge, or aleatory, i.e. due to 
the irreducible randomness of events, may not take into account the particular nature of 
existential uncertainty, concerned as it seems to be with meaning. While it may work to use a 
medico-scientific discourse to address bodily needs, this may not be sufficient to address the 
concerns captured by the other three domains in the van Deurzen framework, which are more 
focused on identity and meaning. This supports the literature that calls for the inclusion of 
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alternative discourses in addressing existential uncertainty, e.g. Friberg & Öhlen (2007), 
Seppola-Edvardsen et al. (2016). 
 
If existential uncertainty is not amenable to a medico-scientific discourse that is defined by the 
twin principles of knowledge generation and uncertainty reduction (Gordon, 2003), then the 
question is how one might better engage with the uncertainty relating to social, personal and 
spiritual domains. Before this question can begin to be answered, it is sensible to ask how 
uncertainties in the different domains are experienced. Earlier models of uncertainty such as 
Mishel’s (1988, 1990) uncertainty in illness theory regard uncertainty as a cognitive state that 
results from an inability to define or categorise an event or to predict an outcome accurately. 
This may not be problematic in the physical domain where events are easier to identify and 
isolate, e.g. a scan or test may generate uncertainty around diagnosis, prognosis or treatment 
options, but it is less clear that uncertainty in the social, personal and spiritual domains is 
always event related. This is particularly relevant to the case of existential uncertainty, if it is 
true – as argued above – that the source of existential uncertainty is human existence rather 
than a specific event. Hilton’s (1994) conceptualisation of uncertainty as “a cognitive 
perceptual state that ranges from a feeling of just less than surety to vagueness” (p.18) is 
broader than Mishel’s, and importantly opens up the possibility that uncertainty can manifest 
as a feeling and not just as a cognitive state. 
 
While there is no generally accepted, unifying theory that explains the relationship between 
uncertainty and affect, existing research has tended to focus on uncertainties that manifest 
within people’s conscious awareness. In a recent review of this research, Anderson, Carleton, 
Diefenbach and Han (2019) acknowledge that there are different levels of awareness, and 
that “awareness of ignorance may occur at a preconscious or unconscious level” (p.2). They 
cite psychophysiological evidence, for example, suggesting that people have somatic 
responses in situations such as gambling that are intrinsically uncertain, and while more 
research is needed, the principle that uncertainty can exist at different levels of awareness 
provides some theoretical basis for the empirical studies discussed above, most notably 
Penrod’s (2007) emphasis on precognitive sensations as well as cognitive evidence. 
 
Summary 
Step 3 of the analysis has shown that for the most part there is consistency in the literature in 
terms of the use of existential uncertainty as a concept – that is to say, there are not multiple 
conflicting uses of the concept. However, existing conceptualisations are vague and diffuse, 
with different researchers focusing on different dimensions of the concept, and no consensus 
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on where it begins and ends, or on where it might sensibly be situated in terms of adjacent 
and related concepts. This lack of specificity undermines its utility. 
 
3.1.4 Step 4: Defining attributes 
Step 3 above gave an account of the immersion part of the immersion/crystallisation process 
(Borkan, 1999), i.e. reading and re-reading the texts and drawing out the commonalities, while 
in Step 4 below I will report my interpretations, which are derived from the intuitive 
crystallisations to which Step 3 gave rise. Although Step 3 took a broad view of the possible 
uses and meanings of existential uncertainty as a concept, encompassing interdisciplinary 
insights from fields such as politics, economics and anthropology that are not directly related 
to health, Step 4 will focus on how these insights can help us to understand the concept as it 
relates to health, and more specifically the Han et al. (2011) taxonomy. The sources 
supporting the defining attributes are listed separately for each attribute in Appendix 9. 
 
According to the Phase 1 analysis, existential uncertainty is defined by the four attributes 
below, the first two of which are concerned with its focus, and the second two with its 
qualitative properties. Existential uncertainty involves: 
 
i. The undetermined but finite nature of one’s own being-in-the-world 
ii. Identity, meaning and choice 
iii. An awareness that is fundamental, ineradicable and always available 
iv. Manifestation at different levels of awareness 
 
i. The undetermined but finite nature of one’s own being-in-the-world 
Existential uncertainty encompasses an awareness of unknown unknowns and of unknown 
knowns (Daase & Kessler, 2007). The former involves an awareness that our future is open 
and unknowable (Spinelli, 2015). The latter involves an awareness that certain death awaits 
us, even if we prefer not always to embrace this awareness in our day-to-day living (Landau 
et al., 2010). 
 
The fact that our existence is undetermined (uncertain) but finite (certain) means that we live 
with a constant threat to the survival of our own particular being-in-the-world in the physical, 
social, personal and spiritual domains. Existential uncertainty is concerned with the question 
of how to live in the shadow of this threat. It is informed by perceptions of past and future time, 
but is oriented towards the choices we make in the present. It is therefore a much broader 
concept than uncertainty about physical death – existential uncertainty is really sparked by the 




ii. Identity, meaning and choice 
Our being-in-the-world is so profoundly relational in nature that existential uncertainty is not 
an uncertainty about the survival of an individual self set apart from the world, but rather an 
uncertainty bearing on the relational systems of which we are a part (Brothers, 2009; Spinelli, 
2015). This means that existential uncertainty is about psychological as well as physical 
survival. Although the vast majority of the health literature that concerns itself with existential 
uncertainty is focused on conditions closely associated with physical death (most notably 
cancer and chest pain), it is plausible to suggest that existential uncertainty features in other 
conditions such as dementia that may be more closely associated with psychological death in 
the form of death of the self (Blandin, 2016). The question is: what does it mean to live as me 
in the world? 
 
The question of how we fit into social systems (ranging from family to community to wider 
culture and society) is evident in discussions of identity in the literature on existential 
uncertainty. Our sense of individual or collective identity, and the worldview associated with it, 
help to give life meaning – when our identity or worldview is threatened by circumstances, we 
are reminded that “lurking just beneath the surface of our efforts to cling to whatever meaning 
and personal value we can is a deep-seated uncertainty stemming from the cognizance of the 
possibility that our lives are devoid of meaning” (Landau et al., 2010, p.198). Ultimately we 
must choose how to live our lives, and though we may be guided by a particular worldview, 
no worldview is absolute or unassailable. 
 
iii. An awareness that is fundamental, ineradicable and always available 
We experience existential uncertainty because of our being-in-the-world. It is fundamental to 
what it means to be a human being, and cannot be eradicated from the human experience. 
Penrod (2007) illustrates this by means of a distinction between situational uncertainty, which 
is specific to a particular event (e.g. a diagnostic test), and existential uncertainty, which is 
concerned with human existence per se. While existential uncertainty can be made salient by 
events, it is not created by them. A shock diagnosis or dire prognosis may lead to existential 
uncertainty, but such uncertainty is not conjured ex nihilo by the diagnosis or the prognosis – 
they merely bring to awareness something that was hitherto kept out of direct awareness: that 
our existence is undetermined and finite. 
 
Our worldview is constantly being challenged by our direct experience, but if the worldview is 
sufficiently flexible and “receptive to the challenges of life experiences” (Spinelli, 2015, p.75), 
then it is able to maintain a balance between its own certainties and the uncertainties of 
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everyday living. There are times, however, when our direct experience is so challenging to our 
worldview that it threatens to overwhelm it, and this is when existential uncertainty is 
experienced as “an abrupt discontinuity with the past and the anticipated future” (Cohen, 1993, 
p.80). 
 
Sometimes we cannot regain our prior equilibrium, and we must grapple with the implications 
of our new awareness: what does it mean to live with unanswerable questions? 
 
iv. Manifestation at different levels of awareness 
Whereas most aspects of uncertainty are conceptualised as conscious, cognitive phenomena 
(Anderson et al., 2019), existential uncertainty can manifest at different levels of awareness, 
ranging from bodily sensations (Penrod, 2007; van den Bos, 2009) to cognitive elaboration 
(Cohen, 1993; Hoffman, 2009). 
 
Other forms of uncertainty in the Han et al. (2011) taxonomy are centred on the disease 
(diagnosis, prognosis, causal explanations, treatment recommendations) or on health care 
systems (structures of care, processes of care) and therefore amenable to a medico-scientific 
discourse, but existential uncertainty is not ‘informational’ and may be more effectively 
addressed by drawing on a range of different discourses, from philosophy, religion and 
spirituality to art, literature and the natural world. This is reflected in the empirical literature 
where people living with cancer talk about having “a completely different awareness” (Karlsson 
et al., 2014, p.6), or being “interested in the other things, not the disease itself” (Friberg & 
Öhlen, 2007, p.220). This suggests that existential uncertainty is not about what people know 
as much as how they know it. As one person put it: “Other people know that they will die; the 
fact that we will die is the only thing we know, it's just that I know it in a different way.” (Karlsson 
et al., p.5) 
 
3.1.5 Step 5: Antecedents and consequences 
 
3.1.5.1 Antecedents 
The antecedents of existential uncertainty are those conditions that are necessary in order for 
a person to experience existential uncertainty. Ultimately the only condition necessary is 
human existence, but for the concept to have practical utility, it is important to specify in more 
concrete terms the circumstances under which it emerges. In the health context, it emerges 




 An event or experience that has the capability to make salient the undetermined but 
finite nature of individual human existence. This could take the form of unusual somatic 
sensations (Meranius & Engstrom, 2015; Røysland & Friberg, 2016) or the receipt of 
a diagnosis, test result or prognosis that carry a reminder of the vulnerability of human 
existence (Gulbrandsen et al., 2016). It is plausible to suggest that this would be 
particularly relevant to diagnoses such as cancer (Karlsson et al., 2014) or to 
experiences such as unexplained chest pain (Røysland & Friberg, 2016) that may carry 
with them the perceived threat of physical death. 
 
 The perception, conscious or subliminal, of a threat to one’s worldview (Landau et al., 
2010; Landau et al., 2012), including sense of identity (Karlsson et al., 2014). This may 
be relevant to diagnoses such as dementia that carry with them the threat of 
psychological death (Blandin, 2016), or diagnoses such as HIV that carry with them 
the threat of rejection and social alienation and therefore a threat to one's identity 
(Brashers, Neidig & Goldsmith, 2004). These suggestions are inevitably speculative 




The main consequence of existential uncertainty is anxiety, as argued by Spinelli (2015) and 
by Landau et al. (2012), who propose that “existential uncertainty – uncertainty about how, 
and whether it is possible to, achieve a significant life – is particularly threatening because 
certain belief in life’s significance serves as a shield against anxiety-arousing thoughts of 
death” (p132). 
 
Other consequences of existential uncertainty are: 
 
 A sense of vulnerability – Gulbrandsen et al. (2016) write that “the existential journey 
of becoming ill may typically start with a perception of uncertainty, and proceed with 
recognition of being vulnerable” (p1506), which is echoed by Sperry (2016), Røysland 
et al. (2016) and Belpame et al. (2019). 
 
 An attempt to incorporate the threatening event or experience into a recalibrated 
worldview (Spinelli, 2015). If successful, this attempt may lead to a new awareness or 
a fresh sense of meaning (Karlsson et al., 2014; Parry, 2003; Pascal & Endacott, 
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2010). If it is not successful, it may lead to disorganisation and despair (Cohen, 1993; 
Mishel, 1990; Grech & Marks, 2017). 
 
When considering the antecedents and consequences of existential uncertainty, it is 
necessary to offer two caveats. Firstly, because this is the first known concept analysis of 
existential uncertainty, the proposed antecedents and consequences are most tentative and 
provisional. Secondly, it is perhaps harder with existential uncertainty to pinpoint discrete 
antecedents and consequences than it is with concepts that have a more physical or 
behavioural (and therefore observable) dimension. For example, it is arguably clearer to see 
in the case of ‘healing’ that “brokenness” precedes it and “the realization of wholeness” follows 
it (Firth et al., 2015, p.47) than it is in the case of existential uncertainty to identify what goes 
before and what comes after. This is because existential uncertainty does not ‘take place’ – it 
is, as argued above, ineradicable and always available to our awareness. It is important 
therefore not to see the antecedents and consequences proposed above as a causal chain, 
but more as a description of circumstances in which existential uncertainty is likely to manifest 
as “an interweaving of thought, feeling and action” (Spinelli, 2015, p.66). 
 
 
3.1.6 Step 6: Empirical referents 
Walker and Avant (2019) describe empirical referents as “classes or categories of actual 
phenomena that by their existence or presence demonstrate the occurrence of the concept 
itself” (p.179). Although empirical referents can in some cases be the same as the defining 
attributes, when the concept and its defining attributes are abstract (as in the case of 
existential uncertainty), it is necessary to specify empirical referents that relate to the defining 
attributes so that the concept can be recognised. The purpose of identifying empirical referents 
is to detect the presence of the defining attributes, not to measure the concept. 
 
There are two possible ways of detecting the defining attributes of existential uncertainty. One 
is by asking a person who is thought to be experiencing uncertainty relevant questions using 
probes corresponding to the four defining attributes, e.g. 
 
- ‘How confident are you that you know what’s ahead of you?’ 
- ‘How do you see yourself in the future?’ 
- ‘What questions would you most like to know the answer to?’ 




If the person does not feel confident about their future, struggles to see themselves in that 
future, seeks answers to what are unanswerable questions and experiences the uncertainty 
somatically, then they are likely to be experiencing existential uncertainty. Due to the highly 
subjective nature of the defining attributes, concerned as they are with the unknown and 
meaning in life, these questions would be better suited to an interview setting than a 
questionnaire. 
 
A second way of detecting the presence of existential uncertainty in someone is by observing 
them in conversation with others, most obviously with their medical team (if they are under the 
care of a team). If they present in a way that tallies with the defining attributes, e.g. if they ask 
persistent questions about their treatment plan and prognosis, if they are dissatisfied with the 
answers they receive, and if they seem agitated, this may be because they are experiencing 
existential uncertainty which, as discussed above, is distinct from informational uncertainty – 
no amount of information the medical team can offer will assuage the existential uncertainty. 
 
These two approaches to specifying empirical referents are informed by Meize-Grochowski’s 
(1984) concept analysis of trust, and by Firth et al.’s (2015) concept analysis of healing. 
 
3.1.7 Step 7: Model case 
Cases in concept analysis are not case studies of individuals (as often in the psychological 
literature), but concrete examples of concepts that help to clarify what the concept of interest 
is (as in ‘model case’) and is not (as in ‘borderline case’, ‘related case’, ‘contrary case’). The 
cases outlined in the following sections are taken from one woman’s autobiographical account 
(in book form) of her cancer experience (Carr, 2004). Kate Carr was diagnosed with breast 
cancer in 1997 and died in 2004, two days before the publication of the book (Lott, 2004). The 
justification for choosing this book as the source for the cases in this analysis is that it provides 
an in-depth and nuanced account of the uncertainty associated with one person’s cancer 
experience, and the complex dynamics of that experience. The centrality of uncertainty to 
Kate’s experience is captured by the opening line of the book: “By the time you read this book, 
I may be dead. Or dying. On the other hand, I may be just fine. The thing is, you see, I don’t 
know for sure.” (p.1) 
 
Cases have no claim to representativeness, so there is no problem with the use of a single 
individual’s account of her unique experience. It is, in fact, plausible to suggest that case 
material sourced from outside of the scientific literature has the advantage of being less 
susceptible to demand characteristics than participant quotes used by researchers in the 
literature (which could equally provide cases for a concept analysis). The existence of Carr’s 
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(2004) book was brought to my attention by a citation in a concept analysis of cancer 
survivorship (Doyle, 2008). 
 
The model case is “a pure case of the concept, a paradigmatic example” (Walker & Avant, 
2019, p.174). The following passage from Carr (2004) describes an exchange she had with 
her oncologist when she had finished treatment. 
 
“'So what do I do now then?' I said 
'Sorry?' he said, worrying his stethoscope, the high priest in his all-knowing white coat, 
but with only the truth of uncertainty to offer a supplicant like me. No easy way out for 
him, no pat little tales of everlasting life. 
'What do I do now?' I said again. 
He looked at me, sort of. 'Well,' he said. 'We'll make an appointment for you to come 
back in three months.' 
'No. I mean, what do I do? 
He glanced out of the window. 'Do? You don't need to do anything.' 
'But what's going to happen to me?' 
He looked at me, carefully this time. 'I don't know.' 
'Am I going to be all right?' It was my turn to look away. 
'I don't know. You've had all the treatment, and now we just have to wait and see what 
happens.' 
I knew this already, of course. But I wanted a different answer. There were two other 
possible answers and I wanted to hear one of them now. I knew I wouldn't though – 
couldn't, the facts got in the way – and that I would spend the rest of my life preparing 
and waiting to hear the other.” (p.106) 
 
There is evidence in this short exchange of all of the defining attributes of existential 
uncertainty. Asking whether she was going to be all right shows an awareness of the 
undetermined nature of her being-in-the-world, while the reference to “the rest of my life” 
indicates an awareness of life’s finitude. Implicit in her desire to know what to “do” (asked and 
then repeated twice) is the idea that she has a choice as to what to do, but does not know how 
to choose because her worldview has been so undermined. This is supported by her reference 
elsewhere to the confusion she felt – “my every step dogged by nagging doubts about my life 
which, however much it looked the same, did not feel the same” (p.94) – suggesting a loss of 
meaning. Her desire to hear the doctor tell her something she knew he never could, because 
“the facts got in the way”, constitutes a painful acknowledgment of the ineradicable presence 
of existential uncertainty in her being-in-the-world. This also conveys the non-informational 
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quality of existential uncertainty – there was no answer the doctor could have given that would 
have satisfied Kate. She “knew this already”. 
 
The fact that Kate looked away from the doctor as she asked if she would be okay also 
suggests that the question was something other than a request for information – averting her 
gaze may indicate a felt sense within her that his answer was not going to dispel the 
uncertainty she was feeling. The fact that the uncertainty is captured here in the form of an 
exchange between Kate and her oncologist is consistent with the conceptualisation of 
existential uncertainty as an intrinsically relational concept focused on Kate’s own being-in-
the-world. 
 
3.1.8 Step 8: Other cases 
 
3.1.8.1 Borderline case 
A borderline case is one in which some or all of the defining attributes of the concept are 
present but which is also somehow different from the concept. The idea is that the 
inconsistency in the borderline case helps to clarify why the model case is not inconsistent. 
 
“The other suggestion the counsellor made was that I did not have to organise every last 
second of my family’s life during my hospital stay. I had been trying to do this with lists 
and plans. It was another way of pretending that I had control over my situation, but it 
was also a genuine worry. I was and am the organiser in our family. Simon has always 
done most of the cooking and food shopping, but I have always held that particular bigger 
picture in my head, organising the children, Kerry, Siony, the house, school, our finances, 
everything from clean sheets to nit remedies and new shoes. I would be out of action for 
at least a month. What would happen to my little family without me? I became obsessed 
with this, and behind this question always lurked the other question. What would happen 
to my little family if I died? My cancer was gradually and inexorably taking me away from 
my family, my absences becoming even longer, and the stem cell treatment was starting 
to feel like a practice run for my permanent absence.” (p.58-9) 
 
As I see it, this is a borderline case between existential uncertainty and psycho-social 
uncertainty, which is an adjacent concept in the Han et al. (2011) taxonomy. Kate is clearly 
aware of the threat to her survival, both physically and in terms of her identity as “the organiser 
in our family”. The uncertainty seems to be manifesting at different levels of awareness too, 
as she writes of one question lurking behind another. It is relational in the sense that it is 
concerned with the relationships in her life. The one defining attribute that is arguably missing 
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from this scenario is the ‘fundamental and ineradicable’ quality of existential uncertainty. In 
the earlier part of the excerpt, her uncertainties are practical and she deals with them with 
“lists and plans”. In this sense, they may veer more towards the practical uncertainty that 
characterises uncertainty around structures of care and processes of care within the Han et 
al. taxonomy. Furthermore the uncertainties are more focused on others than on her own 
being-in-the-world, which arguably makes them psycho-social rather than existential. 
However, in the latter part of the excerpt, as she considers her temporary absence as a trial 
run for her permanent absence, she may be describing existential uncertainty. What this case 
illustrates is the difficulty in drawing clear distinctions between different concepts within the 
taxonomy, an issue that will be addressed more fully in Phases 2 and 3 of the analysis. 
 
3.1.8.2 Related case 
A related case is one that does not contain all of the defining attributes of the concept in 
question, but that is somehow connected to it. I chose prognostic uncertainty here because it 
shares with existential uncertainty a concern with future possibilities – Christakis (1999) refers 
to prognostication as a “well calibrated best guess about the patient’s future”. In the following 
exchange between Kate and one of her doctors, she asks about the ability of ‘cancer diets’ 
such as the Gerson regimen to affect the course of the disease. 
 
“‘I have a lot of patients on these diets,’ he said. ‘They seem to find them helpful.’ 
‘Oh. So you think I should go on one of these diets?’ 
‘Do you want to?’ 
‘No.’ 
‘Well, don’t then.’ 
‘But if it would help…’ 
‘I said my patients find them helpful. I, personally, have never seen these diets have 
any effect on outcome.’ 
Outcome, that little word that stands in for survival.” (p.75) 
 
The final line in this excerpt encapsulates the difference between prognostic uncertainty and 
existential uncertainty – prognostic uncertainty is a form of scientific uncertainty concerned 
with the outcome of a disease and predicated on a conceptualisation of disease as “generic 
and generally independent of its expression in an individual” (Christakis, 1999, p.4), whereas 
existential uncertainty is a form of personal uncertainty concerned with the survival of a 
person. In time, the accuracy of a prognosis can be determined – Kate’s death in 2004 made 
it possible to judge the accuracy of whatever her prognosis was, eliminating the uncertainty. 
As Christakis puts it: “After the fact, a particular outcome may be observed, and we may speak 
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of a ‘realized prognosis’ – as when physicians say, ‘His prognosis was good, but he died 
anyway; the prognosis turned out to be bad’.” (p.20) As existential uncertainty is concerned 
with meaning, it does not make sense to consider its accuracy, and whatever existential 
uncertainty Kate experienced before death was not resolved as such on her death – she just 
ceased (presumably) to experience it. 
 
3.1.8.3 Contrary case 
A contrary case is a case that is relevant to the concept in question, but clearly not an example 
of that concept. Identifying a contrary case helps to delineate the boundaries of the concept 
of interest by highlighting what it is not. 
 
“After the scan, I was told to make an appointment with Mr Sinnett to get the results. 
I said I wanted them. Now. They said that wasn’t how it worked. I said I wasn’t leaving 
until I got them. The head of the unit came in and said the protocol was that Mr Sinnett 
would tell me the results. I said I knew he had looked at the scan, knew what was on 
it and I wanted the results.” (p.149-50) 
 
This is a straightforward case of epistemic uncertainty, corresponding most closely to 
diagnostic uncertainty in the Han et al. (2011) taxonomy – the fact that the results of the scan 
were knowable but unknown to Kate generated an uncertainty that could be eliminated by 
providing her with the results of the scan. Other aspects of uncertainty (including existential) 
may emerge following disclosure of the results of the scan, but at this point in time, the 
uncertainty seems to be purely informational. 
 
3.1.9 Conceptualisation 
Drawing on the eight steps of the concept analysis presented above, I developed the following 
(tentative but theoretically-informed) initial conceptualisation of existential uncertainty: 
 
Existential uncertainty is an awareness that my being-in-the-world is undetermined but 
finite. This entails living life in the shadow of an ever-present threat to my survival. I can 
mitigate the impact of this threat by choosing to develop an individual identity, align 
myself with a collective identity, and invest in a worldview that seems to imbue life with 
meaning. However existential uncertainty is fundamental to what it means to be human 
and therefore ineradicable. It is always available to my awareness, even if I may not 
always choose to embrace it within my awareness. Its manifestations can range from 
precognitive bodily sensations to full cognitive elaboration. It becomes salient at times of 
change or upheaval, and can be overwhelming when identities and worldviews are 
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threatened by challenging experiences. It is at times such as these that I am reminded 
of the possibility that life has no meaning, and of the impossibility of a final and complete 
answer to the question: how am I to live my life? 
 
While I was satisfied that this conceptualisation captured the defining attributes identified in 
the preceding analysis, I was also conscious of the possibility that my desire to impose order 
and structure on the concept might have led me to produce a definition that was too neat and 
didn’t take enough account of the complexity and multi-faceted nature of existential 
uncertainty. I had two responses to this. One was to remind myself that concepts are reductive 
by nature inasmuch as they are a way for us to simplify the dizzying complexity of experience 
in order to get a handle on it, whether in a concrete or a figurative sense. The second was to 
remind myself that this conceptualisation was a way of looking at existential uncertainty and 
was not making a claim to any ‘absolute truth’ (see Methodology 2.1.3). It was therefore open 
to challenge and revision, and I welcomed the opportunity that would be afforded by Phase 2 
of the research to do both of those things – to use participants’ accounts of their cancer-related 
uncertainty to challenge and revise this conceptualisation. 
 
 
3.2 Phase 2 – analysis of interviews 
Having established an initial conceptualisation of existential uncertainty in Phase 1 of the 
analysis, I will present in Phase 2 the results of the thematic analysis of six semi-structured 
interviews in which individuals living with cancer talked about the uncertainty related to their 
experience. I will focus first on my interpretation of what the interviews tell us about existential 
uncertainty itself, before turning my attention to the relationship between existential 
uncertainty and the other aspects of uncertainty in the Han et al. (2011) taxonomy. I will confine 
myself in this phase of the analysis to the interview data. Phase 3 of the analysis will address 
in greater depth how the interview data might be synthesised with the Phase 1 
conceptualisation and the literature on which it was based. 
 
Before setting out the results of the thematic analysis, I would like to begin by offering some 
reflections on the process of coding and chunking the interviews (Crabtree & Miller, 1999), 
and on the immersion/crystallisation process (Borkan, 1999) that happened concurrently – see 
Methodology section above for an explication of these processes. For clarity, I will use data 
drawn from one interview (the interview with Sam) to illustrate the points I am making, which 




3.2.1 Reflections on the analytic process 
The codes specified in the coding manual seemed to do an adequate job of covering the 
different aspects of uncertainty that the participants highlighted in their interviews. Each of the 
eight codes was used in the coding, although participants talked more about issues of personal 
uncertainty (existential, psycho-social) and practical uncertainty (processes of care, structures 
of care) than issues of scientific uncertainty. This is not unexpected given the suggestion that 
“[p]ractical and existential uncertainties […] may be more important to patients than 
uncertainties surrounding scientific information” (Han et al., 2011, p.833). Within the context 
of scientific uncertainty, participants seemed more concerned about uncertainty around 
treatment, diagnosis and prognosis than uncertainty around causal explanations. These 
impressions are supported by the table in Appendix 10, which lists the number of words 
corresponding to each of the eight codes once the chunking process was complete. 
 
It is interesting (if unsurprising) to note that aspects of uncertainty that are adjacent in the 
taxonomy were often adjacent in the coded interviews. For example, the section of coded 
interview reproduced in Appendix 11 shows Sam cycling between existential uncertainty and 
psycho-social uncertainty as they talked about cancer making them re-evaluate themselves 
(existential), then feeling like nobody is going to want to put up with the cancer in the dating 
context (psycho-social), then trying to figure out how the cancer intersects with their non-binary 
identity and their body (existential), then having to deal with other people’s perceptions of what 
a cancer patient should look like (psycho-social), before returning to the question of how the 
different aspects of their being fit together (existential). Coding a section like this is not 
straightforward, as although the taxonomy – categorical by nature – must draw clear lines 
between concepts, people’s experience of uncertainty is a much more fluid affair. This means 
that the coding manual is inevitably seeking to impose a neat structure on a phenomenon that 
is anything but neat. There are strong pragmatic reasons for developing such a structure (see 
Methodology section), but as this example shows, the boundaries between the concepts that 
make up this structure are not clear cut. 
 
The degree to which the concepts within the taxonomy are interwoven with one another is 
evident in the section of coded interview reproduced in Appendix 12, in which Sam moves 
swiftly between existential uncertainty, uncertainty around treatment, diagnostic uncertainty, 
uncertainty around causal explanations, uncertainty around structures of care and uncertainty 
around processes of care before returning to existential uncertainty. In spite of the fact that 
Sam is cycling rapidly through different aspects of uncertainty, there is a fluidity to this passage 
that acts as a reminder that although the taxonomy on which the coding manual is based 
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conceptualises ‘global’ uncertainty as encapsulating different aspects of uncertainty, this is 
not to suggest that uncertainty is fractured along these lines in people’s actual experience. In 
other words, there is no suggestion that people are in experiential terms actually switching 
between different aspects of uncertainty. 
 
It is important to emphasise that this coding strategy is not attempting to capture the 
experience of uncertainty (as one would expect if the research were phenomenological rather 
than conceptual), but rather the meaning structure of uncertainty. In other words, the aim of 
the coding strategy is not to explore how the participants experience uncertainty, but more 
how they makes sense of their uncertainty experience, and ultimately what this means for 
them. What the coding captures is the different aspects of uncertainty that they draw on in 
their attempts to make meaning of their cancer-related uncertainty. The conceptual rather than 
phenomenological nature of the research accounts for the inclusion in the analysis of transcript 
data that is not concerned with the direct experience of uncertainty. For example, at one point 
Sam says: 
 
‘I think in order to generate hope, you have to have a certain level of stability and comfort 
to daydream these positive things, and when you don't have that, your brain works very 
differently, like, you know, when you're in survival mode, that's all you can think about.’ 
 
Sam is not describing the experience of uncertainty here, but rather saying something about 
their understanding of existential uncertainty (presumably derived from their experience), 
which is concerned with the undetermined (‘generate hope’) but finite (‘survival mode’) nature 
of their being-in-the-world and the necessity of making meaning from this (‘daydream these 
positive things’). 
 
Nevertheless, the decision to include such passages (where uncertainty is not explicitly 
mentioned) in the coding and chunking phase required some deliberation. I adopted an 
inclusive strategy in the analytic process, in particular at the coding and chunking stage, with 
the following justifications in mind: 
 
 Given the assumption underpinning this research is that uncertainty pervades human 
existence at the most fundamental level (Spinelli, 2015), it is reasonable to argue that 
uncertainty can be discerned in almost every utterance participants made in their 





 While there are many passages in the interviews where participants were not speaking 
explicitly about uncertainty and where one could wonder whether they weren’t really 
just describing their experience of or thoughts about diagnosis, prognosis, treatment, 
etc. rather than their uncertainty in respect of these things, I believe that uncertainty 
was evident at a latent level. For example, Sam offered the following reflections on 
their approach to appointments: 
 
‘…in the beginning as well you're just a sponge, you just absorb all of these, eh, 
ideas and names of drugs and treatments and all this information around you 
from all these multiple doctors because you're seeing a lot of doctors at once 
and it's all very new, so you have to kind of just soak it all up and kind of process 
it later.’ 
 
 I coded this as processes of care, where the operative question is: what role do I 
play in my care? Although Sam was not explicitly saying ‘I felt uncertain about what 
role I needed to play in my care’, I would suggest that ‘it’s all very new’ points to a 
level of uncertainty – novelty and uncertainty go hand in hand, as when something 
is new, we must spend some time getting to know that thing, during which time we 
inevitably experience uncertainty; and secondly, ‘in the beginning’ implies a contrast 
with a later time, which suggests change, and change is invariably linked with 
uncertainty (Spinelli, 2015). 
 
 Instances where participants talked about certainty were still coded as uncertainty 
(usually with a minus symbol to denote a contrast) because statements of certainty are 
never absolute – they are always made in relation to uncertainty. As Spinelli (2015) 
writes: “there can only be uncertain certainties and uncertain uncertainties.” (p.25) For 
example, Sam talked about their early experience of cancer and ‘all these kind of 
morsels of that certainty idea’ – they referred to ‘a certainty that things would be okay 
in the end’, ‘that kind of dangling carrot of like this is where we're going to get to, almost 
everybody gets there, we're not worried about you, you're young, we caught it early’, 
etc. Although most of this passage is concerned with certainty, it is interwoven with 
expressions of uncertainty – ‘like in the back of my mind there was like well maybe not, 
you know, it's cancer’, ‘for it not to go down that suggested path has been tricky’. 
 
For these reasons, the vast majority of the interview transcripts were coded as some aspect 
of uncertainty. An advantage of such an inclusive approach is that it does not foreclose 
aspects of the participants’ meaning structure that might not be immediately obvious to me at 
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the coding stage. To excise sections of text prematurely would risk skewing the analysis in 
favour of my theoretical understanding of uncertainty at the expense of participants’ 
perspectives. Although remaining open to the potential value of sections of text that did not 
address uncertainty directly prolonged my own sense of uncertainty, I felt it was necessary 
from an ethical standpoint to remain open to meanings and connections that might emerge 
once the interviews had been chunked and coded sections had been gathered together. 
 
A disadvantage of a coding strategy that discerns uncertainty in almost every statement 
participants made is that uncertainty risks ending up as an undifferentiated and amorphous 
universal – if everything is an expression of uncertainty, then how meaningful or useful is it as 
a concept? The challenge for this research was to decide when the uncertainty that could be 
said to underpin a statement is useful for helping us to understand the meaning structure of 
uncertainty. The analytic strategy had two safeguards built into it to prevent uncertainty 
becoming an inconsequential universal: firstly, the taxonomy itself is predicated on the 
assumption that there are different aspects of uncertainty, and this ensures differentiation (as 
it’s not enough simply to identify ‘uncertainty’ – I had to decide which aspect of uncertainty is 
being invoked); secondly, although the coding stage of the analysis was characterised by a 
broad, inclusive approach, some sections of text were excluded at a later stage – once coded 
sections had been chunked and gathered together in one place – if the relevance to the 
particular aspect of uncertainty of which they were originally deemed a potential instance 
remained obscure to me when viewed in the context of other, clearer instances of that aspect. 
For example, I initially coded the following section of my interview with Sam as ‘processes of 
care’: 
 
‘…normally what they'll do is they'll do the blood tests and e-mail them to me so I get to 
see them before my next appointment because the system is very weird, I have to go in 
and get them done because they can only be done there, but they take a week to ten 
days to process, so I go in for an appointment, talk about whatever, but it's not really that 
useful because we don't have my bloods to look at, very strange, so luckily they always 
e-mail them to me.’ 
 
However, when I read this in the context of other sections of text coded ‘processes of care’, it 
was clear to me that although Sam was describing the process of having their blood checked, 
they were offering a factual account of the process itself and not revealing anything useful 





While the coding stage of the immersion/crystallisation process was concerned with identifying 
broadly what the participants were talking about, i.e. which of the different aspects of 
uncertainty they were talking about, the later stage was concerned with how they were talking 
about it, i.e. the different discourses (vocabularies and their associated conceptual 
frameworks) on which they drew when constructing and engaging with each aspect. It was 
important to consider the how as well as the what since the crystallisations would form the 
basis for the defining attributes of the different aspects of uncertainty, and these defining 
attributes needed to include how the different aspects were constructed and positioned by 
participants. In other words, it is of central relevance to the concept of existential uncertainty 
if participants talked about it in terms of ‘scientific ignorance’ or in terms of ‘a fundamental 
mystery’ or in terms of something else again. This type of analysis required a more 
interpretative approach, as I drew out what I saw as the commonalities and distinctions 
between the six participants’ accounts in a bid to develop a meaning structure that would be 
consistent with those accounts. The biggest challenge of this part of the analysis for me was 
balancing the “risks of either prematurely drawing conclusions or, conversely, being unable to 
reach closure, frozen in indecision as to what the data mean” (Borkan, 1999, p.191). As I read 
and re-read the chunked texts, I made notes in the margins of key words that seemed 
significant to me (see sample in Appendix 13), which I then gathered together and rationalised 
into themes. These themes became the attributes of the different aspects of uncertainty that I 
report below. 
 
The overall process was theory driven – deliberately and unavoidably so – in that it was 
structured by the aspects of uncertainty specified in the Han et al. (2011) taxonomy and 
influenced by the defining attributes proposed in Phase 1. However, I made a conscious effort 
not to use the interview data simply as a means to confirm the Phase 1 conceptualisation, but 
rather to look for and welcome data that might offer fresh and unexpected insights. As themes 
began to crystallise in my mind, I tried to remain open to dimensions of the data that did not 
fit so neatly with the existing literature and/or the Phase 1 conceptualisation. 
 
Having offered these reflections on the analytic process itself, I will now discuss the results of 
the analysis. I will begin by setting out the attributes of existential uncertainty yielded by the 
analysis, with quotes to substantiate them. I will then proceed to compare these attributes to 
the attributes of other aspects of uncertainty as a means of clarifying the concept of existential 
uncertainty. 
 
3.2.2 Existential uncertainty – attributes 




i. An undetermined future 
ii. Questions of control and agency 
iii. Identity and meaning 
iv. Living with the spectre of dying 
v. An intrusion into awareness 
vi. Embodiment 
 
What follows is a discussion of each of these attributes in turn, supported by quotes from 
participants’ interviews. 
 
i. An undetermined future 
The cancer seemed to bring home to participants that the future was unknown. Liz said of the 
uncertainty around her cancer: 
 
‘I suppose it makes you appreciate that you can't take how things are today, that that's 
how they're always going to be, and that's how you're always going to be able to 
behave…’ 
 
Jane, for whom music was an important part of family life, had a specific concern about the 
future: 
 
‘I've got a nine-month-old grandson, and, who loves to make music... noise... and my 
thoughts were wouldn't it be lovely to see if he developed and had those same sort of 
interests, so I think the uncertainty is I might not be here to see it, you know.’ 
 
This uncertainty seemed to challenge certain assumptions that she had previously held about 
her future: 
 
‘I think the difficulty accepting it is, is because of [my genetics and my family], I had 
assumed we would go into our seven… sixties, seventies, pretty healthy. That's not to 
say I won't be, you know, I feel fine, you know.’ 
 
The idea that cancer interferes with assumptions previously held is articulated by Sam too, 




‘…there's this kind of field of, eh, invincibility around you mentally cos you don't think 
you're going to get sick, no one thinks they're going to get sick, you know, nobody takes 
preventive medicine seriously, no one...’ 
 
Of their own situation, however, Sam said: 
 
‘…my questions are based in the idea of a timeline that you obviously can't access, like, 
where are we going to go? And, and I think maybe before all of the experiences I've had 
with my disease and treatment, I probably would have thought those kind of questions 
could be entertained.’ 
 
Here Sam seems to be pointing to an appreciation of the unknowability of the future that has 
come with the cancer. Jim put it in stark terms when he said: 
 
‘…life is uncertain, everything in life is uncertain, you never know, even with, eh, things, 
oh, that's a certainty, nothing is, nothing is one hundred per cent certain, apart from 
death, so there's everything that you do in life has got some form of uncertainty…’ 
 
ii. Questions of control and agency 
Many of the participants were preoccupied by questions of control and agency, both in terms 
of their cancer experience but also more generally in life. For example, Liz said of her cancer 
experience: 
 
‘I suppose what it's taught me that there are things that I'll never ever be able to control, 
things that might have a huge impact on me, that I'll never be able to control, and you 
just have to live with that, and find a way to live with it, really, however hard that might 
be.’ 
 
Jane too talked about her irritation at having been diagnosed with cancer in spite of the efforts 
she made to live a healthy life: 
 
‘…we have three alcohol-free days, you know, a week, all the things you should do, we 
exercise, we walk, you can only do what you can do, and it's almost, we've done 
everything we can do, but yet this has happened, and I think that's, that's the being 
annoyed thing, angry is probably too strong, irritated is more the..., how dare it, you know, 




Eddie seemed to take a more fatalistic stance when he said: 
 
‘…it's just destiny almost, innit. It's what's, what, what, what is, you know, down to happen 
to you, em, you've just got to live with it cos you can't change it.’ 
 
In a similar vein, Brian talked about the ‘bottomless dread’ he feels when he goes to receive 
the results of the regular blood test that measures the level of prostate-specific antigen (PSA) 
in his blood: 
 
‘…cos there's nothing, nothing, there's nothing I can do about it, I can't, there's nothing I 
can change in my life that would make it more likely that, that I'll have a good result or 
less likely I'll have a good result, it's completely out of my hands.’ 
 
The question of agency was also picked up by Jim when talking about his decision to have 
hormone treatment for his prostate cancer: 
 
‘I think because I went into it voluntarily, it was my decision to do it, it didn't mentally 
affect me say as bad as like the chemical castration of Alan Turing did, where his was 
forced upon him mentally, I suspect it really screwed his head because it wasn't his 
choice, with me it was my choice, I'd made a considered decision to do that, and it made 
it easier for me to deal with…’ 
 
iii. Identity and meaning 
Brian was grappling with the question of identity, specifically his identity as a man now that he 
no longer gets erections naturally following the treatment for prostate cancer: 
 
‘…that's sort of left me feeling with a sort of am I really still a man? It's a sort of weird 
thing, I hadn't, hadn't expected, em, so much of my sense of self to be attached to my 
penis, yeah? It's a sort of, it wasn't what I was expecting, I didn't, I didn't think, I didn't 
think I was that sort of man, yeah? But actually it's turned out to be a really big deal…’ 
 
For Jane, the cancer experience had implications for her sense of herself as a mother: 
 
‘…why can't I manage this? I think because I've got my boys worrying about me now, 




While Sam felt that ‘in some ways cancer makes you sort of re-evaluate who you are’, and 
that they had become a ‘very different person’ following their diagnosis, it was important for 
them to find meaning in their experience. They reported: 
 
‘…just thinking like, okay, well let's use the time and energy I have, let's use the privilege 
I have to open doors for other people, let's try and do something good out of this, and 
not in a sense of some kind of moral duty, but just, just some way that helps me process 
everything that's happened and make you feel like there's a point to it, there's a purpose, 
and not in some sense of grand design, but just, it would be, I think it would be a waste 
if I was to go through all of this bad stuff and just sit at home and feel bad for myself…’ 
 
Meanwhile for Jim, who had been living with his wife even though the marriage was over and 
he had come out as gay, the cancer experience helped to clarify what was important to him in 
life. He ended up moving out and embarking on a new relationship with a man: 
 
‘…the whole experience has really sort of helped me, em, organise my life, you know, a 
lot better. It's not that I don't get anxious about things still, but, em, you know, I do, I hope 
I deal with things, em, a lot better, you know, than eh, I used to.’ 
 
For some participants, this aspect of existential uncertainty seemed to extend beyond 
individual identity and meaning. Liz brought to the interview a photograph of herself at a march 
in protest at the Brexit referendum result as an object that was associated with her cancer-
related uncertainty. She became emotional as she explained that the day of this march was 
the first time in almost a year that she didn’t think about her cancer. In describing the day, she 
said: 
 
‘I've never seen as many people as that, you couldn't see the end behind you, and you 
couldn't see the end in front of you, so you were just in this huge, huge body of people. 
You knew ultimately where you were going, but you couldn't see the end either way – 
that was incredible to me, all of these people, and all probably thinking the same way as 
I think, you know, em, and all the support, and it was very peaceful and you made, em, 
you made friends with the people around you, you know, there were kids on the march, 
there were people with their dogs, em, and there were people with musical instruments 
and they were singing as they were going along, eh, and it was just, I loved it, I loved the 
day […] the feeling of being part of this thing, and maybe we will change something, 
maybe something will change – you know it hasn't changed, but you've just got that 




I understood the association Liz made between the day at the march and her cancer 
experience as one of contrast – that while the previous year had been characterised by 
existential uncertainty, she one day found herself on the march not experiencing this 
existential uncertainty. I interpreted the sense of belonging and common purpose evoked by 
the image of Liz ensconced in a crowd of like-minded people all heading in the same direction 
to indicate that questions of identity and meaning were part of the existential uncertainty she 
had experienced over the previous year. 
 
Liz’s mention of music and singing echoed the importance of music in Eddie’s account of his 
cancer experience too. One of the objects he brought to the interview was a music CD. For 
him, music and emotion were deeply bound up in his sense of uncertainty: 
 
‘I've realised since I was diagnosed with the cancer that, em, something has changed 
inside of me emotionally and, em, there's so many songs there, I just burst into tears 
when they come on, it don't matter where I am, it just sort of hits, hits a nerve. Em, I don't 
particularly feel particularly sad when it happens, I just feel very sentimental and 
emotional. And it could be daft, I mean, I'm a rock music lover, but it could be, it could 
be Vera Lynn or it could be, you know, Land of Hope and Glory or something like that, it 
could be anything, you know, a Disney song, and I found, I found that sort of weird.’ 
 
It is perhaps significant that, although he is a rock music lover, two of the examples he 
namechecks are Vera Lynn and Land of Hope and Glory which, for many, capture something 
of the quintessence of the British spirit in the twentieth century, and therefore reflect an aspect 
of the British national identity. These examples may point to an association between existential 
uncertainty and the feeling of connection with (or disconnection from) something transcendent, 
whether that be a political movement or a shared cultural heritage, and the meaning with which 
these are imbued. 
 
iv. Living with the spectre of dying 
Dying was an issue that most participants raised, and the impact this had on their day-to-day 
living. Eddie said that dying: 
 
‘…seems more, it seems more concrete, more definite, I suppose, still can't, still can't 
actually say how definite because we don't know when it will be, em, but I suppose before 
the diagnosis, it would have been a flippant remark, well everybody's got to die 
sometime, whereas now since the diagnosis, thinking about it, yeah, and it could happen 
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sooner rather than later, em, and that does, that is there's certainly an element of 
uncertainty that you get which influences the life-changing decisions that you make or 
even your life decisions.’ 
 
Brian was clear that his concern was about quality of life and the fear of prostate cancer 
returning and leaving him in ‘a more diminished state’, not about death per se: 
 
‘I'm not particularly bothered about being dead, if that makes sense, a bit difficult to 
describe to people who say yeah but you're alive, but if I was dead I wouldn't care about 
it, em, so, em, cos I'm an atheist, I don't, if you're dead, you're dead, that's it, I have no, 
no fear of it at all, em, but I wouldn't like an unpleasant, the act of dying I wouldn't like to 
be unpleasant, yeah?’ 
 
Sam talked about the effect of knowing ‘what is probably going to be 90 per cent chance will 
be the thing’ that kills them, and being reminded of this every day when they take their 
medication. For Sam: 
 
‘…cancer is almost, this is going to sound really dark but it's the only way I can think 
about it right now, but especially with my kind of chronic cancer, it's just like a waiting 
room to death, like, not that I see the whole experience as that, but like, you're constantly 
talking in an elongated construct that ends with the finite aspect of death, that's what 
cancer is…’ 
 
For Jim, the fact that we will all die someday seemed to offer a kind of solace, not just in terms 
of his own death, but the deaths of others too: 
 
‘…you know, life, you never get, you know, something you don't get out of alive, you 
know, you, everybody is going to die, and it, it helps me also deal with deaths in the 
family, when my parents died, when my son committed suicide, em, you know, death, 
death is all around us, you know, and, you know, you know you're going to die, why worry 
about it?’ 
 
v. An intrusion into awareness 
Participants talked about the intrusion of cancer into their awareness, both at the time of the 
diagnosis and in an ongoing way. Liz went to her GP after she found a lump in one of her 




‘…there was no inkling that I was ill, or there was anything wrong with me and this is just 
like a bolt out of the blue, and I've always been a really healthy person, but now I suppose 
it makes me think, ah, it can happen again, it's happened once, it maybe can happen 
again…’ 
 
The fact that she is not invincible ‘hit’ Jane when she was diagnosed, but the cancer continues 
to come to her awareness even now that she has been treated: 
 
‘And I think it's kind of hit me with this, em, you know, I'll be working away, and then I 
think, oh, I've got cancer, you know – it was me. And then I just carry on again, you know, 
it's that kind of intrusive thought, but it's just a minute, you know what I mean…’ 
 
Brian talked about the fact that when he sees someone attractive in the street now, he 
immediately has the thought that they are off limits to him because of the erectile dysfunction 
he has experienced since the treatment. He said: 
 
‘…the emotions hit me, and that, that just stays there, that, ‘til it, ‘til it sort of wears off 
[…] it's emotion of loss, em, yeah? And em, eh, being, being less than, less than I was, 
yeah? Yeah. So it's quite odd.’ 
 
Eddie talked about the feeling that emerges when he’s listening to music as coming ‘out of the 
blue […] it just sort of hits, hits a nerve’. Later in the interview, he said: 
 
‘I don't think about cancer very often, so I almost forget I've got it and it's only when I 
realise that other people [in the support group] have had a bit of bad news on their visits 
and then it's had the change or even worse, you know, it's got worse and they can't 
offer anything anymore, it comes home as a, if you like, a warning sign to say, well look, 
just remember, you have got this.’ 
 
vi. Embodiment 
Liz described breast cancer as ‘quite a disfiguring thing, all about your body image anyway’. 
She seemed surprised by her response to the loss of her hair and the doubts she had around 
whether it would grow back to how it was before the treatment. She said: 
 
‘…I always thought that I would cope okay with being bald, but honestly for me that was 
the worst bit of it, that was the worst bit of the whole experience really, em, I kept a turban 




She also described feeling a physical pain in the week between having biopsies done on her 
breasts and lymph nodes, and receiving the results: 
 
‘…so that's when the uncertainty started, and I did get my results, it was just under a 
week, and that week I got such physical pain, em, like I've never had. I got pain under 
my ribs, like in my liver, I got pain in my head, very, very physical pain…’ 
 
Once she received the results of the biopsies and was assured that her cancer was treatable, 
she said ‘it was like this huge weight went from me’, and she never experienced the pain 
again. She wonders now whether the pain was a manifestation of her stress and anxiety. 
 
For Sam too, weight is a defining quality of the bodily experience associated with ‘larger scope 
questions of, you know, am I going to be alright’. They said: 
 
‘…it just feels like a weight on your shoulders, you know, it just feels like, I guess a really 
weird parallel to make would be like sometimes I'm just sat there in bed and I think about 
it or I'm trying to go to bed and I'm trying to think about it, it would feel like I assume – 
I've never been under one – but what those weighted blankets are like, you know, just 
that whole idea of just your whole body and you just lose this energy and you just have 
this kind of weight on top of you of like [sigh], where are we going, what are we doing, 
you know.’ 
 
When asked whether they could locate feelings of uncertainty in their body, participants often 
referenced the stomach. Liz talked about ‘that sinking feeling in your tummy’, Sam said ‘you 
kind of feel like the pit of your stomach kind of go’, while Brian also referred to that ‘pit-in-the-
stomach feeling’ he would get when he was weighing up the effects that the different treatment 
options would have on his life – he described it as ‘hollow, empty and leaden’. 
 
The fact that Brian’s ‘pit-in-the-stomach feeling’ was associated with the choice he had to 
make among treatment options raises a key question for this research: what distinguishes 
existential uncertainty from other aspects of uncertainty, such as uncertainty about treatment? 
I will address this question in the next section by exploring some of the themes that I drew 
from passages coded as other aspects of uncertainty and suggesting how these might help to 





3.2.3 Existential uncertainty – relationship with other aspects of uncertainty 
As space precludes a full exploration of all the different aspects of uncertainty in the taxonomy 
and their associated themes (see Appendix 14), I will focus in this section on what in Phase 1 
I called borderline cases – in other words, cases in which some of the attributes of existential 
uncertainty are present but which are also somehow different from existential uncertainty. My 
reason for this is that borderline cases are more likely to yield insights into the borders between 
existential uncertainty and other aspects of uncertainty than unambiguous cases of other 
aspects of uncertainty. 
 
I will focus specifically on prognostic uncertainty and psycho-social uncertainty since these 
are arguably the two aspects of uncertainty that overlap most with existential uncertainty (see 
Step 8 of Phase 1), explicitly concerned as they are with the future course of the disease and 
with relationships respectively. However, I will begin by offering some reflections on treatment 
uncertainty, as I think this suggests an important distinction between existential uncertainty 
and other aspects of uncertainty in the taxonomy. 
 
3.2.3.1 Existential uncertainty vs treatment uncertainty  
I coded the passage in which Brian talked about the ‘pit-in-the-stomach feeling’ as both 
treatment uncertainty and existential uncertainty. I coded it as treatment uncertainty because 
the feeling was associated with the decision he had to make as to whether to have surgery or 
radiotherapy to treat the prostate cancer. However, it was not a straightforward matter of 
scientific uncertainty, as the following account of his interactions with his care team illustrates: 
 
‘So, well, you're, you're the radiologist and the surgeon, why don't you know the right 
answer to this, surely? No, no, we can't tell you, you have to decide for yourself, we can't 
advise you on what your treatment should be, eh, cos they've both got different side 
effects and we don't know what's important for you, em.’ 
 
It seemed likely to me that the ‘pit-in-the-stomach feeling’ was associated with Brian’s need to 
reflect on what was important for him, i.e. the meaning of life, rather than uncertainty around 
the treatment itself. The radiologist and surgeon could reduce any uncertainty Brian had about 
side effects of treatment, for instance, by providing him with facts and data, but they couldn’t 
tell him what it would mean for him if he were to experience these side effects. 
 
Side-effects and quality of life were aspects of the treatment that many participants spoke 
about. I would argue that these issues border on existential uncertainty insofar as they touch 
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on the question of what makes life worth living. For example, Eddie described his thinking 
around tablets he was taking for his lung cancer: 
 
‘…one of the side effects for these tablets was chronic, em, diarrhoea and it knocked me 
confidence cos I couldn't go out for fear of having an accident while I was out sort of thing 
and it took away me taste buds and me sense of smell, and I'm thinking to myself at the 
time, probably be, into me mind-set at that time, well is life really worth living anyway if 
it's going to be like this all the time?’ 
 
Jim also found himself questioning what was important in life when he had to choose between 
radiotherapy and hormone therapy for his prostate cancer: 
 
‘…when I first said well I'll do the radiotherapy, I'd read what the side effects were, em, 
and the long-term sort of effects, and I'd read what the side effects were of the hormone 
treatment, what the long-term effects were for that, em, my heart, em, was saying well 
you want a sex life, em, and that, just go for the radiotherapy, the side effects are less 
effective, you know, not going to be as, em, bad for your sex life as the hormone 
treatments are, but then when the head kicks in, em, then it was a case of yes, but there's 
more to life than sex…’ 
 
As these quotes show, there is a close connection between treatment uncertainty (especially 
around side effects) and existential uncertainty – what do the (potential) side effects mean for 
the kind of life one wants to lead? As ever, it does not make sense to draw too sharp a 
distinction between the two aspects of uncertainty, but I would argue that treatment uncertainty 
might involve uncertainty about side-effects and the likelihood of their occurrence (and is 
therefore amenable to an informational intervention), whereas existential uncertainty involves 
questions about what these side-effects would mean for the kind of life the person wants to 
lead (which is a deeply personal matter and therefore not a question that medical professionals 
can answer, as Brian experienced above). 
 
I would suggest that one way of distinguishing between existential uncertainty and the aspects 
of uncertainty classified as scientific is that the former is concerned with meaning while the 
latter are concerned with information. The informational quality of scientific uncertainty was 
evident not just in treatment uncertainty, but in uncertainty around diagnosis, prognosis and 
causal explanations too. For example, Jane told me how she wanted to speak to her 




‘I have some more questions cos mine was a mixed tumour, so it was low grade with a 
focal point of high, and they told me that's fine we're just casting it as low grade and the 
more I've thought about it, the more I've got questions which the nurse couldn't answer. 
Being a pharmacist myself, I can read the papers and understand them, and I know it's 
subjective, so I just have some questions, em, not necessarily a second opinion, just 
have some questions, so all of that I feel is uncertain.’ 
 
It is reasonable to imagine that Jane’s consultant could give her information as to why the 
cancer was cast as low grade, which would have reduced that aspect of her uncertainty. This 
was not a question of meaning for Jane. 
 
3.2.3.2 Existential uncertainty vs prognostic uncertainty 
Prognostic uncertainty is related to treatment uncertainty inasmuch as prognosis describes 
the course of a disease, which treatment is intended to influence. I drew three themes from 
interview passages coded as prognostic uncertainty. 
 
(i) Time and death 
For many participants, prognosis was tied up with notions of time and death. When Liz thought 
she had secondary breast cancer, the question on her mind was how long it would take her to 
die. Jane talked about ‘seeing it was a lump and thinking the worst, and I was going to be 
dead in five years’. Sam expressed doubt that they would still be alive in ten years: 
 
‘I don't really think I'm going to make it into my forties, I'd like to, I'm 32 now, but, you 
know, I've gone through treatment after treatment after treatment, we're running out of 
treatments, the longer that it is detectable in your blood, the more likely there's a mutation 
which is treatment resistant…’ 
 
Brian referred to his regular PSA tests as ‘that sort of sword of Damocles’ that makes him 
wonder how many years he has left, while Jim remembered asking his doctor ‘a very simple 
question – how long will I live if I don't have treatment?’ It was a comment that Eddie made, 
however, that seemed to me to point towards a potential distinction between prognostic 
uncertainty and existential uncertainty: 
 
‘The biggest question I would ask is the one I was afraid of asking, was how long have I 
got. Really. Because it's, it's like everything, innit, if you're at work and you need to 
develop a project, and the first question you ask is, how long have I got to develop it, and 
then it'll come along, well what's the investment, what resources can I have, em, you 
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know, and everything else. If I'm looking towards dealing with an illness, it's the same 
thing – how long have I got? Cos that'll help me decide whether I take early pension and 
get the caravan or, you know, we sell up the house and downsize, em, or whatever we 
do with our lives. And from a practical side of things, that's what I should have known, 
but from an emotional side of things, I didn't really want to know or ask that question.’ 
 
I think the distinction Eddie makes here between the ‘practical’ and the ‘emotional’ side of 
things reflects the distinction between prognostic uncertainty and existential uncertainty: 
prognosis conveys information about the likely course of a disease, but as with treatment 
uncertainty above, the information is not emotional per se – it is the meaning of the information 
for the individual that gives it an emotional (and therefore embodied) quality. A prognosis will 
mean something different to the doctor delivering it and to the patient receiving it, and it is 
more likely to be associated with existential uncertainty for the patient than the doctor. 
 
(ii) Variability and unpredictability 
Another aspect of prognostic uncertainty for participants was its variability and unpredictability. 
Sam spoke about the variance associated with their regular blood tests, which meant that the 
results are ‘just so all over the place’. Meanwhile Jane talked about wanting more clarity: 
 
‘And I'm putting the worst prognosis on it all, and you know, [my husband] says stop 
reading papers about it, because all I find is it's very subjective, so there is no right 
answer…’ 
 
For Brian there was a question mark over what prognosis really means, in particular the notion 
of a cure: 
 
‘…medically they think if you survive five years, you're cured of cancer, yeah? Cos that's 
the, the, the time horizon they, they, they work on. Cos they think, if you've gone for five 
years, you could die of something else in five years, so, eh, but, em, which is fine from a 
medical point of view, but from a, from a real point of view, seeing that, that, that, yeah, 
things, there seems to be a reoccurrence even in people who've had a radical 
prostatectomy at around the 10-year mark, some have had 15, still, still completely free, 
em, some haven't got to 10, you know, they've got about six or seven and it's come back 
with a vengeance…’ 
 
It is interesting to consider what Brian might mean when he distinguishes between the ‘medical 
point of view’ and the ‘real point of view’. He may be making the point that prognosis and cure 
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are part of a medical discourse predicated on probabilities and typical cases, which do not 
necessarily reflect the reality of individual human experience – which, I would argue, is better 
described in terms of existential uncertainty. 
 
(iii) Direction and recurrence 
Participants were concerned about the direction of the disease trajectory or, if they had 
finished treatment, the possibility of its recurrence. Eddie said: 
 
‘I'm certain I've got it, and I'm certain that it's incurable. I'm not certain when it comes 
back, but I know whatever treatment I'm on, it will do…’ 
 
Both Brian and Jim talked about the anxiety they experience when they go to receive the 
results of their regular PSA tests, and the fear that the numbers will start rising. Brian said: 
 
‘…it's stayed around the nought point six, nought point five, nought point six every six 
months now, but it's been stable, but as I get close to the date when I have my PSA test 
done, as I have it regularly done, and then have it done and waiting for the results, that's, 
that's not a great place to be because there's always a worry that if that number goes up, 
it's come back…’ 
 
When I asked Sam to talk about the difference between the uncertainty around their blood 
tests and the uncertainty around the ‘larger scope questions’, they offered these reflections: 
 
‘…it's this idea of like the difference between my quantifiable evidence of your health and 
this metaphysical concept of your health. So this idea of, okay when I look at a blood test 
I understand what's going on, this is fine, and it's, you know, you can see the evidence 
of where it's going. This big overarching question, especially because I'm not a person 
of faith, is just, it's very hard to feel okay about that, and, and to have a positive faith for 
it because when all of the previous evidence has been nothing but complicated…’ 
 
The distinction they make between health as something quantifiable and health as something 
metaphysical seems to mirror quite closely the distinction between prognosis as an issue of 
scientific uncertainty and a person’s life as an issue of existential uncertainty, echoing Brian’s 
distinction between the ‘medical’ perspective and the ‘real’ perspective discussed above. 
 
So what might the examples above tell us about the distinction between prognostic uncertainty 
and existential uncertainty? It seems to me that while both of them are concerned with the 
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future, the former is focused on the future course of the disease and amenable to a 
quantitative, medico-scientific discourse whereas the latter is focused on the future of the 
person and more amenable to an alternative discourse – perhaps one that is consistent with 
Sam’s invoking of ‘faith’. 
 
3.2.3.3 Existential uncertainty vs psycho-social uncertainty 
If existential uncertainty can be distinguished from treatment uncertainty by its emphasis on 
meaning rather than information, and from prognostic uncertainty by its emphasis on the 
person rather than the disease, perhaps the most difficult distinction to make is between 
existential uncertainty and psycho-social uncertainty, given both are about meaning and both 
are squarely focused on the person. In a bid to suggest ways in which the two might 
nevertheless be distinguishable from one another, I will first outline the three themes I derived 
from the interview passages coded psycho-social uncertainty before reflecting on some of the 
nuances that set it apart from existential uncertainty. 
 
(i) Practical/material concerns 
The practical uncertainties that arose in the context of the cancer were a common concern for 
participants. Eddie felt it necessary to make provisions for his wife if he were to die: 
 
‘…we've used a chunk of my, em, pension up, we've both gone short time work, we've 
spent all this money updating stuff, so we haven't got an awful lot of money left in the 
kitty, and what we're earning now is not allowing us to top it up very much, so we've had 
the house valued, we've got to make a decision as to whether we downsize, if we 
downsize we'll move nearer where our children are, em, obviously, then if anything 
happens to me, [my wife]'s got people local to her, family local to her.’ 
 
Meanwhile Sam described how they became unemployed and homeless following their cancer 
diagnosis, and reflected on the challenges presented by this: 
 
‘Like, especially on benefits, like yes, I now have the disability one on top, but I can't 
afford to pay the London rent, I would have to leave London and I don't have a good 
relationship with my family, so that would leave me with no support, which is what the 
council were originally suggesting…’ 
 
Liz and Brian both made major practical decisions that were informed by their cancer 
experience: Liz decided to move back to the city from the countryside where she had been 
97 
 
living in order to be closer to her friends; and Brian decided to leave his job because it didn’t 
feel relevant to him anymore. 
 
(ii) Socio-political/socio-cultural factors 
Although participants tended to focus on the impact of cancer on the immediate context of 
their lives, Liz and Sam in particular drew attention to the wider social factors that affected 
their cancer experience. For Liz, this was Brexit: 
 
‘I've never been terribly political, I do have views, but Brexit I was a very staunch 
Remainer, and I was so upset when, you know, we were going to... Leave won, em, and 
I think that was then exacerbated because if we were leaving with no deal, which it looked 
like at that time, em, and it would have been the end of March 2019, the uncertainty for 
me there was there was all this stuff about drugs are going to run out, we're going to 
have to stockpile drugs, but we can't stockpile radiotherapy drugs because they have a 
very short shelf life, and I knew, and this is part of the uncertainty of the cancer 
experience, isn't it, if I couldn't do all my chemotherapies on time, if I got an infection or 
something stopped me having some of those chemotherapies, my radiotherapy would 
be put back…’ 
 
For Sam, this was how their queer identity intersected with the cancer. They talked about how 
presenting in the way they feel most comfortable presenting, such as wearing earrings or 
painting their nails, changes the way they are perceived by others and carries the risk of losing 
certain cis-passing privileges. For this reason, they found themselves doing a ‘cost-benefit 
analysis’ to mitigate any disadvantage they might incur. Their experience of cancer care was 
that ‘people want to treat you like a cancer patient but they don't know how to treat you as an 
LGBT person’. 
 
(iii) Managing relationships 
One of the concerns that participants shared was around how and when to tell people about 
their cancer diagnosis. For example, Liz said: 
 
‘…you don't know how long this is, this is, this is going to go on, and at what point do I 
tell people? Em, you know, because it was only my husband knew, and my niece cos I 
couldn't go and look after the baby while I was having all of this done, so it was only my 
husband and my niece knew, there was definitely a point where I was going to have to 
tell [my daughter], and I had no idea how I was going to do that, but I didn't have any 
inkling then of when I should tell her, em, because I didn't know what the real news was 
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going to be, you know. So the, the uncertainty around the timing of a lot of stuff for me in 
this process was huge.’ 
 
Jane and Eddie both expressed concern about the impact of their cancer diagnosis on those 
around them. For Eddie, the cancer: 
 
‘…wasn't only affecting my state of mind, it was affecting my wife's, my children's, my 
friends', and everything, and by me being as I am, em, it's making everybody miserable 
and anxious and stuff.’ 
 
Sam and Brian talked about the challenges of managing other people’s reactions to the 
cancer. This is exemplified in the different ways in which Sam’s friends engaged with the issue: 
 
‘…with friends it's tricky because some friends don't want to talk about it, some friends 
are, em, sickeningly positive, which is fine, it helps them but it doesn't help me because 
they're not the ones dealing with it every day and going to these appointments and having 
all this bad news, they kind of take that blind faith thing of like, oh, it'll be fine, it'll be fine, 
this one will work, and it's like, okay, you know, that's, that's where you're at, em, and I 
have other friends that are just, I have one friend that's Swedish and just is way too 
Nordic about it, and just you know, she's always tells me that I'm dying so, it's, it's very 
weird the way that it impacts sort of friend personal things, and I almost feel like I can't 
talk to them about it…’ 
 
3.2.3.3.1 Issues in distinguishing between existential and psycho-social uncertainty 
I would suggest that one way of distinguishing psycho-social uncertainty from existential 
uncertainty in participants’ accounts of their cancer experience is that psycho-social 
uncertainty has a practical, concrete dimension to it. In many cases, it was possible to identify 
how the psycho-social uncertainty could be reduced, if not solved – stable, appropriate 
housing in the case of Sam, more money in the case of Eddie, relocating to the city in the case 
of Liz. Even in the realm of human relations entailed by the second and third themes, there 
were practical measures that could reduce the uncertainty – a Brexit deal that would safeguard 
the delivery of the medication necessary for cancer treatment, measures to reduce the 
exclusion of marginalised groups in society, support for people who are struggling with the 
impact of cancer on their relationships. By contrast, it is less than clear that the attributes of 
existential uncertainty identified above have solutions at all, attainable or otherwise – the future 
is undetermined no matter how hard we might try to forecast it, most things are outside of our 
control however much we might try to control them, we are unavoidably embodied and on a 
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journey towards death, etc. These are not problems to be solved, but rather what it means to 
live as a human being. 
 
This is not, however, to over-simplify things by suggesting an absolute distinction between 
psycho-social and existential uncertainty. Quite clearly, the practical challenges associated 
with psycho-social uncertainty are entwined with some of the deeper questions about what it 
means to live as a human being. Take Liz’s Brexit-related uncertainty: 
 
‘[The Brexit referendum is] the one thing, I think, in my life before this pandemic that has 
made me feel, oh my God, I really don't know what's going to happen, and uncertainty 
for myself, but uncertainty for young people as well. I think more for young people that 
what's going to happen to their futures…’ 
 
This quote shows that although a Brexit deal to safeguard the medicines supply would have 
eliminated the aspect of Liz’s uncertainty that involved her own treatment, quite clearly there 
was another aspect of her uncertainty that was more existential in that the outcome of the 
referendum challenged her worldview and made her worried for the future – something that a 
Brexit deal would be unlikely to resolve. 
 
A similar case can be made for uncertainty on the micro level of managing individual 
relationships. Around the time Jane was having her treatment, her son had found a lump which 
he was having investigated, but he didn’t tell her about it until a scan revealed it was nothing 
to be concerned about. So Jane didn’t want to worry her son, and her son didn’t want to worry 
his mother, so they were careful about what they shared with each other. Although one could 
say this instance of psycho-social uncertainty was resolved when they had an open 
conversation about what had been happening for both of them, the fact that he didn’t tell her 
about it while it was happening triggered an existential uncertainty for Jane: 
 
‘…cos you don't stop being a mum, you're still worried about that, but he didn't want to 
worry me, and it kind of stops you…’ 
 
In other words, in the process of managing her relationship with her son (psycho-social 
uncertainty), Jane was confronted with deeper questions around her identity (existential 
uncertainty), which intruded on her taken-for-granted sense of herself as a mother. 
 
I would suggest that it is more difficult to draw a clear line between existential uncertainty and 
psycho-social uncertainty than between existential uncertainty and any other aspect of 
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uncertainty in the taxonomy. This is not surprising given existential uncertainty and psycho-
social uncertainty are both classified as aspects of personal uncertainty. In Phase 3 of the 
analysis, I will return to the theoretical literature to see if it might yield a convincing rationale 
for such a distinction. 
 
3.2.4 Ways of talking about existential uncertainty 
The emphasis of this phase of the analysis has been mostly on what participants talked about 
when they talked about various aspects of their cancer-related uncertainty, but I want to 
conclude by considering how they talked about existential uncertainty. One of the reasons that 
the interviews began with an object elicitation exercise was to give participants the opportunity 
to frame their uncertainty experience themselves rather than to have them respond to my 
framing, as would have been the case if I had begun by asking them direct questions about 
their uncertainty experience. It is interesting to reflect on the range of objects that participants 
brought. In some cases, the connection with cancer-related uncertainty was direct and 
unambiguous: some brought a letter from their doctor, one participant brought a bottle of pills, 
one brought a booklet entitled ‘prostate cancer and your sex life’, one brought his PSA test 
record card and a penis pump. In each of these cases, I would suggest that the object was 
associated with an aspect of scientific uncertainty – diagnosis, prognosis, treatment – and 
could be talked about in direct terms. 
 
There were other cases where the link between the object and the cancer-related uncertainty 
was less direct, but still clear. For example, Sam brought a set of keys and explained that they 
were living in a hostel because the cancer treatment made it impossible for them to continue 
in their job and keep up with the rent on their flat – the set of keys they brought pointedly 
lacked a front door key, and they spoke of the psycho-social uncertainty connected with their 
unstable housing situation. Although they stepped out of the medico-scientific discourse of 
diagnosis, prognosis and treatment while they talked about the lack of security they felt in their 
life, the psycho-social uncertainty they experienced could still be articulated in a 
straightforward manner: they talked about the frustrations they encountered in securing the 
benefits that were due to them, and in dealing with the council about the housing situation. 
 
There were other cases still, however, where the link with cancer was opaque. One of these 
was the cathedral choir that Jane identified as an object associated with her cancer-related 
uncertainty. She explained that both of her sons had gone to a cathedral school and one of 
them had been a chorister – she spoke of that time as a happy one for her family, and she 
was keen to see if her grandson would be musical like her two sons turned out to be, but was 
uncertain as to whether she would be around to find out. There was a parallel between Jane’s 
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harking back to an earlier time of life and Eddie’s account of how songs ‘bring out the 
memories’ for him. There is a risk of overstating the music connection, but the reason I think 
it is significant is because the cathedral choir and the music CD were not throwaway 
comments made in response to a question of mine, but rather the result of reflection on their 
part prior to the interview, and we must therefore assume that the choices are meaningful. Liz 
too referred to musical instruments and singing when she talked about the anti-Brexit march 
captured in the photo she brought as one of her objects. 
 
So what are we to make of the fact that when Jane, Eddie and Liz were asked to identify an 
object that was somehow associated with their cancer-related uncertainty, they chose a 
cathedral choir, a music CD and a photo of an anti-Brexit march they had joined? In each 
case, I think they were tapping into an aspect of their uncertainty that could not be directly 
expressed using the same language as the more concrete aspects of their uncertainty. They 
had to reach beyond the medico-scientific discourse of the health care system, and this felt 
uncomfortable – perhaps it is significant that the one time in the interview when Liz became 
visibly upset was when she described the march. For Jane and Eddie there was a strangeness 
around their objects: Jane regarded her choice of cathedral choir as ‘a bit odd’, while Eddie 
found his changed response to music ‘weird’. This sense of ‘weirdness’ recurred with some 
regularity in passages coded as existential uncertainty, such as when Sam described their 
weighted blanket metaphor as ‘a really weird parallel’, or when Brian said it was ‘a sort of weird 
thing’ to find that so much of his sense of self was attached to his penis. Eddie described as 
‘weird’ his experience of recurring lucid dreaming, which involved people challenging him and 
questioning his ability. This weirdness was not evident in passages coded as scientific 
uncertainty. 
 
In the next and final phase of the analysis, I will endeavour to synthesise the observations and 
interpretations made in this phase (Phase 2) with the conceptualisation of existential 
uncertainty proposed at the end of Phase 1 and the literature from which it was derived. 
 
 
3.3 Phase 3 – synthesis of concept analysis and analysis of interviews 
The final phase of the analysis process involves a synthesis of the first two phases, exploring 
how the insights yielded by the analysis of participant interviews fit with the conceptualisation 





i. A discussion of the attributes of existential uncertainty 
ii. A discussion of the distinction between existential uncertainty and other aspects of 
uncertainty 
iii. A discussion of the manner in which existential uncertainty can be expressed 
iv. A revision of the Phase 1 conceptualisation of existential uncertainty on the basis of i-
iii above. 
 
3.3.1 Attributes of existential uncertainty 
There was broad support in the Phase 2 analysis for the defining attributes of existential 
uncertainty proposed in Phase 1. Table 2 brings together the lists of attributes identified in 
both phases in a way that shows where the points of convergence and divergence are. I will 
discuss what these points might tell us about existential uncertainty as a concept before 
proposing a revised set of attributes that attempts to harmonise the two lists. 
 








An awareness that is fundamental, 
ineradicable and always available 
An intrusion into awareness 






The undetermined but finite nature of 
one’s own being-in-the-world 
An undetermined future 




--- Living with the spectre of 
dying 





When it comes to the focus of existential uncertainty, i.e. what existential uncertainty is about, 
there was agreement between phases that it is concerned with the future, which is both 
undetermined and finite. There was also clear agreement that it is concerned with questions 
of identity and meaning, but choice was less salient in Phase 2 than it was in Phase 1. I offer 
two possible explanations for this: one is that in Phase 2, choice was referenced more explicitly 
in passages coded as treatment uncertainty, particularly in the cases of Brian and Jim, who 
were offered a choice as to how they wanted their prostate cancer treated; another is that in 
Phase 2, choice was an implicit aspect of agency. For example, Sam said: 
 
‘…it's a very strange thing to also know your body's working against you and know that 
the one certain thing in all of this, the one certain thing is if I did nothing and ignored it, I 
would die, you know like, that's, that's the one certain thing to take away. The uncertain 
things are if I'm going to survive, how's it going to work, how is the rest of my life going 
to be, am I ever going to be able to work again, all those things, but the one thing I know 
is that if I, if I give up, then within a few years, that would be it. And that's kind of 
exhausting cos sometimes you want to stop for a bit, you just want to be like, I want to 
get off, I just want to whatever…’ 
 
I think the exhaustion Sam is referring to here is associated with agency – they fantasise about 
‘doing nothing’, ‘giving up’ and ‘getting off’, but what is exhausting is that ‘doing nothing’ 
involves making a choice to do nothing. It is not so much the existence of the choice per se 
that is integral to existential uncertainty, but rather the need to make the choice, i.e. agency. 
This interpretation is consistent with Brian’s frustration when he had to decide between the 
treatment options presented to him – it would have been easier if the radiologist and the 
surgeon had made the choice for him. 
 
The connection between agency and control is made by Lewis and Bates (2013) in their 
discussion of religiosity as a source of existential certainty, and the prominence of control as 
a theme in the Phase 2 interviews points to what is perhaps the most significant absence in 
the Phase 1 conceptualisation. I returned to the literature on which the conceptualisation was 
based to see whether control was largely absent from existing accounts of existential 
uncertainty or whether I had not been sensitive enough to its presence. I found that while a 
number of researchers do mention it, it was not as prominent as the other attributes identified: 
Adamson (1997) argues that “the patient's project involves learning to live with the chaos of 
lost control” (p.154), while Penrod (2007) emphasises the importance of confidence and 
control in uncertainty – she suggests in her concept analysis of ‘living with uncertainty’ that 
“during existential modes of uncertainty, when different ways of knowing are highly influential 
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in forming perceptions of confidence and/or control, information was not helpful” (p.663). Given 
that control does in fact feature in the literature and was prominent in the interviews, I thought 
it was important that it be incorporated into the conceptualisation of existential uncertainty. 
 
Taking these points into account, I suggest that existential uncertainty has five defining 
attributes, as set out in Table 3. 
 
Table 3: a synthesis of the attributes of existential uncertainty identified in Phase 1 and Phase 2 of the analysis, 
grouped by meta-theoretical category 
Meta-theoretical category Attribute 
Quality: 
Existential uncertainty is 
experienced as… 
A bodily awareness at cognitive or precognitive levels 
Focus: 
Existential uncertainty is 
concerned with… 
 
The undetermined but finite nature of one’s future 
 
Identity and meaning 
Source: 
Existential uncertainty is a 
consequence of… 
 
Living with the spectre of dying 
 
Questions of control and agency 
 
For the reasons discussed above, I propose that a more parsimonious conceptualisation is 
provided by removing choice as a focus of existential uncertainty and regarding it instead as 
more fundamentally a source of existential uncertainty, implied in questions of agency. 
Furthermore, it seems to me that the two qualities of existential uncertainty identified in both 
phases can be more succinctly expressed as a single quality: bodily awareness. Finally I 
thought it important to retain the two themes from Phase 2 that I classified as sources of 
existential uncertainty, which can be seen as mirroring the two focuses of existential 
uncertainty: because I live with the spectre of dying, I am concerned with the undetermined 
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but finite nature of my future; and because it is not always clear what I can and can’t control, 
I rely on my own agency to construct an identity and meaning in life. 
 
3.3.2 Delineating existential uncertainty 
Something the Phase 2 analysis yielded was an empirical basis for distinguishing between 
existential uncertainty and other aspects of uncertainty in the Han et al. (2011) taxonomy. I 
will briefly discuss the three distinctions I identified in Phase 2 with reference to the Phase 1 
analysis and the theoretical literature. 
 
i. Existential uncertainty is concerned with meaning rather than discoverable facts 
This is perhaps the most straightforward distinction that can be made, and is supported by the 
contrary case cited in Phase 1 in which Kate demanded to know the results of her scan, which 
she knew were available and therefore discoverable. It is also a distinction supported by the 
literature, with researchers contrasting existential uncertainty and clinical uncertainty 
(Adamson, 1997), existential uncertainty and situational uncertainty (Penrod, 2007), personal 
uncertainty and informational uncertainty (Van den Bos, 2009), irreducible uncertainty and 
reducible uncertainty (McCormack et al., 2011), and of course personal uncertainty and 
scientific uncertainty (Han et al., 2011). In each case, the latter term implies a discoverability 
while the former is about meaning rather than a lack of information. Willig’s (2011) statement 
that “diagnosis initiates the struggle for meaning” (p.901) supports this in that it implies 
diagnosis and meaning are not one and the same thing. It bears repeating that the distinction 
is not absolute – when Kate discovered the results of her scan, she would no longer have 
experienced uncertainty about the results of the scan, but she may have found herself 
experiencing existential uncertainty, depending on what she made of those results. Likewise, 
once Jane learned from her consultant why her mixed tumour was classified as low grade, 
she may have found it difficult to know what this might mean for her life. While it may be useful 
to think of these as different aspects of uncertainty, it is equally important to remember that 
they are deeply entwined. 
 
ii. Existential uncertainty is concerned with the person rather than the disease 
Christakis (1999) refers to the contemporary medical belief that “conditions have identities 
independent of their existence in given patients” (p.6). It is possible to understand how this 
belief has led to the emergence of two foci of uncertainty in the Western health care system – 
one related to the disease itself (scientific uncertainty), and one related to the person (personal 
uncertainty). Although one might find fault with this distinction, it is a reflection of the way in 
which the health care system operates, with an emphasis on the reduction of scientific 
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uncertainty (Babrow & Kline, 2000), and the way in which research into health-related 
uncertainty has evolved with a bias towards issues of scientific uncertainty (Han et al. 2011). 
 
The distinction between person and disease is less clearly true of the distinction between 
existential uncertainty and practical uncertainty, i.e. uncertainty around structures and 
processes of care, since these forms of uncertainty are concerned with the person’s 
relationship with the health care system. Even here though, given the system itself is disease-
centred, the focus can be on the disease rather than the person, as Sam found when they 
tried to share something personal with their consultant: 
 
‘…the medication before this which they put me on, they were like oh well FYI, it can give 
you like persistent diarrhoea, and I kind of was trying to hint to them as well, I was just 
like, with my life and lifestyle and just, you know, trying to like hint, I was like, sexual 
impacts, vuh-vuh-vuh, and, and they just weren't, they weren't getting it, they weren't 
getting it, and it was that thing of like you know constantly having to come out et cetera, 
but you just kind of realise like, I don't want to fight this battle with you guys, like, if I'm 
leaving you breadcrumbs and you're just ignoring it because you just want to give me 
the medication…’ 
 
The sense that Sam had of their consultant just wanting to give them the medication suggests 
an approach in which Sam is seen more as the host of a disease-in-need-of-treatment than a 
person with values and an identity that might be more important to them than the disease. 
There is an echo here of the participant quoted in the Phase 1 analysis who was receiving 
palliative care for cancer and who said he was “interested in the other things, not the disease 
itself” (Friberg & Öhlen, 2007, p.220). 
 
The distinction between person and disease is not true at all of the distinction between 
existential uncertainty and psycho-social uncertainty, however, since these are both issues of 
personal uncertainty. Nevertheless, the final distinction provides a rationale for conceiving of 
these two aspects of uncertainty as conceptually separable: 
 
iii. Existential uncertainty is concerned with the fundamental principles of existence rather than 
the practicalities of living 
In Phase 2 I acknowledged the difficulty of drawing a clear distinction between existential and 
psycho-social uncertainty, given both are about our being-in-the-world-with-others (Cohn, 
1997). However, I suggested that while psycho-social uncertainty has a practical, concrete 
dimension to it, existential uncertainty is more concerned with what it means to be human 
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irrespective of the specific conditions in which that humanity manifests itself. The existential 
therapy literature offers two sources of support for such a distinction: 
 
Firstly, while existential uncertainty and psycho-social uncertainty are both about being with 
others, Spinelli’s (2015) distinction between surface and deeper levels of relatedness is 
instructive: on the surface level, “every thought, feeling and action experienced or undertaken 
by me is said to arise not only from the interaction of systems and components within me as 
a boundaried organism, but also from the interaction between boundaried organisms” (p.16); 
while on the deeper level, the sense itself of being a boundaried organism is only possible by 
virtue of a “prior grounding in relatedness” (p.17) – in other words, the self is not its own 
originator, but emerges from a foundational precondition of relatedness that is not established 
in particular instantiations, but is always there as the sine qua non of those instantiations. 
Spinelli argues that a failure to appreciate this deeper level of relatedness reduces relatedness 
to relationship between boundaried beings. Applying Spinelli’s argument to the question at 
hand, I propose that while psycho-social uncertainty is concerned with boundaried beings and 
the relationships between them, existential uncertainty is a consequence of the deeper level 
of relatedness, and therefore concerned with the grounding on which these relationships 
depend for their continued existence. 
 
This distinction is supported by the contrast between the ontic and the ontological as described 
by Cohn (1997) and discussed in the Phase 1 analysis. My intention is not to suggest that the 
distinction between ontic and ontological is neat, much less absolute. The ontic and the 
ontological are always deeply intertwined – it is not possible to talk of the ontological without 
drawing on the ontic, most obviously one’s socio-cultural, socio-linguistic and socio-temporal 
context. However, they are different in terms of their qualities. In his exploration of meaning 
and existential givens in psycho-oncology, Vos (2015) writes that “meaning is experienced in 
concrete examples, though it is simultaneously experienced as transcending the level of 
concreteness” (p.886). The same can be said for existential uncertainty, and it is this 
transcendence that sets it apart from other aspects of uncertainty, including psycho-social, 
that remain in the realm of the concrete. This distinction is exemplified by the borderline case 
cited in Phase 1 of the analysis, where Kate moves from thinking about how her family will 
cope during a prolonged stay in hospital (a concrete concern that she addresses with ‘lists 
and plans’) to reflecting on the time away from her family as ‘a practice run’ for her ‘permanent 
absence’ (which cannot be addressed with ‘lists and plans’ in the same way) – thus the 




I observed both the close association between these two aspects of uncertainty and the 
distinction between them when I found myself sometimes coding passages of the interviews 
in an alternating manner between the two, such as the extract from the interview with Sam 
discussed in the Phase 2 analysis (reproduced in Appendix 11). It struck me as I coded such 
passages how difficult it is to pin down in words the distinction between the two, and I wonder 
if this can be accounted for, in part, by the same linguistic limitations that Spinelli (2015) 
identifies when he asserts that the relatedness from which existential uncertainty is derived 
can only be indirectly expressed through analogies due to the dualism and separatism 
underlying the linguistic structures on which we rely when expressing ourselves. I will now 




In Phase 1 of the analysis, I drew on the literature to argue that while it is possible to engage 
with aspects of uncertainty centred on disease and health care systems using a medico-
scientific discourse, such a discourse fails to capture the complexity and idiosyncrasy of 
uncertainty around meaning. I cited evidence of people turning to literature (Friberg & Öhlen, 
2007), religion (Miké, 2000; Ahmed, Terrill & Sherry, 2019; Mrdjenovich, 2019; Lewis & Bates, 
2013) and nature (Karlsson et al., 2014) as a way of engaging with their existential uncertainty. 
I would argue that these alternative discourses provide a means by which people can engage 
with an aspect of their uncertainty that cannot be accessed directly, in the same way that 
Spinelli (2015) asserts that the deeper level of relatedness cannot be expressed directly. 
 
The interviews from Phase 2 of the analysis provide some support for this argument. The 
sense I had in passages coded as existential uncertainty is that participants were frequently 
reaching for something elusive that could not be captured by what Willig (2011) refers to as 
the “new and unsettling discursive universe” (p.897) into which people are thrown following a 
cancer diagnosis – a universe characterised by the scientific and practical issues of 
uncertainty in the Han et al. (2011) taxonomy. They compensated for the limitations of a 
conventional scientific discourse by invoking metaphor (e.g. uncertainty as weighted blanket), 
analogy (e.g. uncertainty of having a husband who was a NATO pilot) and other modes of 
expression such as humour (e.g. Jim naming his tumour Donald) and music (e.g. a cathedral 
choir, Vera Lynn). Interestingly religious discourses did not feature in participants’ accounts, 
although Sam referred to ‘faith’ on six occasions (one of which was to say that they were not 
a ‘person of faith’). Participants’ attempts to describe the existential aspects of their uncertainty 
were sometimes faltering and tentative, but tended also to be more imaginative in the way 
they were expressed than other aspects of their uncertainty. Perhaps the ‘weirdness’ they 
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described when talking about existential uncertainty was related to stepping outside of the 
conventional language of a medico-scientific discourse and forging instead a new and 
idiosyncratic way of expressing their experience of uncertainty. 
 
When I asked Sam what questions they most wanted answers to, if they were available, they 
sighed and said: 
 
‘…I think the answers to the questions I want are just not answerable, but I'll answer the 
question, but you know like it's some semblance of precognition and the idea of like am 
I going to get better?’ 
 
Sam gamely tried to answer my question by invoking some semblance of precognition and 
the idea of like whether they were going to get better. It is clear that these words are 
approximations, but fail to capture it exactly or entirely. It was in analysing passages like this 
that I was reminded of Gergen’s (2018) argument that the limits of language are the limits of 
psychological explanation, in which he referred to “territories beyond elementary articulation” 
(p.709). I believe existential uncertainty is such a territory. Gergen calls for a dialogue between 
psychology and the arts as a way of bridging the gap between the structural limitations of 
language and the complex meanings that we as humans might wish to convey. This echoes 
Mair’s (2012) argument that “[o]ur lives require the nourishment of poetry and art as well as 
the precision of science and mathematics” (p.208) – he points to the importance of metaphor, 
imagination and different modes of storytelling in conveying deeper meanings. 
 
Such arguments chime with my belief in the power of different discourses to articulate different 
things, in particular the power of the arts to articulate things that cannot be captured in 
conventional scientific terms. It is a belief that predates the current research project – my first 
two university degrees were in classical languages and literature, so my psychological 
inquiries are informed by a sensitivity to the importance of storytelling and the niceties of 
language in shaping meaning. For this reason, I think passages in the Phase 2 interviews that 
were not so obviously or explicitly about uncertainty (including Liz’s attendance at the march, 
Jane’s invoking of a cathedral choir, Eddie’s emotional responses to music) are worthy of 
close attention, offering an insight into the richness of participants’ meaning structures. In the 
Phase 2 analysis, these passages reflected the difficulty of giving an account of existential 
uncertainty which, as I argue, is more ontological than ontic in nature. Spinelli’s (2015) 
foundational principles support the suggestion that existential uncertainty is so deeply 
embedded in what it is to be human that it cannot be isolated as a specific question about a 
specific thing in the way that other aspects of uncertainty can, and this makes it difficult to talk 
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about in conventional terms. Bohart (1999) writes of tacit, intuitive knowledge as being “by no 
means primarily verbal and conceptual”, but rather so rich, detailed and complex that “it could 
never be entirely spelled out in words” (p.293). Perhaps the same can be said for existential 
uncertainty, which is a tacit, intuitive form of not knowing. 
 
3.3.4 Existential uncertainty vs. ontological insecurity 
If it is legitimate to cast existential uncertainty as an ontological uncertainty, then it is worth 
considering how existential uncertainty might differ from the concept of ontological insecurity, 
which occupies similar conceptual terrain. Laing (1960) describes ontological insecurity in the 
following way: 
 
“The individual in the ordinary circumstances of living may feel more unreal than real: in 
a literal sense, more dead than alive; precariously differentiated from the rest of the 
world, so that his identity and autonomy are always in question. He may lack the 
experience of his own temporal continuity. He may not possess an over-riding sense of 
personal consistency or cohesiveness.” (p.42). 
 
It is worth noting firstly that Laing uses the term ontological in a non-philosophical sense – for 
him, it is simply the adjectival derivative of ‘being’ and not therefore to be read as a contrast 
with ontic. Furthermore Laing’s ontological insecurity is narrowly associated with the 
experience of schizophrenia and the childhood adversity from which it is presumed to emerge 
– he does not write of it as something that is a feature of everyone’s existence, regardless of 
their childhood experiences. 
 
The narrow emphasis on schizophrenia is criticised by van Deurzen (1998), who argues that 
what we call schizophrenia is really “an extreme form of the core human experience of being 
insecure: deeply and totally essentially insecure” (p.11). She writes that “none of us is really 
secure: social position, or material ease, or personal relationships may protect us momentarily, 
but a time might come when we get deprived of such advantages and find ourselves exposed 
and stripped to the bone” (p.14). This broader conceptualisation of ontological insecurity as 
something universal that may manifest itself at any time seems to have more in common with 
my conceptualisation of existential uncertainty, but are they one and the same concept? I 
would say no for two reasons. Firstly, ontological insecurity seems to me to be closer to the 
concept of existential anxiety than existential uncertainty – in fact, van Deurzen suggests that 
“what Laing was describing was pure existential anxiety” (p.8), stating elsewhere that in her 
view openness in living entails “a deep-seated sense of vulnerability: ontological insecurity, 




Secondly, on a semantic level, uncertainty and insecurity are not synonyms – to say one feels 
uncertain is not the same as saying one feels insecure. Just as Spinelli (2015) conceptualises 
existential anxiety as a consequence of the foundational principle of uncertainty, I would 
suggest that one might very well feel insecure about something as a consequence of one’s 
uncertainty about it – further supporting the idea that ontological insecurity is closer to 
existential anxiety than it is to existential uncertainty. So while there is an aspect of uncertainty 
in Laing’s (1960) conceptualisation (the fact that the person’s identity is in question), the 
concept seems to be focused more on the consequences of the uncertainty and therefore 
does not belong in a taxonomy of different aspects of uncertainty. 
 
3.3.5 Revised conceptualisation 
Synthesising the evidence from Phase 1 and Phase 2 of the analysis presented above, I 
propose the revised conceptualisation of existential uncertainty below. The revision includes: 
a greater emphasis on control and agency; and a clearer articulation of how existential 
uncertainty differs from other aspects of uncertainty. 
 
Existential uncertainty is an awareness that my being-in-the-world is undetermined but 
finite. This entails living life in the shadow of an ever-present threat to my survival that is 
beyond my control. I can use my sense of agency to mitigate the impact of this threat by 
developing an individual identity, aligning myself with a collective identity, and investing 
in a worldview that seems to imbue life with meaning. However existential uncertainty is 
fundamental to what it means to be human and therefore ineradicable. It becomes salient 
at times of change or upheaval, and can be overwhelming when my identity and 
worldview are threatened by challenging experiences. At times such as these I am 
reminded that whatever choices I make between now and my death are ultimately mine 
to make, and that life may be meaningless irrespective of my best efforts. 
 
Existential uncertainty is distinguished from other aspects of uncertainty by the fact that 
it is ontological in nature, tapping at a fundamental level what it means to be human. 
While other aspects of uncertainty can be captured in the scientific language of accuracy 
and rationality, wherein a specific question has a specific answer, even if that answer is 
not known at the time, existential uncertainty defies a conventional medico-scientific 
discourse for its articulation, requiring instead a language of metaphor, analogy and 
imagination to convey its meaning. It is a bodily awareness that I can experience as 
anything from precognitive bodily sensations to full cognitive elaboration as I engage with 





In this chapter, I presented the results of three phases of analysis, proposing in the final phase 
a list of five defining attributes of existential uncertainty as well as a rationale for distinguishing 
between existential uncertainty and other aspects of uncertainty in the health context. I pointed 
to the role of different discourses in constructing and expressing the various aspects of 
uncertainty implicated in the experience of ill health, arguing that existential uncertainty is not 
amenable to a medico-scientific discourse, relying instead on metaphor, analogy and 
imagination to capture its meaning. I concluded with a narrative conceptualisation of existential 
uncertainty that captures all of the above. In the next chapter, I will turn to a discussion of the 
practical and theoretical implications of this conceptualisation for health care, including for the 






Having proposed a conceptualisation of existential uncertainty that encapsulates its defining 
attributes as well as the features that distinguish it from other aspects of uncertainty, I will turn 
now to a consideration of the implications of this conceptualisation for theory and practice. I 
will argue that an awareness of the concept of existential uncertainty is important for the 
provision of patient-centred health care, and that a failure to acknowledge that uncertainty is 
an intrinsic part of life risks pathologising life itself, generating further distress for people who 
are already in a vulnerable position. 
 
I will conclude by offering some reflections on what it was like to carry out this research during 
the time of Covid-19, which has posed so many questions about the way we can or should 
live our lives and therefore speaks directly to the concept of existential uncertainty. I will use 
this experience to suggest future directions for research in this area, while also acknowledging 
the limitations of conceptual work of this kind. 
 
 
4.1 Implications for health care 
 
4.1.1 The Han et al. (2011) taxonomy 
The conceptualisation of existential uncertainty yielded by this analysis raises two important 
issues for the Han et al. (2011) taxonomy. Firstly, the emphasis on existential uncertainty as 
an intrinsic part of human existence rather than an aspect of uncertainty that is restricted to a 
health ‘event’ distinguishes it from other aspects of uncertainty in the taxonomy, such as 
diagnosis, treatment options and processes of care. In other words, although it is conceivable 
that a person might encounter health issues without any significant prior experience of health-
related uncertainty (as captured by the taxonomy’s scientific and practical issues) – for 
instance the first time they are faced with a non-trivial health problem – it is hard to imagine 
any adult encountering health issues without some experience, however minor, of personal 
(i.e. psycho-social or existential) uncertainty – a doubt about relationships, identity or meaning 
in life. If clinicians fail to take account of those aspects of uncertainty that are shaped by 
patients’ personal histories and broader circumstances, they risk failing to understand why 
patients might continue to report distressing levels of uncertainty even after their medical and 
practical questions have been answered with the best available information. Future research 
might investigate how existential uncertainty relates to the concept of uncertainty tolerance 
(Hillen, Gutheil, Strout, Smets & Han, 2017), which is defined as “the set of negative and 
positive psychological responses – cognitive, emotional, and behavioral – provoked by the 
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conscious awareness of ignorance about particular aspects of the world” (p.70). In other 
words, might psychological responses to – or consequences of (see 3.1.5.2) – existential 
uncertainty be different from psychological responses to scientific aspects of uncertainty? If 
so, how might they interact and what are the implications for clinicians? 
 
Secondly, and relatedly, although existential uncertainty is classified within the taxonomy as 
something that people might be uncertain about (in the way they might be uncertain about 
prognosis, treatment options, processes of care, etc.), the conceptualisation developed here 
makes clear that our being-in-the-world is not only an object of uncertainty for us, but also a 
source of uncertainty. This is not explicitly acknowledged in the taxonomy, where the three 
sources of uncertainty are identified as probability, ambiguity and complexity. Probability, 
defined as “a phenomenon’s indeterminacy” (Han et al., 2011, p.833) is the closest source of 
uncertainty in the taxonomy to Spinelli’s (2015) conceptualisation of uncertainty, but fails to 
capture the fundamental and ineradicable quality of the uncertainty generated by our human 
existence. I acknowledge that not much would be gained by adding ‘existence’ as a fourth 
source of uncertainty in the taxonomy, particularly given the taxonomy is designed to achieve 
“some reasonable middle-ground level of abstraction” (Han & Djulbegovic, 2019, p.185), which 
can be adjusted according to the comprehensiveness and specificity required by the context 
in which it is being used. However, it is important to emphasise that uncertainty in the health 
domain cannot be divorced from the uncertainties that exist in other domains of people’s lives, 
all of which are underpinned by the fundamental uncertainty of human existence. A failure to 
acknowledge this may lead to patients and clinicians alike persistently seeking answers to 
unanswerable questions. 
 
Given how pervasive uncertainty is in the cancer experience (Nissim et al., 2012), all 
professionals involved in cancer care could benefit from a deeper understanding of its different 
aspects. It was for this reason that I set out to have the Phase 1 concept analysis published 
as a standalone article (Dwan & Willig, 2021) in a journal focused on the evaluation and 
development of clinical practice across medicine, nursing and the allied health professions. 
During the peer review process, I received the following comment: 
 
‘I think that to conceptualize being-in-the-world as a source of uncertainty is true in a very 
high-level, abstract sense, but it is not practically useful: it is like saying that the world is 
a source of uncertainty. Of course being is necessary for uncertainty and thus a ‘source’: 
I think the question is whether it is useful to conceptualize it as such [in the context of 




The point, as I argued in my response to this comment, is not just that existential uncertainty 
is part of living, but that the existential uncertainty associated with the medical context cannot 
be conceptualised as if it were unrelated to a person’s pre-existing uncertainty landscape – in 
other words, it is not meaningful to draw a distinction between ‘medical existential uncertainty’ 
and ‘non-medical existential uncertainty’. This exchange with my reviewer reinforced my belief 
in the need to disseminate counselling psychology research, informed as it is by a regard for 
the individual’s holistic, subjective experience and by a focus on wellbeing rather than cure 
(Rafalin, 2010), to others in the health professions whose approach to care might be more 
disease-centred than person-centred. 
 
4.1.2 Psycho-oncology 
The strong desire for answers following a cancer diagnosis is something I observed in my 
clinical work when I was on placement as a trainee counselling psychologist at a specialist 
cancer hospital. One of the important challenges I faced with clients was trying to decide 
together whether the questions they had were answerable. This is a key issue for 
professionals involved in psycho-oncology because the idea that existential uncertainty is 
fundamental and ineradicable is not to deny that some questions do in fact have answers, and 
it may be that the most useful thing we can do for our clients is to help them find these answers. 
If uncertainty exists at various levels of abstraction – whether one chooses to label those levels 
physical, social, personal and spiritual/philosophical (van Deurzen, 2012) or scientific, 
practical and personal (Han et al., 2011) – then it is important to ask what the most appropriate 
psychological intervention might be at each of those levels. For example, if a client who is 
living with cancer is uncertain about a particular aspect of their medical care (which might be 
described as a physical or scientific issue), it may be that an informational intervention 
delivered through improved communication with their medical team is required (Epstein & 
Street, 2007) – much as in the Phase 2 analysis Jane wanted to have a conversation with her 
consultant to find out why her tumour was cast as low grade. If, on the other hand, a client is 
struggling with an issue that is more social or practical, it may be that a solution-focused 
intervention (Neilson-Clayton & Brownlee, 2002) is what would be most helpful. In the Phase 
2 analysis, Liz’s uncertainty over when and how to tell her daughter about her diagnosis might 
fit into this category, or Sam’s uncertainty around housing or benefits. 
 
If the uncertainty is what van Deurzen (2012) calls spiritual/philosophical or what Han et al. 
(2011) call existential, however, an informational or solution-focused intervention would not 
be appropriate – and may in fact be unhelpful if the person is already feeling overwhelmed by 
their experience (Persson et al., 2012). In the Phase 2 analysis, when Sam describes their 
cancer as ‘just like a waiting room to death’, there is no ‘answer’ to their ‘question’, no ‘solution’ 
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to their ‘problem’. In cases like these, a meaning-oriented intervention might be more 
beneficial (Lee, 2008; Vehling & Philipp, 2017), and there is growing evidence of the efficacy 
of such interventions in the cancer context (Bauereiß, Obermaier, Özünal & Baumeister, 
2018). The point I am making here is that in order to decide what kind of intervention might be 
most helpful to clients who are experiencing uncertainty, clinicians must first have some 
conceptual framework on which to draw. The conceptualisation of existential uncertainty 
proposed in this research offers a perspective on the uncertainty experience of people living 
with cancer that may help to deepen clinicians’ understanding of the meaning structure of 




4.2 Implications for counselling psychology 
Brennan (2001) states that in the cancer context “[m]uch of the (non-specific) power of ‘talking 
therapies’ and other forms of social support may be the result of helping clients to represent 
their experiences in language” (p.13) – this, he suggests, is how people adjust their 
“assumptive world” after its constituent assumptions have been challenged by a cancer 
diagnosis. This is, on the face of it, a fairly uncontroversial and benign-sounding statement, 
but what does it really mean to help clients to represent their uncertainty experiences in 
language? We are perhaps more accustomed to thinking about constructing meaning around 
what is known than what is uncertain and therefore unknown, and I would like to consider here 
what the implications of this thesis are for the theory and practice of counselling psychology. 
 
4.2.1 Meaning as co-construction 
Spinelli (2001) regards therapy as “the activity of generating meanings which might potentially 
transform experience through collaborative dialogue” (p.6). While this does not contradict 
Brennan’s (2001) construal of therapy, it articulates aspects of the therapeutic endeavour that 
Brennan leaves unremarked and open – that representing experiences in language involves 
generating meanings in dialogue rather than one boundaried being (the therapist) helping 
another (the client) to put words on a meaning that already resides inside the latter. Spinelli 
emphasises the idea that therapy is a collaborative dialogue in which both parties play a 
formative role. Due to the power imbalance inherent in the therapeutic relationship (Proctor, 
2017), there is always the risk that the therapist might – inadvertently or otherwise – impose 
their own theoretically-informed meaning on the client’s experiences. This risk is plausibly 
heightened when the client is experiencing high levels of uncertainty, i.e. when the client might 





One possible response to a client’s grappling for meaning in the context of their own not 
knowing is for the therapist to adopt a stance of what Spinelli (2014) calls ‘un-knowing’: 
 
“The attempt to ‘un-know’ suggests the counselling psychologist’s willingness to explore 
the world of the client in a fashion that not only seeks to remain respectful of the client’s 
unique way of being-in-the-world, but also to be receptive to the challenges to the 
counselling psychologist’s own narrational biases and assumptions (be they personal or 
professional or both) that this exploration may well provoke. Put bluntly, un-knowing 
requires the counselling psychologist to be willing to abdicate, at least for the time being, 
a great deal of that which might, from the stand point of most psychological models and 
approaches, be taken as the counselling psychologist’s authority, security, expertise and 
interpretative power.” (p.12) 
 
The point Spinelli is making here is that counselling psychologists must cultivate a level of 
comfort with uncertainty in the therapeutic encounter. They should guard against using 
theoretical knowledge as a way of assuaging their discomfort at not knowing, which risks 
foreclosing the kind of meaning making that can emerge from not knowing. This is where the 
tension between research and practice is evident – how can clinicians use theoretically-
derived knowledge to inform their practice without adopting an expert position predicated on 
having at least some of the answers? Henton (2012) acknowledges the conceptual clarity that 
research provides, but suggests that “practitioners need research (like jazz musicians need 
systematic musical learning) to extemporise successfully” (p.15), which echoes Bohart’s 
(1999) conception of therapy as an intuitive and creative endeavour. With respect to the 
current research, the conceptualisation of existential uncertainty offered above is not intended 
as a contribution to ‘expertise in uncertainty’. Its purpose is to help sensitise us as therapists 
to an aspect of the meaning structure of uncertainty that might be more or less salient at any 
given point in the therapeutic dialogue – it is hoped that a unique and creative response 
appropriate to the situation at hand may emerge from this sensitivity. 
 
I have in mind here Mair’s (2012) description of personal construct psychology as: 
 
“…a psychology ‘empty’ of facts and data but fully concerned with methods of personal 
inquiry for undertaking different phases and aspects of making sense of our worlds […] 
a perspective on psychological inquiry that seemed to be rich and suitably complex, full 





In other words, the conceptualisation of existential uncertainty proposed in this research does 
not belong in the realm of facts – rather it offers a perspective that might enable therapists to 
engage with uncertainty in a different way, and to have more helpful conversations with their 
clients as a result. This is very much in keeping with the spirit of the Han et al. (2011) 
taxonomy, which is presented as “a provisional and flexible – rather than a final and fixed – 
descriptive model aimed at classifying the types and components of uncertainty in a manner 
that is both logically coherent and practically useful in different circumstances” (Han & 
Djulbegovic, 2019, p,185, emphasis added). It is in keeping too with Bohart’s (1999) insistence 
that concepts are tools that are “made to do work in different situations” (p.292). Finally, it is 
in keeping with the notion of therapy as conversation, and as the therapist as a “professional 
conversationalist” (Mair, 2000, p.335) or “a master conversational artist who facilitates the 
dialogical conversation and works from a position of ‘not knowing’” (Spinelli, 2001, p.6). 
 
It seems to me that in order to avoid imposing meaning on clients, we must be aware of and 
acknowledge the part we are playing in the co-construction of meaning rather than casting 
ourselves as objective bystanders helping our clients to realise their own meanings. Research 
such as this can help us to become reflexive conversationalists by sensitising us to conceptual 
aspects of experience that may be more or less present in clients’ awareness, and by helping 
us to respond in ways that are creative and intuitive rather than diagnostic and prescriptive. 
 
4.2.2 Meaning and language 
The question that remains is the extent to which it is possible, as Brennan (2001) suggests, to 
represent experiences in language. The role of language in defining reality is a central concern 
for counselling psychology (Woolfe, 2016), and although an in-depth exploration of the 
relationship between meaning and language is beyond the scope of this project, I would like 
to offer some brief reflections on how existential uncertainty, manifesting as a bodily 
awareness at cognitive and precognitive levels, might be represented in language in clinical 
work. 
 
The growing evidence that uncertainty is not only a conscious experience but may also 
manifest at preconscious or unconscious levels (Anderson, Carleton, Diefenbach & Han, 
2019) is consistent with the humanistic idea that “fully functioning persons are open to [two] 
sources of information: bodily felt senses and intellectual-conceptual thought” (Bohart, 2013, 
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p.91).4 The key question for practitioners is how meaning can be constructed from the 
existential uncertainty that manifests as a bodily felt sense and that sometimes eludes direct 
articulation in a conventional scientific discourse. One way to engage with this question is to 
broaden our conception of language beyond words. Mair (2012) writes: 
 
“Language is at the heart of conversational inquiry. It is not incidental or peripheral. This 
sense of language is not just in words and sentences, however important these are. It is 
to do with all the ways in which we body forth and convey meaning between and among 
ourselves. Language is in dress and design, in buildings and organizations, in music and 
gesture, in the silence between words and the stillness between movements.” (p.197) 
 
In other words, it is important for practitioners to be attentive to the different discourses on 
which clients might draw when trying to articulate their uncertainty, in particular the existential 
aspect of it, and to develop a facility with as many different discourses as possible so that our 
responses in the meaning-making endeavour are in harmony with clients’ chosen discourses, 
whether they be scientific, artistic, literary, musical, spiritual, religious, etc.. Taking this a step 
further, it is interesting to consider whether existential uncertainty might be more satisfactorily 
expressed in therapeutic approaches such as person-centred expressive arts therapy that 
bypass the limitations of language in favour of non-verbal modes of expression (Rogers, 2013) 
– a speculative suggestion, but something that future research might fruitfully explore. I believe 
the current research can be of practical value to counselling psychologists in drawing attention 
to the possibility that uncertainty is not always verbal-conceptual, and that the process of 
constructing a symbolic representation of a client’s uncertainty experience, i.e. the therapeutic 
conversation, may be as important as the representation itself (Bohart & Tallman, 1999). 
 
It follows from this that being a professional conversationalist must involve more than words. 
There is, of course, an irony in using 45,000 words to make this point, but it is an irony that is 
well established and explored by writers like Iris Murdoch, who wrestled in her first novel 
(2002/1954) with the difficulty of trying to get “under the net” of language. Mair (2012) suggests 
that “[i]n much of psychology, language is an embarrassment. Many seem to think that we 
would have a much better discipline if we could get rid of words and use statistics and 
mathematics instead.” (p.197) In spite of its shortcomings, however, language is still the most 
                                                          
4 In this paragraph and the one preceding it, I contrast ‘cognitive’, ‘conscious’ and ‘intellectual-conceptual’ on 
the one hand with ‘precognitive’, ‘preconscious’, ‘unconscious’ and ‘bodily felt senses’ on the other. In doing so, 
my intention is to be faithful to the terminology of the authors referenced rather than to suggest that the terms 
in the respective lists are strictly synonymous. The point I am making is about levels of awareness, where the 
two lists are assumed to point to different levels of awareness. 
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complex and nuanced symbolic system of meaning we have, and capable of expressing 
myriad things that statistics and mathematics cannot. It is also by definition central to the 
practice of talking therapies. This is why it is crucial to be aware of – and honest about – its 
shortcomings. It is why it is also crucial to engage with those shortcomings so that we can 




The shortcomings of language apply as much to this research endeavour as they do to the 
kinds of meaning that can be co-constructed in the therapeutic dialogue. As Gergen (2018) 
points out: “To describe the world essentially requires embracing a system of signs that are in 
place prior to observation. Regardless of observation, knowledge claims fall victim to the 
system of language.” (p.698) This implies a circularity in our use of language that is particularly 
difficult to escape in psychology – in order to label a psychological phenomenon, we must 
have some conceptual notion of what the label represents, which is confirmed by the labelling 
itself. I was most keenly aware of this circularity when I was coding the interviews in Phase 2 
– in order to code a passage as ‘existential uncertainty’, I obviously had to have some idea of 
what ‘existential uncertainty’ is (which of course I had courtesy of the Phase 1 
conceptualisation), so the risk was that the Phase 2 analysis would just find confirmation for 
the Phase 1 conceptualisation, effectively making the Phase 3 synthesis redundant. 
 
I managed this risk in two ways: firstly, by consciously resisting the temptation to code as 
existential uncertainty only those passages that referred explicitly to the defining attributes 
specified in the Phase 1 analysis and by remaining open to more intuitive insights – my 
identification in Phase 2 of ‘control’ as an important dimension of existential uncertainty 
(absent from the Phase 1 analysis) is evidence that this strategy was to some extent effective; 
and secondly, by paying particular attention to instances where participants seemed to be 
venturing into “territories beyond elementary articulation” (Gergen, 2018, p.709) through the 
use of analogy, metaphor, imagery and other ways we have for deploying language creatively 
to expand its capacities for meaning. 
 
Concept analysis methodological frameworks are not without their critics – for example, 
Beckwith, Dickinson and Kendall (2008) argue that concept analysis lacks depth, rigour and 
replicability. In choosing concept development as a methodology, I was aware that I was 
embarking on “a formal, linguistic exercise” (Walker & Avant, 2019, p.168), which would mean 
engaging with – and ultimately accepting – the limitations of language. I would not dispute that 
my conceptualisation of existential uncertainty lacks replicability inasmuch as if someone were 
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to use the same methodology to develop their own conceptualisation, they could not possibly 
come up with exactly the same result. No claim is made that the conceptualisation offered 
here is the only possible conceptualisation or even the most ‘correct’ conceptualisation – 
indeed, as Rodgers (2000) argues, concepts should be seen as: 
 
“…dynamic, rather than static; ‘fuzzy’, rather than finite, absolute, and ‘crystal clear’; 
context dependent, rather than universal; and […] possess[ing] some pragmatic utility or 
purpose, rather than an inherent ‘truth’.” (p.77) 
 
This, indeed, is the nature of language. 
 
I would argue that the concept development described above fulfils its stated aim of 
establishing a theoretically-informed conceptualisation of existential uncertainty. It is my hope 
that the establishment of an explicit and rigorous conceptualisation will give future research a 
firm basis from which to continue investigating its nature and effects. In other words, I conceive 
of this research project as part of a conversation – a conversation at the macro level of health 
research that is symbiotic with the conversations that take place at the micro level of the 
consulting room (Mair, 2000). In keeping with the pluralistic outlook of counselling psychology, 
I would welcome an alternative conceptualisation of existential uncertainty that might provide 
a counterpoint to the one offered here, and that might further our understanding of the 
uncertainty experienced by people living with cancer. 
 
 
4.4 A broader perspective on existential uncertainty 
The shadow that loomed over me as I carried out this research is that of Covid-19, “a novel 
disease and an unprecedented challenge to individuals, health care and society in the 
broadest sense” (Freeston, Tiplady, Mawn, Bottesi & Thwaites, 2020, p.12), or – more 
colourfully – a “vast, cruel sociological experiment [that] has confined people to their homes, 
radically disturbed their taken-for-granted knowledge and beliefs, and forced them to alter 
behaviors once casually, even unthinkingly, employed  in  their  everyday  personal,  working,  
and  social lives” (Goodson & Schostak, 2021). As it became clear in March 2020 that Covid-
19 was going to have a substantial (but as yet undefined) impact on all our lives, I became 
aware of a feeling of unease, a vague nausea in the pit of my stomach, that was accompanied 
by a difficulty concentrating and a restless boredom. I was not particularly worried about 
contracting the virus myself, nor was I specifically worried about any family or friends 
contracting it. The unease I felt was hazy and non-specific, while definitely being connected 
to the pandemic. There was an incredulity about the way things were turning out, the 
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restrictions on the way of life I took for granted – freedom to fly home and see family, to 
socialise with friends, to go to restaurants, shops, theatres, etc. What I found hardest to deal 
with was not knowing when it would all end. There was nothing I could do either to solve the 
problem or to escape it, and meanwhile the number of Covid-19 deaths climbed to 
inconceivable levels. In short – I experienced the defining attributes of existential uncertainty. 
 
By the time I came to do the Phase 1 concept analysis in July 2020, Covid-19 had already 
been around for some months. My response to the pandemic will undoubtedly have influenced 
what was salient for me in the data I was analysing in both Phase 1 and Phase 2 of the 
analysis. I think this will have had the advantage of sensitising me to the more ‘felt’ aspects of 
the uncertainty experience (‘awareness at precognitive levels’) and to the difficulty of 
expressing exactly what the uncertainty was about (which I attributed in part to the limits of 
language). When I carried out the interviews in July 2020, there were many things in 
participants’ accounts that resonated with what I was feeling. For example, Sam talked about 
the distinction between the uncertainty they felt after they were stabbed and the uncertainty 
related to their cancer, explaining that it helped in the former case to have someone to blame. 
I found myself wondering whether the restrictions under which I was living were difficult to 
accept in part because there was nobody to blame – just a virus that didn’t mean any harm 
because it didn’t mean anything at all, as I saw it – it was simply doing what viruses do. Another 
comment from the interviews that struck a chord with me was Liz’s feeling about her cancer: 
‘it’s happened once, it maybe can happen again’. Once the pandemic is over, can there be a 
return to the cosy certitude of our pre-Covid existence or will the possibility of another virus 
continue to lurk somewhere in the deeper recesses of our awareness even once things have 
supposedly ‘returned to normal’? 
 
None of this is to suggest that my experience of Covid-19 was the same as the experience of 
participants in the study who were living with cancer (and Covid-19 too, of course) – it is more 
to say that my own experience of uncertainty may have heightened my awareness of 
conceptual aspects of existential uncertainty that might otherwise have been less evident to 
me. It was important for me not to fall into the trap of finding confirming evidence in the 
interviews for whatever I was feeling, and one way of avoiding that trap was to remain alert to 
disconfirming evidence or differences. One such difference seemed to be that although Covid-
19 posed questions for me around meaning in life (which is to say it challenged my worldview), 
I didn’t question my identity in the way that the participants reported questioning theirs 




Although I have experienced existential uncertainty over the past year and a half, I did not, as 
far as I am aware, contract Covid-19, so I was never actually ill. This suggests that one doesn’t 
have to be diagnosed with anything in order to experience existential uncertainty, supporting 
the idea that it is always available to awareness rather than being something that is generated 
by a medical diagnosis. One of the theoretical implications of this is that the Han et al. (2011) 
taxonomy could provide a useful template for conceptualising uncertainty more broadly, not 
just in health care. In my Covid-19 example, one can easily identify scientific issues of 
uncertainty focused on the virus itself (genetic sequencing, transmission rates, risk factors), 
practical issues of uncertainty focused on the system, i.e. society (social distancing measures, 
travel restrictions, quarantining requirements), and personal issues of uncertainty (impact on 
relationships and meaning in life). A question for future research is whether this template could 
usefully be applied to any major life event that involves aspects of uncertainty at the scientific, 




Something that has reverberated for me throughout this research project is the famous quote 
from the poet Rilke (2011/1929), who made the following plea to a young poet with whom he 
was carrying on a correspondence: 
 
“I should like to ask you, as best I can, dear Sir, to be patient towards all that is unresolved 
in your heart and to try to love the questions themselves like locked rooms, like books 
written in a foreign tongue. Do not now strive to uncover answers: they cannot be given 
you because you have not been able to live them. And what matters is to live everything. 
Live the questions for now. Perhaps then you will gradually, without noticing it, live your 
way into the answer, one distant day in the future.” (p.18) 
 
I have tried to convey in this thesis a love of the questions themselves, and a belief that the 
way we engage with questions is as important as any answers we might find – a belief that 
underpins the relationship between counselling psychology and research (Rafalin, 2010). 
 
As concepts are fuzzy, ever-changing things, the development of the concept of existential 
uncertainty set out within these pages must be seen as a contribution to an evolving 
conversation rather than anything more definitive or enduring. I offer the conceptualisation as 
a tentative description of health-related existential uncertainty, which emphasises the 
importance of identity and worldview in managing the fundamental, ineradicable uncertainty 
of our being-in-the-world, and the challenge that a serious diagnosis can pose to our sense of 
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ourselves and of meaning in life. I hope that this conceptualisation will spark discussion and 
continued research that might further our understanding of the personal aspects of uncertainty, 
which have in past research been overshadowed by the endeavour to quantify and reduce its 
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6.1 Appendix 1 – Interview schedule 
 
 
Part 1. Object elicitation exercise 
‘Did you manage to identify one or two objects that are linked in your mind to the uncertainty 
associated with your cancer experience? Can you tell me why you chose these objects?’ 
 
[If participant does not have objects to show] 
‘Can you tell me what went through your mind when you thought about trying to choose 
objects that are linked to your uncertainty?’ 
 
Part 2. Interview questions 
Note: these questions will be adapted to take account of what has already been shared in 
Part 1. For example, if participants choose an object in Part 1 that is connected to their initial 
diagnosis, it may not be necessary to ask the first question below as they might already have 
shared this information. 
 
i. ‘How did you find out that you had cancer?’ 
ii. ‘What were the biggest questions you had in your mind around the time 
you were first diagnosed?’ 
iii. ‘How did these change over time?’ 
iv. ‘What did it feel like in your body to be living with this uncertainty? How 
about emotionally?’ 
v. ‘Who helped you to deal with your uncertainty?’ 
vi. ‘What did you do to make sense of your uncertainty?’ 
vii. ‘How aware were you of the uncertainty of life before your diagnosis?’ 
viii. ‘How has your relationship with uncertainty changed since your 
diagnosis?’ 
ix. ‘What does uncertainty mean to you now?’ 









6.2 Appendix 2 – Coding manual 
 
Coding manual setting out the eight aspects of uncertainty (column 1) that constitute the coding manual, including a working definition for each 
(column 2) and the broad question that might be said to underpin the uncertainty from the point of view of the patient (column 3). 
 
Aspect of uncertainty Working definition Operative question(s) 
Diagnosis Uncertainty as to the source of symptoms or the nature of an illness 
 
What is the matter with 
me? 
Prognosis Uncertainty as to the course and outcome of an identified illness – can pertain to blood 
test results, scans, etc. 
 
How will this illness 
develop into the future? 
Causal explanations 
 
Uncertainty as to how and why the illness arose and is taking the course it is 
 
How/why is this happening 
to me? 
Treatment* Uncertainty as to the optimal treatment of an identified illness for a particular individual 
in a particular context, including questions about side-effects 
 
Is this the best treatment 
for me? 
Structures of care Uncertainty as to “the competence of one's physician, the quality of care one can 
expect to receive from a given clinician or institution” (Han et al., 2011, p.833) or the 
identity of provider responsible for a particular aspect of one’s care – i.e. focusing on 
externals such as professionals, hospitals, etc. 
 
How much confidence can 
I have in my medical 
team? 
Processes of care Uncertainty as to “the responsibilities and procedures one must undertake to access 
care” (Han et al., 2011, p.833) – i.e. focusing on patient role within the context of 
structures of care 
 
What role do I play in my 
care? 
Psycho-social Uncertainty as to relationships and wider social factors, including practical concerns 
such as employment, money, housing, etc. 
 
How will this affect my life 
and the lives of those 
closest to me? 
Existential Uncertainty as to identity and meaning associated with an awareness of the 
undetermined but finite nature of one’s own being-in-the-world coupled with the 
necessity of making choices – drawing on different (non-medical) discourses and 
manifesting at different levels of consciousness 
Who am I really? What 
does all this mean? 
 
 
* ’Treatment recommendations’ in the taxonomy has been replaced with ‘treatment’ in the coding manual to broaden its purview beyond the recommendations per se. 
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Are you experiencing uncertainty? 
 
Would you like to be part of a research study exploring the different 
ways that uncertainty features in the cancer experience? 
 
 
We are looking for volunteers in the United Kingdom who were diagnosed with cancer within 
the last 5 years to help us understand better the meaning of uncertainty for them. 
 
Participation in this study would involve a short screening telephone call followed by 
one interview with a researcher at a later date lasting up to 90 minutes. The interview would 
take place online via videoconference, so it would not be necessary to leave home. 
 
During the interview you would be asked to describe  
your own experience of uncertainty and reflect on what it means for you. 
 
To find out more about this study, please contact: 
 
Conor Dwan 
Department of Psychology 
City, University of London 
 
 
This research project is supervised by: 
Prof Carla Willig 
 
 
This study has received ethics clearance from City, University of London Research Ethics 
Committee 
 
If you would like to complain about any aspect of the study, please contact the Secretary to the Senate 
Research Ethics Committee on . City, University of 
London is the data controller for the personal data collected for this research project. If you have any 
data protection concerns about this research project, please contact City’s Information Compliance 





6.4 Appendix 4 – Screening call protocol 
 
[The following text is designed to give a sense of what will be covered and said in the 
screening call, but the exact form will be adapted to fit the conversation as it unfolds.] 
 
Thank you for expressing an interest in taking part in this research study into the uncertainty 
experience of people living with cancer. 
 
This short call is an opportunity for me to tell you a little bit more about the study and to ask 
you a few questions about your current situation. It is also an opportunity for you to ask me 
any questions you may have about the study. Are you happy to go ahead with the call, and 
is now a convenient time? 
 
Just to give you a bit more detail about the study: 
 
 The aim of the study is to get a better understanding of uncertainty in the cancer 
experience. Although uncertainty is a big part of many people’s cancer experience, 
we don’t understand it fully. A deeper understanding of uncertainty may lead to 
improvements in the psychological support that is offered to people struggling to deal 
with cancer. 
 If you choose to take part, you will be interviewed by me about your personal 
experience of uncertainty in the context of your cancer diagnosis. The interview will 
last approximately 90 minutes, and it will take place remotely via videoconference 
(either Zoom or Microsoft Teams), so there will be no need for you to leave your 
home. If you agree to take part, you’ll receive a meeting invitation via e-mail which 
will enable you to join the meeting from your computer or other digital device. 
 The interview will be in two parts: 
o For the first part, I would like you to identify and talk about two objects that 
are linked in your mind to the uncertainty associated with your cancer 
experience. These objects can be anything at all and there are no right or 
wrong answers – so they can be anything from everyday objects like clothing 
and household items to documents, photographs and artwork. The most 
important thing is that you somehow associate the object with your 
uncertainty and are able to say something about that. 
o In the second part, I will be asking you a small number of open questions 
about your experience, but it will feel informal and you will be free to talk 
about whatever comes to mind. If you’re struggling to know what to say, I will 
give some prompts to help you. 
 The interview will be recorded using the videoconferencing software, and later I will 
transcribe and analyse it. Direct quotes from your interview may be used in the write-
up of the study, but your name and any identifying details will be removed to protect 
your anonymity. 
 
I have a few questions that I would like to ask you, if that’s okay: 
 
i. Firstly, can I ask what makes you interested in taking part in the study? 
ii. How long ago were you diagnosed with cancer? 
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iii. What type of cancer do you have? 
iv. How do you feel you are coping with the challenges of day-to-day living at the 
moment? 
v. Are you experiencing any thoughts of self-harm or suicide at the current time?  
vi. I would like to make you aware that the interview itself does not have a therapeutic 
aim, and could in fact bring up some difficult thoughts and feelings for you, which 
may generate more uncertainty for you in the hours and days following the interview. 
If this were to happen for you, who do you have around you to help support you? 
vii. Can I check what age you are? 
 
[If the answer to any of the questions above means the person is not eligible to take part in 
the study, the researcher will explain to them that they do not meet the eligibility criteria as 
set out in the recruitment material. In practice, this means: if the answer to (ii) is greater than 
5 years; if the answer to (vii) indicates the person is under the age of 18. 
 
If the answer to any of the questions above suggests that taking part in the study may not be 
in the person’s best interests, then the researcher will explain to them that it may be safer at 
this time to focus on ways of looking after themselves rather than take part in a research 
project, and signposting will be offered to appropriate support services, including local 
cancer support services (e.g. Maggie’s, Paul’s Cancer Support Centre, hospital open 
support groups) as well as more general services such as Samaritans, GP, A&E, depending 
on the level of distress discerned. In practice, this decision will be based on the following: if 
the answer to (iv) indicates the person is having difficulty coping with life at the moment; if 
the answer to (v) indicates the presence of thoughts of suicide or self-harm; if the answer to 
(vi) suggests the person is isolated and does not have support available to them should the 
interview prove unsettling for them. 
 
If the person is deemed eligible to take part in the study, they will be invited to ask the 
researcher any questions they have, and arrangements will be made as to when the 














Participant information sheet v1.1-rem  
6th April 2020 
 
 
Title of study: An exploration of uncertainty among people living with cancer 
 
Name of principal researcher: Conor Dwan 




We invite you to take part in a research study. Before you decide whether you would like to 
take part, it is important that you understand why the research is being done and what it would 
involve for you. Please take time to read the following information carefully and discuss it with 




What is the purpose of the study? 
The aim of the study is to get a better understanding of uncertainty in the cancer experience. 
Although uncertainty is a big part of many people’s cancer experience, we don’t understand it 
fully. A deeper understanding of uncertainty may lead to improvements in the psychological 
support that is offered to people struggling to deal with cancer. 
 
The study is being conducted as part of a doctoral training programme in counselling 
psychology at City, University of London. The study will be published in the form of a doctoral 
dissertation and may be published at a later date in an academic journal. 
 
 
Why have I been invited to take part? 
You have been invited to take part because you answered an advertisement asking people 
who are living with cancer and experiencing uncertainty to be interviewed about their 
experience. People who were given a cancer diagnosis within the last five years are eligible 





Do I have to take part? 
No. Participation in the project is voluntary and you are free to withdraw at any time without 
giving a reason or being disadvantaged in any way. It is up to you to decide whether or not to 
take part. If you do decide to take part you will be asked to sign a consent form. 
 
You may withdraw your data from the study up to the point at which the data has been 
analysed. If you withdraw your data before this point, the data will be destroyed. 
 
 
What will happen if I take part? 
If you choose to take part, you will be interviewed by a researcher about your personal 
experience of uncertainty in the context of your cancer diagnosis. The interview will be done 
remotely using videoconferencing software (either Zoom or Microsoft Teams) and last 
approximately 90 minutes. This means that it will not be necessary for you to leave your home 
in order to take part in this project, but you must have access to a computer or other digital 
device that allows you to access the internet. 
 
The interview will be in two parts: 
 
 In the first part, you will be asked to identify and talk about one or two objects that are 
linked in your mind to the uncertainty associated with your cancer experience (as 
discussed during the introductory phone call). These objects can be anything at all, 
from documents, photographs and artwork to everyday objects including clothing and 
household items. The most important thing is that you somehow associate the object 
with your uncertainty and are able to say something about that. 
 
 In the second part, you will be asked a small number of open questions about your 
experience, but it will feel informal and you will be free to talk about whatever comes 
to mind. If you’re struggling to know what to say, you’ll be given some prompts to help 
you. 
 
The interview will be recorded using the videoconferencing software before being transcribed 
and analysed. Direct quotes from your interview may be used in the write-up of the study, but 
your name and any identifying details will be removed to protect your anonymity. 
 
 
How will it work in practice? 
If, following the introductory phone call, you agree to take part, you will receive a meeting 
invitation over e-mail, with a link that will enable you to join the meeting at the agreed time. 
This link will enable you to join via your web browser, so it will not be necessary to download 
any additional software to your computer/device. However, if you already have the Zoom or 
Microsoft Teams app on your device, you will be able to join the meeting by entering the details 
from the meeting invitation into the app. 
 
You will also receive an e-mail with a consent form attached ahead of the meeting. You will 
need to complete this consent form and ‘sign’ it by typing your name and the date in the 
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appropriate spaces. You will then need to e-mail the form back to the researcher in order for 
the interview to go ahead. If you don’t manage to do this before the meeting, it can be done 
‘live’ at the beginning of the meeting. 
 
When the time of the meeting arrives, it is best if you can be in a private space with good wifi 
where you are not likely to be disturbed or distracted. 
 
Further information on Zoom can be found here: 
https://zoom.us/about 
 




What are the possible disadvantages and risks of taking part?  
Thinking and talking about objects that are relevant to your experience of uncertainty may lead 
you to uncover aspects of your experience that you had not previously considered. There is 
also a chance that talking about your experience of uncertainty may bring up some questions 
for you which make you feel more uncertain. This can be upsetting. The interview is a research 
interview rather than a counselling session, but if you decide after the interview that you would 
like to explore further some of the topics from the interview, we can support you in identifying 
an appropriate psychological support service that might be able to help. 
 
 
What are the possible benefits of taking part? 
By taking part you will be contributing to psychological research on uncertainty, which may 
lead to a deeper understanding of this phenomenon and, in time, of how people can be 
supported to cope with it. You may also view it as an opportunity to tell your own story to 
someone who is very interested, which many people find beneficial. 
 
 
Data privacy statement 
City, University of London is the sponsor and the data controller of this study based in the 
United Kingdom. This means that City is responsible for looking after your information and 
using it properly. The legal basis under which your data will be processed is City’s public task.  
 
Your right to access, change or move your information is limited, as we need to manage your 
information in a specific way in order for the research to be reliable and accurate. To safeguard 
your rights, we will use the minimum personal identifiable information possible. For further 
information please visit: https://ico.org.uk/for-organisations/guide-to-data-protection/guide-to-
the-general-data-protection-regulation-gdpr/lawful-basis-for-processing/public-task/ 
 
City will use your name and contact details to contact you about the research study as 
necessary. If you wish to receive the results of the study, your contact details will also be kept 
for this purpose. The only people at City who will have access to your identifiable information 
will be the research team. Identifiable information about you from this study will be destroyed 





You can find out more about City’s data protection policy here: 
https://www.city.ac.uk/about/governance/legal. 
 
If you are concerned about how we have processed your personal data, you can contact the 
Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO): https://ico.org.uk/ 
 
 
Will my taking part in the study be kept confidential? 
 Only the researcher and his supervisor will have access to your personal data. 
 All data will be anonymised prior to publication so you will not be identifiable in any of 
the published materials that result from the interview. 
 All data will be stored securely on a City OneDrive and identifiable information will be 
destroyed once it is no longer needed for the purposes specified above. 
 
 
What will happen to the results?  
The study will be published in the form of a doctoral dissertation and may be published at a 
later date in an academic journal. If you wish to receive the results of the study, there will be 
an opportunity to say so on the consent form. 
 
 
Who has reviewed the study? 
This study has been approved by City, University of London Department of Psychology 
Research Ethics Committee. 
 
 
What if there is a problem? 
If you have any concerns about this study, you should contact the research team. If you remain 
unhappy and wish to complain formally, you can do this through City’s complaints procedure. 
 
To complain about the study, you need to phone . You can then ask to speak 
to the Secretary to the Senate Research Ethics Committee and inform them that the name of 
the project is: An exploration of uncertainty among people living with cancer. 
 
You can also write to the Secretary at: 
 
 
Research Integrity Manager  
City, University of London 
Northampton Square 








City, University of London holds insurance policies which apply to this study, subject to the 
terms and conditions of the policy. If you feel you have been harmed or injured by taking part 
in this study you may be eligible to claim compensation. This does not affect your legal rights 
to seek compensation. If you are harmed due to someone’s negligence, then you may have 




If you have any queries about the research, please contact: 
 
Conor Dwan – researcher –  


















Title of study: An exploration of uncertainty among people living with cancer 
 
Name of principal researcher: Conor Dwan 
Research Ethics Committee reference number: ETH1920-1358 
 
To consent to participating in this study, please click reply to this e-mail, and then tick 
or initial each box below before typing your name at the bottom of the form (in lieu of 
signature) 
 
1 I have read and understood participant information sheet v1.1-rem dated 6th 
April 2020 for the above study. I have had the opportunity to think about the 
information and ask questions about anything I was unsure of. 
 
2 I understand that my participation is voluntary and I am free to withdraw without 
giving a reason. 
 
3 I understand that I will be able to withdraw my data up to the time when my data 
will be analysed. 
 
4 I agree for the interview to be recorded using videoconferencing software.  
5 I agree to City, University of London processing information about me. I 
understand that this information will be used only for the purposes explained in 
the participant information sheet and my consent is conditional on City 
complying with its duties and obligations under the General Data Protection 
Regulation (GDPR). 
 
6 I want to be informed of the results of this study once it has been completed and 
understand that my contact details will be retained for this purpose. 
 
7 I agree to take part in this study.  
 
 























Title of study: An exploration of uncertainty among people living with cancer 
 
Name of principal researcher: Conor Dwan 
Research Ethics Committee reference number: ETH1920-1358 
 
Thank you for taking part in this study. Now that it’s finished we’d like to tell you a bit more 
about it. 
 
The aim of the study is to get a better understanding of uncertainty in the cancer experience. 
Although uncertainty is a big part of many people’s cancer experience, we don’t understand 
it fully. 
 
By identifying common themes in the way that people living with cancer describe their 
thoughts and feelings around uncertainty, this study aims to clarify how different types of 
uncertainty relate to one another, for example uncertainty relating to diagnosis, treatment 
options or the meaning of life. The conversation we have had today is key to achieving this 
aim. 
 
The hope is that a deeper understanding of uncertainty may lead to improvements in the 
psychological support that is offered to people struggling to deal with cancer. 
 
If you feel that you need psychological support, charities such as Macmillan Cancer Support 
(www.macmillan.org.uk) or Maggie’s (www.maggiescentres.org) may be able to help. 
Alternatively your GP may be able to let you know about local sources of support available to 
you. 
 
We hope you found the study interesting. If you have any questions please do not hesitate to 
contact us: 
 
Conor Dwan – researcher –  
Professor Carla Willig – research supervisor –  
 
 




6.8 Appendix 8 – Key excerpts from the sources identified through Strand 1 of the search strategy for the concept analysis 
 
 
Source Existential uncertainty 




Abulof (2009)1 “The paper posits ‘small peoples’ as ethnic communities characterized by 
prolonged and deep-rooted uncertainty regarding their own existence. I argue 
that in modern times, ‘small peoples’ doubt the validity of their past-based 
ethnic identity and the viability of their future-driven national polity. Empirically, I 
analyze two distinct ‘‘small peoples’’—Israeli Jews and French Canadians 
(Québécois)—and argue that while the former have been more concerned with 
the future survival of their polity, the latter have been more concerned with 
insecurity about their identity.” 
[p.227] 
 
“The focus of Israeli Jews’ existential uncertainty has been and remains the 
future survival of their national polity (i.e., Israel as the Jewish state). French-
Canadians question the validity of their common ethnic identity. The former 
asks: ‘do we have a future?’- the latter: ‘do we have a past?’ These questions 












Abulof (2014)1 “The incomplete (or absent) legitimation for a collective identity or collective 
polity intensifies its members’ perception of insecurity (as existential 












“Existentialist philosophers maintain that the intuition of nothingness or non-
being that comes with the contemplation of one's death is a source of 
existential uncertainty or anxiety. […] I follow existentialist usage in using the 
term existential uncertainty to refer to the individual's awareness that his or 
her future is open and undetermined. In the medical encounter, existential 
uncertainty is that form of uncertainty which is experienced privately by the 
individual patient upon the realisation that the future life of his or her mind, 















“Whereas existential uncertainty is privately experienced, clinical uncertainty 
is the socially organised realisation by a member of the medical community that 
the knowledge needed to diagnose a disease and predict an outcome is 
missing. Whereas existential uncertainty is resolved by the individual's freely 
chosen actions, clinical uncertainty is a problem that invites a collective, 
intersubjectively verifiable solution. The normative assumption within scientific 
medicine is that the problem, puzzle, or conundrum which is the source of the 





“The clinician confronts the chaotic flux of disease seeking to discover an order 
within that chaos which will lead toward a cure, while the patient's project 




Ahmed, Terrill & 
Sherry (2019)1 
 
“Religious communities occupy a particularly important position in the 
management of identity based uncertainty. In addition to their role in fulfilling 
personal spiritual needs, religious communities function as internally cohesive 
social groups. They offer a profound sense of moral guidance and psychological 
wellbeing as well as a potent defence against the specific cognitive demands of 
existential uncertainty. [...]  Those encountering a deep-seated existential 
crisis are more likely to experience their religious self-construct as a “master 
identity”—one that satisfies their fundamental need for certainty around the 












vs group identity 
Sociology 
Belpame et al. 
(2019)1 
 
"Living with existential uncertainty 
In the interviews, all adolescent and young adult [AYA] survivors expressed that 
their past cancer experience had confronted them with their own vulnerability. 
Once they had understood the seriousness of their experience, a significant 
time afterwards, an existential uncertainty arose. This became a permanent 
factor, forever ingrained in their lives. One AYA survivor said in the interview 
that every time he had to fill out a questionnaire, for instance regarding 
insurance, he felt the uncertainty of his health status. [...] Digging deeper into 
the possibility of a future relapse, many AYA survivors mentioned that they had 
clearly been alerted to the possibility of a relapse in the early years following 
their cancer experience, but that their concern and fear of this had diminished 















assumed that a relapse could never be excluded, they experienced a certain 
degree of resignation. Furthermore, data revealed that a lot of survivors did not 
particularly consider a relapse as a risk, or renewed risk, of death. Rather, a 
relapse meant having to repeat the entire cancer experience again: the 
intensive treatment, the pain and discomfort." 
[p.e33] 
 
Participant quote under ‘living with existential uncertainty’ heading: “I don't 
think about the fact of dying; that you can die. Because, yes, you can always die 
and tomorrow, it's true, I could walk out the door and get run over by a car. So, 
that's not really what it's about. What's worse is that you would have to 
experience all of that once again, including the consequences (…). It genuinely 




Brothers (2008)1 “Although my professional involvements as a self-psychologically informed 
psychoanalyst have hardly been pain free, my connection to this field has 
increasingly become a source of pride and satisfaction. My recent investigation 
into experiences of existential uncertainty (or uncertainty about the availability 
of a relational exchange necessary for psychological survival) and how they are 











“I found that experiences of the ineluctable uncertainty that attends 
psychological survival is made bearable by means of the reciprocal regulatory 
processes that operate within living systems such as those involved in feeling, 
knowing, forming categories, making decisions, remembering and forgetting, 
sensing time, and fantasizing. To the extent that they bring some degree of 
orderliness to a relational exchange, they allow us to feel that our expectation of 
going-on-being need not even be questioned. 
 
Thoroughly dialogic in nature and inextricably embedded in relational systems, 
language is one of the most important of these processes. I discovered that it 
not only plays an indispensable role in transforming experiences of existential 
uncertainty, it is itself profoundly uncertain. Rather than being fixed and static, 



















altered, reshaped’. Consequently, we can never be sure of the meaning of any 
given word, nor can we fully know the implications of saying it.” 
[p.502] 
 
“I would like to take a closer look at that ‘something’ in terms of what I call 
‘existential uncertainty’. In my last book, I pointed out that, because we are 
profoundly dependent on others for our experience of differentiated selfhood, 
but we cannot fully know them, or ourselves for that matter, uncertainty about 
our psychological survival is an inescapable feature of human experience. I 
believe it is just the sense of naked aloneness that makes our confrontations 
with existential uncertainty so unbearable. Because these devastating 
experiences are likely to arise when the certainties that pattern psychological 
life are destroyed by trauma, I have come to think of people who have 
undergone trauma as exiles. They have lost contact with a once-familiar world 
in which the availability of a self-sustaining emotional give and take with other 





“But what most distinguishes Murakami as an analyst after my own heart is that 
he continually grapples with what I call ‘existential uncertainty’, or the 
unbearable awareness that we can never be sure that others will participate in 










“In my view, feeling that one is a welcome and familiar member of the human 
family goes a long way toward mitigating the anguish of what I have called 











Cohen (1993)4 “Uncertainty varies in degree of magnitude, intensity, and saliency - from the 
overarching, existential issues of life and death to the inconsequential 















“A near total transformation is one in which the individual experiences an abrupt 









Quoting Ipswitch (1979): “We moved into another world… It was a world that did 
not take on reality until you were in it. It was as if Scott and I entered one of 
those old-fashioned paperweight scenes where we could see out and others 




“Suddenly, family relationships take on a temporal quality and thinking about the 
future seems to invite the threat of loss. Present time becomes discontinuous 
with past and future time. Mental confusion and behavioral disorganization 
occur as parents ‘switch worlds’ and move from the secure world of the known, 
the familiar, and the predictable to a normless world of ambiguous boundaries, 





“Parents and doctors experience the event of diagnostic certainty quite 
dissimilarly. For the physician, the occasion brings closure to a series of 
questions and hypotheses and provides reasonably clear direction for his or her 
subsequent decisions and actions. [...] For the parents, however, diagnostic 
certainty only answers the question ‘What is wrong with my child?’ It does not 
provide any sense of closure nor suggest how they should proceed. Their 
uncertainty, which until the time of diagnosis had been unidimensional, quickly 
becomes multidimensional and spreads to every aspect of family life, raising 
countless unanswerable questions and fears. Parents are now confronted with 





















“Described significances for reporting/non-reporting [of occupational disorders] 
were related to financial compensation, to a part of organizational political game 
or to an existential uncertainty, i.e. questioning if it belonged to their chosen 
work and life.” 
[p.176] 
 







Friberg & Öhlen 
(2007) 1 
 
Participant quote: “You are interested in the other things, not the disease itself.” 
[p.220] 
 





“One important project became the search for a unifying picture, and John 
reflectively explored the situations he went through and turned to literature in 
order to get an answer. When his situation deteriorated, he realized that only 











“One striking and important finding was the patient’s need to talk about the 
uncertain future combined with the health professionals’ vague or sometimes 






patients vs health 
professionals 
“Thus, managing and confronting existential uncertainty and living existential 
certainty will both frame, co-create and be co-created by the knowledge seeking 
behaviour of patients receiving palliative care. […] Perhaps a reluctance to talk 
about prognosis and future is related to the strict frames of the medical 
discourse itself. In order to talk about the future with palliative cancer patients, 















Furtak (2019) 1 “One way in which Kierkegaard offers existential guidance to his reader with 
regard to ‘the uncertainty of earthly life, in which everything is uncertain’ (CUP 
1, 86/SKS 7, 85) is to portray unsuccessful ways of dealing with the varieties of 
uncertainty that are entailed by the finite limitations of our epistemic standpoint. 
There are cases in which what we long to know is, by its very nature, 
inaccessible to us - such as the mind of another, or what is going to happen in 
the future. And there are other cases in which the kind of knowledge that we 
can gain does not remove the fundamental uncertainty of our predicament. Yet 
the aspiration to arrive at definite answers, to have everything resolved and 
finished, does not just characterize the Cartesian or Hegelian philosophers from 
whom we can easily distinguish ourselves. This wish to be liberated from the 
cognitive limits that are a structural feature of the human condition is one that is 
liable to plague us all – including those of us who are prompted by 
Kierkegaard’s writings to want to heed his warning against this very wish. He 
therefore issues reminders to us in various contexts and in a diversity of voices, 
continually telling his reader: this pertains to you.” 
[p.383] 















“’Do You Know Who You Are?’ Radical existential doubt and scientific 
certainty in the search for the kidnapped children of the disappeared in 
Argentina 
 
During the Argentine military dictatorship (1976–83) up to 30,000 people 
disappeared. Included among them were an estimated 500 children who were 
handed over to families related (or with close ties) to security forces. The 
Grandmothers of the Plaza de Mayo formed to discover their fate. During the 
1980s, the Grandmothers used newly available genetic technologies as a 
means of verifying the identities of potential grandchildren to reunite them with 
their biological families. In the 1990s, custody was no longer an issue because 
the children were legally adults. Forced to change their strategy, they embarked 
on public campaigns directing those with ‘doubts about their identity’ to contact 
the organization. This article provides an ethnographic analysis of these public 
campaigns to advance theoretical perspectives on the nature of embodied truth 
and the transformation of individual concerns regarding personal identity to 












Lamy, Ward & 
Liu (2013) 1 
 
“The motivation for ethno-cultural continuity (MEC) scale was developed to 
capture the agency of minority individuals in the long-term acculturation of their 
group and their dedication to cultural persistence over many generations. […]  
As expected, higher values were found among Jews and Māori than Chinese. 
Together with traditional ethnocentric predictors, MEC predicted intentions for 
endogamy and in turn selective dating for Jews and Māori, but not for Chinese. 
Results are interpreted in terms of existential uncertainty experienced by 
“small peoples” and the impact of collective interests on individual behavior.” 
[p.1047] 
 
“The results of this study demonstrated that MEC was structurally equivalent 
across cultures and prevalent across all three ethno-cultural group samples. As 
expected, higher scores were observed among members of ‘small peoples’. 
This demonstrates that group factors impact individual motivation to ensure 
ethno-cultural continuity: the existential uncertainty experienced by Jews and 
Māori as groups is reflected in the psychology of Jewish and Māori individuals 










Gullick et al. 
(2017) 1 
“Acute coronary syndrome disrupts lived temporality, and the projected potential 
for carers’ being-alongside. Carers experienced an existential uncertainty that 














“Scholars across a range of disciplines have increasingly argued that the 
intractability of political conflicts is rooted in the proliferation of competing 
historical narratives. These collective narratives construct the basis of a sense 
of shared collective identity. Narrative and identity are thus increasingly 
conceptualized as fundamental to the maintenance and reproduction of political 
conflict. In this paper, I explore two underlying conceptions of identity that have 
emerged in the literature on youth and political conflict. One conception views 
identity as a burden for youth, suggesting that youth perceive the need to 
internalize a master narrative of collective identity that provides a sense of 
security and solidarity in the midst of existential uncertainty. Though 
psychologically beneficial, this internalization is problematic in the reproductive 















“A multifaceted contemporary movement aims to correct alleged weaknesses in 
the scientific foundation of psychoanalysis. For both pragmatic-political and 
scientific reasons we are encouraged to do and/or study systematic empirical 
research on psychoanalytic process and outcome, as well as apparently 
relevant neuroscience. The thesis advanced here is that the privileged status 
this movement accords such research as against in-depth case studies is 
unwarranted epistemologically and is potentially damaging both to the 
development of our understanding of the analytic process itself and to the 
quality of our clinical work. In a non-objectivist hermeneutic paradigm best 
suited to psychoanalysis, the analyst embraces the existential uncertainty that 
accompanies the realization that there are multiple good ways to be, in the 
moment and more generally in life, and that the choices he or she makes are 
always influenced by culture, by socio-political mind-set, by personal values, by 
countertransference, and by other factors in ways that are never fully known. 
Nevertheless, a critical, nonconformist psychoanalysis always strives to expose 
and challenge such foundations for the participants’ choices. The ‘consequential 
uniqueness’ of each interaction and the indeterminacy associated with the free 
will of the participants make the individual case study especially suited for the 











advancement of ‘knowledge’ - that is, the progressive enrichment of sensibility - 






Öhlen (2014) 1 
 
“Since suffering is about experiencing a threat to one's existence, uncertainty 
needs to be related to the existential dimension of life. […] In particular, when a 
person becomes ill with cancer, the bodily experience involves becoming aware 
of one's own mortality and this awareness means to live in existential 
uncertainties due to the mortal threat to the body. It follows that the existential 
uncertainty of individuals in this situation is about the uncertainty of the 
prospect of the disease trajectory, about being able to survive or not and how 











life before death 
n/a Nursing 
“Although existential uncertainty prevails in cancer patients, there are studies 
which show that they can also experience certainty and even existential 
certainty in the sense of having a fresh take on life, getting to know themselves 
better and appreciating their families in a different way.” 
[p.2] 
 
“The participants described different kinds of experiences with nature and 
related that in close proximity to nature they could find existential certainty in 
their existential uncertainty. For example, some of the participants described 
how they enjoyed walking quickly or slowly in the natural environment, and 
being close to the sea and perhaps going for a swim. Through the power of 
each person's different senses, nature awakened vivid memories within them. 
[…] The present could be experienced as more certain, as opposed to the 
future, which appeared more uncertain as a result of living with advanced 
cancer and receiving palliative treatment. […] Being personally involved in 
planning important things for the future was described by the participants as 
providing a greater sense of certainty in their existential uncertainty. It was 
also meaningful to have a goal to look forward to, having something ahead of 
them that was perceived as meaningful.” 
[p.5] 
 













Participant quote: “Other people know that they will die; the fact that we will die 
is the only thing we know, it's just that I know it in a different way. I suppose it's 







“Living with a life-threatening cancer was highlighted by some participants as 
having resulted in a completely new attitude to life and self-insight, and they 
expressed having experienced personal growth in a positive sense during their 
period of illness. Existential uncertainty had raised the question of what was 
important in their individual lives and promoted the insight that there is no point 
in wasting time on boring things - it was more important to choose things that 







Participant quote: “Yes, you take charge of it. I think something good can come 







“Palliative care policy and guideline documents tend to cover existential issues 
to a much lesser degree than symptom distress. However, when existential 
questions are not addressed by helathcare professionals, or addressed in an 







“It became evident in our study that patients are concerned with aspects of 
uncertainty that, from the physician's perspective, are unlikely to be seen as 
relevant to the decision-making process. Uncertainty about social integration in 
a patient's usual life, for instance, or uncertainty about one's ability to cope with 
disease-related life changes, do not seem to be immediately linked to a 
treatment decision. However, from the patient's point of view these aspects 










Kinnvall (2004) 1 “The globalization of economics, politics, and human affairs has made 
individuals and groups more ontologically insecure and existentially uncertain. 
One main response to such insecurity is to seek reaffirmation of one’s self 
identity by drawing closer to any collective that is perceived as being able to 
reduce insecurity and existential anxiety. The combination of religion and 











rapid change and uncertain futures, and is therefore more likely than other 
identity constructions to arise during crises of ontological insecurity.” 
[p.741] 
 
“By supplying a consistent structure, religion thus provides order from the chaos 
and uncertainty in the world. In doing this, religion and nationalism both provide 
answers to questions concerning existence itself, the external world and human 




Trivin (2020) 1 
 
“Individuals turn towards identifiable in-groups to reduce uncertainty in social 
interaction. By reducing existential uncertainty, economic development 
undermines the rationality of in-group bias and, as such, facilitates the 
emergence of generalized trust. Conversely, income inequality may undermine 













Kosloff (2010) 1 
 
“Because the meaning- and value-conferring aspects of death-denying 
worldviews are fragile social constructions, and confidence in their absolute 
validity is continually susceptible to threats, people are rendered existentially 
uncertain: unsure whether their lives have ultimate meaning and significance or 
whether they are instead fated only to absolute annihilation upon death.” 
[p.195] 
 
“While the exact circumstances of our physical death are indeed uncertain, its 
inevitability is undeniable and we are aware of the possibility that it signals the 
















Sullivan (2012) 1 
 
“We introduce a novel account of the role of uncertainty in extremism that builds 
on terror management theory and the existential theorizing of Ernest Becker 
(1969). We argue that people are particularly threatened by existential 
uncertainty – uncertainty about life’s significance – because it signals the 
possibility that they are insignificant and destined only for death. People 
normally minimize existential uncertainty by investing in their cultural 
worldview’s bases for viewing life as significant. However, people remain 
existentially uncertain to varying degrees because they can never be certain 
that the mainstream cultural worldview is absolutely true. Thus, they may 












uncertainty, reducing their conceptions of the world and themselves to 
exceedingly narrow dimensions that afford confident (albeit limited) bases for 
viewing life as significant. We argue that extremism can be profitably 
understood as the use of fetishism to minimize existential uncertainty. To 
support this claim we review recent research showing that inducing existential 
uncertainty increases people’s preference for simplified and concrete 
conceptions of the social world and themselves in ways that are typically 
associated with extremism. We then analyze real-world cases of extremism to 
show that social environments known to breed extremism are likely to arouse 
acute existential uncertainty, and that diverse patterns of extremist thought 
and behavior can be understood as fetishism.” 
[p.131] 
 
“First, we propose that existential uncertainty – uncertainty about how, and 
whether it is possible to, achieve a significant life – is particularly threatening 
because certain belief in life’s significance serves as a shield against anxiety-
arousing thoughts of death.” 
[p.132] 
 
Lewis & Bates 
(2013) 1 
“The second account of religiosity which we draw on here suggests that 
religiosity emerges as a source of existential certainty, generating a sense of 
agency and control, and thus serving to reduce feelings of anxiety.” 
[p.399] 
 
“Existential uncertainty was measured with the following two items: ‘The world 
is too complex for me’; ‘I cannot make sense of what's going on in the world’… 












McCoy (2018) 1 “Through ethnographic description and phenomenological interpretation, this 
article explores the ways in which the familiar world solicits this individual into 
reflecting about his sense of self amidst existential uncertainty.” 
[p.421] 
 
“I borrow the concept of ‘solicitation’ from Dreyfus and Kelly to describe what 
happens when worldly phenomena draw responsive activity from the individual. 
I further suggest that there are a range of solicitations, from those that solicit my 
basic skills to those that drastically alter my understanding of the world and my 
self. These more profound solicitations I call ‘existential solicitations’. 
sense of self; 
profound 
basic vs profound Anthropology 
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Solicitation, in this existential sense, draws from the original Latin sense of the 
word sollicitare meaning to agitate, arouse, or set the whole in motion. An 
existential solicitation stirs me to think over my existence, and in a deeply 
involved way. As Throop notes, varieties of reflective experience may emerge 







“Prescribed medications are supposed to support future health. However, this 
study revealed that existential uncertainty among the participants was 
increased by the experience of side effects and by increased doubt that the 
medication was good for their health.” 
[p.2759] 
 
“The findings provide an understanding of the experience of managing 
medication and will be useful for both nurses and physicians when caring for 
and prescribing medications to older people with multimorbidity. It is evident that 
the existential uncertainty involved in self‐management of medications is 
increased by the experience of side effects and fear of medical errors. This 
creates an ambivalence that can be a barrier for the correct and safe 
management of medications. It is important that care providers build and 
maintain empathetic patient relationships. In this way, existential uncertainty 
among the participants seems to diminish, and the patients feel more secure in 











Miké (2000) 1 “The second imperative of the ethics of evidence is a reminder that there will 
always be uncertainty. I distinguish between two kinds: scientific uncertainty, 
essentially dynamic, constantly changing with progress in research, but never 
fully eliminated, because of intrinsic limitations of the scientific method, and 
existential uncertainty, always present, because the question of meaning, the 
greatest mystery, is beyond the scope of science.” 
[p.357] 
 
“This view points the way to the synthesis we seek, since in the end we have to 
deal with more than scientific uncertainty. The source of our deepest anguish is 
existential uncertainty. Beyond physical pain, it is this existential anguish that 
may drive some people to seek a way out by ending their own lives. To come to 
terms with the uncertainty of meaning, the ethics of evidence counsels a look at 
















“Atheists who experience dissonance between their self-perception and non-
belief in God—and agnostic theists who are prone to existential uncertainty 












Parry (2003) 1 “Although the [long term survivors] in this study discussed cancer as a source of 
uncertainty, the majority also discussed it as a source of existential certainties 
and certainty in one's own strength and resilience.” 
[p.238] 
 
“Certainty and uncertainty are linked and dialectic in the sense that the process 
of unfolding uncertainty (or awareness of uncertainty) simultaneously fosters a 
focus on and embracing of certainties (appreciation of life, strength, deeper 
meaning in life, etc.) and the development of faith and hope. It is my proposition 
that uncertainty and certainty might not be oppositional forces; instead, they 
might be dialectic, reflexive, and inextricably linked.” 
[p.239] 
 
“Thus, for some [long term survivors], the reconstituted world is not built as 
awareness of existential uncertainty fades over time; rather, it is constructed 
as uncertainty is integrated into the survivor's worldview and sense of self.” 
[p.240] 
 
“Discomfort with death, so prevalent in many Western societies, might 
contribute to the development of theories that survivors must repress, cope 
















“Accompanying such challenges is not only anxiety and concern, but also 
existential angst; that is, a confrontation with the limitations of one's own 
mortality. […] what remains under-researched are the existential crisis and 
subsequent ethical questioning of self, family and place in the social world. 
Such ethical and existential questions focus on the value and purpose of life; 

















“For participants the experience of cancer survivorhood gave life enhanced 
meaning. That is, the lived experience of cancer survival is not just 
understanding the cancer experience; it is also making sense of a human life 




Penrod (2001)4 “Confidence and control are described as ‘feelings’ to accentuate that 
uncertainty is not simply a set of probabilities, but a state of being.” 
[p.241] 
 
“Lack of knowledge is often identified as the underlying cause of uncertainty, 
and many interventions are designed to give the individual the information 
needed (as determined by an ‘other’. Yet, as shown by Dove [1993], this 
assumption is not always supported; in some cases, bolstering confidence or 










Penrod (2002)4 “Fleshing out the skeletal framework: concept correction 
 
 Uncertainty is a perception of doubt or not knowing that is brought 
about by cognitive and pre-cognitive ways of knowing. 
 States of uncertainty are uniquely determined by an individual's 
perception of being in the world - while opportunities for uncertainty 
may abound, the state is highly individualized. 
 Highly individualized perceptions of confidence and control create a 
dynamic flow of varied types of uncertainty and modes of uncertainty, 














cognitive ways of 
knowing 
Nursing 
Penrod (2007)4 “…whether the doubt is situational (i.e. based on a particular context) or 
existential (i.e. situated as a broader issue of human existence), different 












“Uncertainty is possible only when evidence (cognitive and/or precognitive 
forms) permeates being to a level of awareness that prompts a tallying and 








and/or control. This is why distraction and other forms of blocking of authentic 
being in the world (i.e. a state in which the precognitive and cognitive evidence 
are embraced into awareness rather than held away from being) are effective 






in the world 
precognitive 
evidence 
“The derived modes of uncertainty specify whether event specific (i.e. 




global issues specific events vs 
global issues 
“...it was discovered through phenomenological inquiry that for some 
uncertainties (particularly in the existential mode) probabilities cannot be 
appreciated; the person simply cannot identify, take in or process evidence.” 
[p.662] 
 
“In contrast, during existential modes of uncertainty, when different ways of 
knowing are highly influential in forming perceptions of confidence and/or 
control, information was not helpful. In fact, during these states of existential 
uncertainty (especially of the overwhelming type), additional or new 
information contributed to feelings of being out of control and challenged 














“This emphasizes the shifting temporality of uncertainty. Uncertainty is a 
present-oriented state that is influenced by perceptions of the past and future 
reflected in precognitive sensations (e.g. a feeling in your gut that this is right) or 















“In Nelson’s study, the existential mode was reflected primarily in the themes 
that focused on how the women encountered issues when introspectively 
considering the self with cancer and the self in reference to the world of women 
with breast cancer. Much like the caregivers in this study, these women were 




world of women; 
meaning; 
grand scale 




the illness and its treatment into perspectives of life on a ‘grander scale’ (Nelson 
1996, p. 73). Introspective processes marked these existential modes.” 
[p.666] 
 
Persson et al. 
(2012)4 
“Lack of information and education often leads to an experienced lack of control 
that results in uncertainty and causes psychological suffering for the patients. 
However, the usefulness of information can differ severely. Information was 
identified as most useful in situational ways of uncertainty but not helpful during 
existential uncertainty, i.e. when knowledge is highly influential for forming 
one’s perceptions of confidence and/or control. During states of existential 
uncertainty (especially of overwhelming type), additional or new information 
has in fact been proved to contribute to feelings of being out of control and 
unable to take in or assimilate the information adequately. Thus, providing 
information depending on context is essential, and we need to address both 
situational ways and existential ways of uncertainty. The participants in the 
present study could be seen living with an underlying existential uncertainty 
throughout their life where uncertainty is a normative state i.e. that people 
having an increased risk of developing cancer live with uncertainty because 
















“Theory and research derived from the humanistic tradition suggest that in the 
pursuit of existential meaning and significance, people sometimes pursue goals 
of personal growth and self-expansion and such pursuits often involve 
approaching, not avoiding, personal uncertainty. People study other cultures 
and religions, travel to foreign lands, deliberately strive to challenge longheld 
assumptions and beliefs, engage in self-scrutiny in the service of self-
improvement, strive for a sense of uniqueness from others, and pursue intrinsic 
goals. Such behaviors might provide existential meaning but would not 
necessarily provide the best means to attain either informational or personal 
certainty. In sum, a compelling theory that offers uncertainty reduction as the 
core existential motive needs to better consider theory and research that 
suggests that people’s quests for existential security need not always journey 












Friberg (2016) 1 
 
“Being physically active while living with unexplained chest pain means 
balancing between existential uncertainty and existential certainty. […] The 









therein lies an existential dimension. Exposed to existential aspects such as 
vulnerability during physical activity, the respondents bring themselves in the 





Røysland et al. 
(2016) 1 
“An existential dimension exists here in that participants talked about exercise 
bringing them into the vicinity of illness and even death. […] Being uncertain 
made the participants vulnerable. Embarking on an exercise training 
programme seemed to imply a process in which existential uncertainty was 
challenged. Against the background of not knowing enough about the erratic 
pain in their chests, the participants wondered what kind of exercise they could 




“…physical activity may have an existential meaning and might influence the 











Rubin (2018) 1 “The present research used individual difference measures of the chronic fear 
of (1) self-annihilation and (2) existential uncertainty to investigate the extent 




“The four items in the Transcendental Consequences scale assess fear about 
uncertainty regarding what happens after death. Again, the items in this scale 
start with the phrase “death frightens me because of...,” and they end with either 
“the uncertainty of what to expect,” “the uncertainty of any sort of existence after 
death,” “its mysteriousness,” or “the unknowns associated with it.” Participants 
responded to the items in these scales and the other scales in this study using a 
7-point scale ranging from strongly disagree (1) to strongly agree (7).” 
[p.301] 
 












Risør (2016) 1 
 
“Serious illnesses confront people with the uncertainty of life itself.” 
[p.367] 
 
“Uncertainties that are still experienced in everyday lives of former cancer 









or dying, being healthy or not, and knowing how to take part in, enjoy, and fulfil 
a role in everyday social life. These uncertainties are intrinsic to life itself, but 
when severe conditions such as cancer are diagnosed, they become more 







“Our main understanding of uncertainty and risk in this study does not start from 
a focus on the risk of cancer recurrence in itself or on whether risk is managed 
as an objective risk or a perceived risk or whether the approaches to uncertainty 
are rational or non-rational. Following Jenkins, Jessen, and Steffen (2005) we 
instead view uncertainty as a state of being, focusing on the symbolic and 
existential dimension of it - something that a risk discourse departing from 
clinical risk does not fully encompass.” 
[p.368] 
 
state of being clinical risk 
“The participants talked about the ways in which they trained themselves not to 
make their worries and concerns a frequent topic of discussion, as this would 
only serve to validate them and make them more tangible to others, and, at the 
same time, possibly jeopardise their everyday social life. Drawing on 
existentialist philosophy, it is possible to argue that the worries or uncertainties 
acquired a reality through the meaning the participants gave them. When the 
participants started talking about them, they became much more ‘real’ than 
when they only existed more implicitly between them. Keeping uncertainties 





implicit vs explicit 
“Participants in our study talked about striving to stay in their present, everyday 
life situations. Central to this was being able to maintain their roles in important 
relationships to family, friends and colleagues.” 
[p.380] 
 
“We also observed one aspect of 'balancing' which was about including others 
in one's life, accepting that others were close enough, old enough, resilient 
enough, about to provide support or simply able to listen to what was shared as 
a good colleague, friend or relative. Another dimension of balancing was about 
protecting others from worries and uncertainties that could not be shared 







private vs shared 
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Soroka (2007) 1 “I argue that Vynnychenko's utopian novel, complex in form and controversial in 
concept, can be explained as much by his ‘voluntary’ exile in Germany, which 
resulted in a state of existential uncertainty, a feeling of extreme 







Sperry (2016) 1 “I will demonstrate how a theoretical knowledge of complexity enables one to 
grasp the phenomenology of complexity, namely the feeling of living in and with 
the irreducible complexity of human experience, of being open to novelty, and of 









Stockl (2007) 1 “Adamson (1997) describes two uncertainties: one is the existential 
uncertainty of having to deal with the impact of uncertain diagnosis on life 
strategies, a second is an epistemological uncertainty which afflicts clinicians 













Tersbøl (2006)3 Thus the aim of the present article is first of all to give voice to a group of 
Namibian men who are either unemployed or in poorly remunerated jobs. […] A 
second aim is to situate the experiences of men within the context of historical 
and socio-economic structures and dynamics pertaining to Namibia to attempt 
to understand how concerns over HIV/AIDS may be marginalised in relation to 
concerns over identity and existential doubt. Finally, the article argues that 
when attempting to promote reproductive health, including safe sexual 
practices, in a context where both women and men lack hope for the future, 
efforts need to go beyond information campaigns. Prevention efforts should 
take their starting point in experiences of social and symbolic exclusion and 











vs concerns over 
existential doubt 
Health 
van den Bos 
(2009)2 
“Personal uncertainty is defined as the aversive feeling that you experience 
when you feel uncertain about yourself.” 
[p.197] 
 
“I argue that although informational uncertainty is important, we should not 














type of uncertainty, and I think that, compared with informational uncertainty, it 
is even more important to understanding self-regulation, existential sense-
making, and world-view defense. […] I define personal or self-uncertainty as a 
subjective sense of doubt or instability in self-views, worldviews, or the 
interrelation between the two. […] …personal uncertainty is the feeling that you 
experience when you feel uncertain about yourself.” 
[p.198] 
 
“It is my assumption that personal uncertainty and meaning maintenance 
processes may be strongly related, at least under some circumstances. Thus, 
personal uncertainty and existential sense-making may be associated intimately 
with each other. […] I argue that people have a fundamental need to feel certain 
about their world and their place within it and that too much personal uncertainty 
threatens the meaning of existence.” 
[p.200] 
 
“Persons or events that bolster one’s cultural worldviews provide the existential 
meaning one is looking for under conditions of personal uncertainty; an effect 
one could label as the existential uncertainty effect.” 
[p.203] 
 
“Ironically, it could be argued that the fact that one day we will die is the only 
absolute certainty that we humans have. This indeed may be the case, but this 
may confound informational uncertainty with personal uncertainty. That is, this 
does not mean that there is no social psychological relationship between 
contemplating death and feelings of personal uncertainty. You can be certain 
that you are going to die someday, but being reminded about your mortality may 
trigger feelings of personal uncertainty (e.g., why am I here, what is the 
meaning of the life I am leading and the activities I am engaged in, etc.). 
 
“It is my hypothesis that it is not so much the (informational) uncertainty as to 
when and how we will die that is important in the relationship between mortality 
salience and uncertainty thoughts, as Landau et al. (2009) and other terror 
management theorists seem to propose. I propose rather that an important 
effect of being reminded of their death is the emergence of feelings of personal 
uncertainty. After all, being reminded about the termination of their existence 
probably makes some people uncertain about themselves, their future, or their 
current personal situation, including their personal cultural worldviews (Van den 





tolerate personal uncertainty may be strategies that at least some people use to 
deal with their awareness of death. This may highlight psychological processes 
not studied earlier in mortality salience experiments. Thus, at a bare minimum 
terror management theory should be extended to encompass feelings of 
personal uncertainty as one of the psychological processes instigated by 
mortality salience. Personal uncertainty may also be an important concept to 
study because in everyday life it may be an issue that people are confronted 
with more frequently than issues terror management tends to focus on, such as 
death and the utter annihilation of the self.” 
[p.208] 
 
van der Merwe 
& Jonker (2013) 
1 
“In this article the authors seek to conceptualize a dynamic and inclusive 
understanding of personal identity within multicultural democracies such as 
South Africa, which will draw on both the liberal and communitarian traditions’ 
respect for the project of self. A preliminary layout for such a project emerges 
from a literature survey of recent, primarily South African publications on identity 
and culture, and it suggests that selfhood depends on: a) virtues, cultivated 
within cooperative communities which allow for effective freedom; b) a venture 
into existential uncertainty, which alleviates that fear of loss of identity that is 
supposedly central to many multicultural conflicts; c) the hermeneutic 
construction of identity through narratives that allow for a plurality of voices; and 
d) the creative transcending and re-interpretation of values and traditions. The 
authors contend that such an understanding of identity goes some way towards 
addressing the question of the way that diverse personal and group identities 
are to be accommodated in South Africa’s multicultural democracy, and to 
rethinking the unity which underlies diversity without resorting to liberalism’s 
reduction of personal identity to rational autonomy.” 
[p.271] 
 
loss of identity n/a Humanities 
Warran, 
Fancourt & 
Perkins (2019) 1 
“The first superordinate theme deals with how the choir may provide support in 
the face of existential uncertainty. For example, participants described the 
choir as providing a distraction from thinking about death, in addition to an 
awareness of death in the rehearsal room which heightened the connection 
between choristers: 
 
I think the combination of the music, which is so joyful, and the sense of 
mortality that must shadow all of us in that room makes it particularly powerful, 












Christopher also reported that the choir ‘does seem to inject a kind of purpose 
into the week’, which was supported by David, who commented that the choir 
‘gives hope’, and Jason, who stated that the choir provides ‘something to aim 
for, instead of having nothing to aim for’. It would seem that whereas having 
cancer brings about a heightened sense of mortality, the choir facilitates 
enhanced connection with others and provides a sense of purpose. This 
suggestion was reinforced by, and interconnected with, the first subtheme in 
this category: the dichotomy between the cancer experience and the choir 





Prieth (2020) 1 
 
“What does end-of-life care mean in late modern western societies? Generally 
speaking, this subject deals with the collective coping process with the universal 




death n/a Sociology 
Yair (2007) 1 
 
“Actors are actually driven by existential uncertainty and personal anxiety, 
vying for self-esteem rather than for objective future payoffs. This motive of 
action appears to be ‘warm’ and emotional; one that is intimately related to 
facets of self and identity.” 
[p.683] 
 
“A doctor’s choice to emulate esteemed colleagues is rational in that conformity 













The superscript numbers in the first column indicate the following: 
 - 1: result from search for ‘existential uncertainty’ (n=38) 
 - 2: result from search for ‘personal uncertainty’ AND ‘existential’ (n=2) 
 - 3: result from search for ‘existential doubt’ (n=2) 
 - 4: identified from reference lists of articles yielded by searches 1-3 above (n=7) 
 
In the interests of clarity, the in-text citations have for the most part been removed from the quotes above. 
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6.9 Appendix 9 – Sources supporting the four attributes of existential uncertainty 
proposed in the Phase 1 analysis 
 
The undetermined but finite nature 
of one’s own being-in-the-world 
Brothers (2008, 2009, 2012a, 2012b); Cohen 
(1993); Gullick et al. (2017); Furtak (2019), 
Karlsson et al. (2014); Landau et al. (2010); 
Landau et al. (2012); Parry (2003); Pascal & 
Endacott (2010); Penrod (2007); Røysland & 
Friberg (2016); Røysland et al. (2016); Seppola-
Edvardsen et al. (2016); Spinelli (2015); van den 
Bos (2009); Warran et al. (2019); Wegleitner et al. 
(2020) 
Identity, meaning and choice Adamson (1997); Ahmed, et al. (2019); Brothers 
(2009); Gandsman (2009); Gezentsvey Lamy et al. 
(2013); Hammack (2010); Hoffman (2009); 
Karlsson et al. (2014); Kinnvall (2004); Kyriacou & 
Trivin (2020); Landau et al. (2010); Landau et al. 
(2012); Miké (2000); Pascal & Endacott (2010); 
Penrod (2007); Soroka (2007); Spinelli (2015); 
Tersbøl (2006); van den Bos (2009); van der 
Merwe & Jonker (2013) 
An awareness that is fundamental, 
ineradicable and always available 
Ahmed et al. (2019); Brothers (2009); Cohen 
(1993); Furtak (2019); Kinnvall (2004); McCoy 
(2018); Landau et al. (2010); Landau et al. (2012); 
Miké (2000); Pascal & Endacott (2010); Penrod 
(2007); Seppola-Edvardsen et al. (2016); Sperry 
(2016); Spinelli (2015); van den Bos (2009) 
Manifestation at different levels of 
awareness 
Brothers (2009); Cohen (1993); Hoffman (2009); 
Karlsson et al. (2014); Kasper et al. (2008); 
Penrod (2001; 2002; 2007); Soroka (2007); Sperry 






6.10 Appendix 10 – Number of words corresponding to each code (aspect of 
uncertainty) after chunking 
 
 
Aspect of uncertainty Number of words 
Diagnosis 6,111 
Prognosis 6,102 
Casual explanations 903 
Treatment 7,532 
Structures of care 5,087 







6.11 Appendix 11 – Section of coded interview with Sam featuring psycho-social 
uncertainty and existential uncertainty 
 
Mmm. Mmm. You, you, you said there about your body not playing along. Can you talk to me 
a bit about, about, em, your relationship with your body and, em, you know, how that's 
evolved over that time? 
 
Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, so it's been a weird one because in some ways cancer makes 
you sort of re-evaluate who you are, which is, you know, tricky, em, I mean, so for me 
it's like different factors, so one factor is, like, mobility, you know, like, I don't like walking 
with a stick, I'm embarrassed by it, I think, you know, that's unfortunately a socialised 
thing, but, you know, it is the way it is, I mean, you're 32, and I think being in the kind of 
queer world, like I think men that sleep with men can be very, very vapid at points. I think 
all cultures can, but I think there is a heightened value of it at, at, in certain spaces like 
bars and areas where you meet people so you can kind of feel excluded from that by 
having a disability, em, and I should say newly acquired disability, cos that's where the 
problem is, cos it's newly acquired it's getting used to that, em, and feeling with, with the 
mobility stuff but also with my health in general, you know, feeling undesirable, feeling 
like no one's going to want to put up with it or have to deal with it, and even when I have 
tried dating, they say they will but then there's always a problem around my doctor's 
appointments or they're annoyed that I can't go out or, you know, on holiday I spend half 
my day in bed, you know, it's just, you feel like a drag, em, you know, and then there's 
other things, you know, it kind of pulls out of the works of, like, gender and the way you 
see your body, and when there's also a national discussion around that, like, I grew up 
with a lot of gender dysphoria but didn't really know what that meant, you know, I'd just 
sort of lay in the bath and look at my body and not understand it or not like it, em, as a 
kid I mean, and then, you know, to then as an adult have this national conversation, and 
luckily I have a very good like queer circuit to talk through these things with, but then you 
add the cancer on top and it starts to make you really process your body and, kind of, 
there are certain parts of it I have come to terms with, which is better, I've been like, you 
know, non-binary and accepting what that is and still struggling with, you know, social 
standards of proving that, but, but then there's this other part which is the cancer, so 
that's completely out of my control really, you know, it's just, and it's, and it's tricky 
because, you know, people as well can sort of without meaning to devalue the whole 
thing because they're like oh but you look good, you know, you look fine, and like, well, 
it doesn't change anything [exhalation, chuckle], like, and it's also this really strange 









therefore don't have that, you don't qualify for their sympathy, instead you get their 
curiosity or disbelief. I mean, I've had it in bars where people who I know, em, will tell 
me, you don't look sick, I don't believe you, and like, I mean, I mean also I'm kind of used 
to that from being queer, when you first come out everyone's just like oh you don't look 
that, I don't believe you, you know, this kind of thing, it's just like, I for one don't have to 
prove to you what's happening in here, but two, your perception of it doesn't change it 
either, so, you know, it's just kind of noise, but it's noise you have to battle through, and 
it's, and it's something that's been sort of a weird thing of like, it's that intersectionality of 
becoming newly physically disabled, being disabled by cancer, you know, and then 
there's other things of like growing up dirt poor and all that kind of stuff, but being a queer 
person in that is just a lot of stuff to fit together and sometimes trying to fit it all together 






6.12 Appendix 12 – Section of coded interview with Sam featuring different aspects of 
uncertainty in rapid succession 
 
Mmm. And if there were, eh, answers to some of your questions, like, what are the questions 
that you desperately want answers to, if they were available? What are the kind of big 
questions on your mind? 
 
I think [sigh], I think the answers to the questions I want are just not answerable, but I'll 
answer the question, but you know like it's some semblance of precognition and the idea 
of like am I going to get better? You know, like, is this going to be it forever, you know, 
because, I mean, I remember thinking about a year and a half into my treatment, I 
remember thinking about a year and half in, thinking, bear in mind I was on a medication 
that was making, like it was like giving me really sort of psychological impact but thinking 
like I don't want to do this, I don't want to do this forever, this, it took me a while to, maybe 
I haven't fully, but it's been a process to let go of who I used to be, you know, and people 
find it strange when I say that cos, you know, you're the same person et cetera, but in 
reality people that know me well know that I'm a very different person. Your mood 
changes, your outlook changes, all that kind of stuff, but beyond that, from a personal 
aspect, your physical capacity, ability to move in the world changes. You know, I used to 
be very productive, have multiple projects on the go, walk everywhere, be very healthy, 
et cetera, so letting that go, it's tough, but then not knowing what the rest of your life is 
going to be is almost even worse, it's like am I going to get back to that? No, probably 
not. Em, am I going to survive this? Who knows? Is this new medication actually going 
to do what it's supposed to do? You know, it's, there are these big questions, I mean, 
obviously minor questions of like do I have a mutation on this disease, like is that why 
it's not working, you know, kind of, stuff like that but, em, but those are kind of, you know, 
they're specifics that I kind of almost have to not entertain because you would hope that 
the doctor would have considered that if that was an option, you know what I mean, it's 
like, it's kind of, I have to think on things in my sphere and trust them to do the stuff on 
their side because otherwise if I start second guessing every decision, it's not healthy for 
anyone, em, but yeah, but the idea of the big questions that I'd want to know, just am I 
going to be alright? Because it doesn't feel like it, and it hasn't felt like it, and, and if I'm 
not going to be alright, even if it means I don't have a good quality of life and I'm still 
here, like, am I going to be happy? Like, compare that to the life I used to have, you 
know, I don't feel happy, I don't feel, I don't feel fulfilled, I don't, I don't feel like I have as 














6.13 Appendix 13 – Immersion/crystallisation process: from key words to themes 
 
Em, so [sigh], you know, so it kind of stems from like I don't really believe in 
good luck, I believe in opportunities and taking advantage of them, you 
know, like things just happen if you kind of work towards it. I'm not saying 
that you know like [inaudible 6 seconds – technical glitch] ... can pass you 
by, and then I think the not believing in bad luck is because, eh, sort of, eh, 
[sigh] if I was to believe in some kind of like existential reasoning around all 
the bad things that have happened to me, then I would have to subscribe to 
there is some master plan or something, some extraneous variable that has 
a direct influence on what's happening but I'm, you know, I have cancer, I'm 
homeless, all these kinds of things, but I've survived, barely survived a hate 
crime, em, had open chest surgery from it, abuse, child abuse, like all the, 
all these things that if I was to start believing in these sort of extraneous 
explanations of or machinations of reasoning around what's happened, I 
think it just pulls away from the reality that just bad things happen, and I 
think it gives you a false hope that things will get better without making them 
better. So yeah, it's just that thing of like when you've had so many bad 
experiences to believe that there's some kind of uptick when there hasn't 



















I guess there's two somatic markers, I suppose. One would be kind of like 
nausea, to be honest, like if I think about it, it's just, it doesn't feel good, like. 
But also, cos the anxiety problems I have, nausea is like the one symptom I 
have tied to my anxiety, so I feel like it's just related to that, but also it just 
then compounds it, cos when I think about my future, I just feel sick, I'm just 
like, and there was the kind of additional aspect, going back to what I said 
before about this isn't the kind of life I recognise or want, I don't want the life 
that's coming either. You know, what I really want is to go back to how I was, 
but I can't do that, so I have to fight and work towards a life that I'm not even 
happy with. Weird. The other thing is it just feels like a weight on your 
shoulders, you know, it just feels like, I guess a really weird parallel to make 
would be like sometimes I'm just sat there in bed and I think about it or I'm 
trying to go to bed and I'm trying to think about it, it would feel like I assume 
– I've never been under one – but what those weighted blankets are like, 
you know, just that whole idea of just your whole body and you just lose this 
energy and you just have this kind of weight on top of you of like [sigh], 
where are we going, what are we doing, you know. I think, I think a lot of it, a 
lot of that feeling comes down to the fact that I don't feel like I have control 
over my life at all, you know, I can't go where I want to go, can't take 
holidays I want to take, no control over my health, no control over my 
housing, you know, I don't have anything other than small things that I make 
manage myself, and when, when I think about that, that's when I just kind of 
have that weight over me, I'm just like [big sigh], you know, this isn't, this 



























Luck, agency, causality, acceptance, 
control 
Questions of control and agency 





6.14 Appendix 14 – Themes and indicative quotes 
 




What are these symptoms (pre-diagnosis)? 
Is the diagnosis correct? 




Time and death 
Variability and unpredictability 








Side-effects and quality of life 
Efficacy 
Weighing up (decision) 
 






Processes of care 
 
Accessing the right help/information 












An undetermined future 
Questions of control and agency 
Identity and meaning 
Living with the spectre of dying 







[1] = ‘Liz’ 
[2] = ‘Jane’ 
[3] = ‘Eddie’ 
[4] = ‘Sam’ 
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[5] = ‘Brian’ 
[6] = ‘Jim’ 
 




What are these symptoms (pre-diagnosis)? 
[1] Oh, it's cancer, it's cancer in my liver, eh, and it's cancer in my brain, that's what I've got as 
well. And I used to feel the lymph nodes, and I was sure I could feel like swollen lymph nodes 
as well, you know, em, it was very very, the pain was very very real, em, and then my husb... 
they rang me and said we've got your results, can you come down, so em, my husband and I 
went down straightaway, em, and she said yeah, you have got cancer, definitely, em, it's in... 
it's in both breasts, but both of them are very treatable, you know, I can treat this for you and 
it will go away, and when she said that, all my pain went away as well [laughing], I never had 
the pain under my ribs, I never had the pain in my head, em, all the pain just went away as 
well with the uncertainty, all of this, all of that went, you know, so... 
 
[1] I reckon it was the worry that I might have secondaries, you know, I might... I've got cancer, 
I definitely, I knew I had cancer in my breasts, I didn't need the biopsy results, I knew that, I 
think, but what I didn't know was whether I had secondaries anywhere, em, and if I did, 
secondary breast cancer they can treat it for a while, but, you know, you will die eventually. 
So I suppose it was the uncertainty of not knowing whether I had the secondaries, but it was, 
and it wasn't until, she did the biopsies of my breasts first, and it wasn't until she went for my 
lymph nodes that I thought, oh my God, really, it really hadn't occurred to me that I could have 
it elsewhere 
 
[2] then having a scan, that was an ultrasound, and then having a cystoscopy where they just 
have a look up, and she said, oh, that looks just superficial, we could just take that off, that 
looks fine, if you're going to have something, that looks fine, so we all went, ah-ha [= sound of 
inhalation, exhalation], you know, that, thank goodness for that 
 
[3] I had my, em, I had my issues for about a year before they decided to chest x-ray me cos 
I didn't smoke, and then when they did diagnose it, it was, you know, they were very, very 
apologetic and very kind, but the fact remained it was what I've got, and I'm going to have to 
live with it, and that's, that's where I am with it now. 
 
[3] Well that's taken on the Lake District, and that was taken on the day when I first realised I 
was, I was probably ill because whenever we go there we do this walk, and when we walk this 
walk, em, more often than not, I'm leading the way and I'm having to wait for her to catch up, 
but this particular day, I mean I'd been complaining to the doctors about this irritable cough, 
em, like a chesty type thing, em, and stuff like that, but what I didn't realise because I didn't 
do any physical activity other than the normal things like driving around and shopping, that I 
really couldn't walk up this hill anymore and I was gasping for breath and I really, really, really, 
really struggled, em, and of course, when we got down again, I said to [my wife], well I'm not 
fit, I'm going to have to book into a gym, because this, this isn't , em, this isn't right. And when 
I come back, I did book into the gym, [my wife] said, well go to the doctors again, because, 
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you know, cover it both sides, and that's when I, I saw this different doctor, and he got me to 
have a chest x-ray, and, and, and what they found. And so, I guess, everytime I see pictures 
of the Lake District now, or if I'm going through my old photos, it sort of brings me back to that 
day where, em, I suppose I finally realised I was ill, em, you know, so, so something that brings 
them thoughts into me, that does. 
 
[3] Now, I didn't know that I had but I suspected I had lung cancer, and I was thinking to myself, 
well, how am I going to cope with that 
 
[4] the situation when I was diagnosed was kind of crazy anyway, just sort of like, I had food 
poisoning, got a blood test, found out I had cancer basically, after like a month of ops[?], em, 
and I was in a foreign country, had to come back, like it was all crazy 
 
[5] I'd gone to my GP, eh, with this [?] symptoms and she said, so she took a PSA test, as you 
would [?], and then, when I came back to get the results of the PSA test and it's only two point 
two, em, em, but she said, I'm going to give you an examination anyway, if that's alright, and 
I said yes, em, so she gave me a digital rectal examination, em, and she said, I'm not an expert 
but that doesn't feel right, I'm going to pass you on to a urologist, and then that, that process 
started, em, so that was a bit of a surprise because with a PSA level of two point two, that, 
that is well within the, it's quite low for a fifty-[?] year old man, em, so I wasn't expecting what 
happened next, which was the urologist gave me the same examination, with her fingers, em, 
and, eh, said yeah, that's not right, and then the whole process started of going in for biopsies, 
MRI scans and various scans and stuff, and then the operation 
 
[6] I'd only just come out, em, in the June, em, of that year, 2016, and em, sort of, I was starting 
a new life and I'd been to the doctor's about certain things and one of the things I'd been to is 
I'd been to the doctor about erectile dysfunction and, em, the doctor I saw, I'd explained to the 
doctor about just coming out and everything like that and wanting to, em, eh, improve, you 
know, sort of, I was first sort of struggling with erections when I was sort of meeting people, 
and the first thing he suggested he wanted to do blood tests, em, so obviously blood test was 
done, blood tests, eh, were sent away and, em, then I get a phone call, eh, to go in to the, the 
doctor, and, eh, I saw another doctor and he explained that, em, all your bloods have come 
back and everything is fine, but your PSA level is raised to 26.4, em, and we'd like you to, em, 
you know, I'd like to recommend you have a biopsy, em, which he did 
 
Is the diagnosis correct? 
 
[2] I have some more questions cos mine was a mixed tumour, so it was low grade with a focal 
point of high, and they told me that's fine we're just casting it as low grade and the more I've 
thought about it, the more I've got questions which the nurse couldn't answer. Being a 
pharmacist myself, I can read the papers and understand them, and I know it's subjective, so 
I just have some questions, em, not necessarily a second opinion, just have some questions, 
so all of that I feel is uncertain. 
 
[2] I'm saying well yeah, it's low grade, but I've got this kind of small focal point and it's not the 
very, it is low grade but it could have been a G1, mine's a G2, well actually you read all the 
stats, it doesn't really make any difference, low grade's low grade, you know, it doesn't come 
back any more or progress any more, so I'm now looking at the... making it more uncertain for 
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myself, because I'm looking more into it, whereas if you had a phone call or someone who 
wasn't medical and just told it was low grade, not to worry, see you in three months, most 
people would accept that, and I haven't been able to, and it's made me more uncertain 
 
[2] and when then I looked at the guidance, NICE guidance, and I saw the word multi-focal on, 
and thought well does that mean what I've got, you know, with two different sorts inside, or 
does that mean you've got a papillary and you've got one something else, or you've got one 
somewhere else. And she didn't know, so that then increased the uncertainty again. 
 
[2] I think I'd reached the end of her knowledge, you know, I think, I 'm asking her difficult 
questions that she doesn't know the answer to, and she knows that, and that's fine 
 
What are these symptoms (post-diagnosis/post-treatment)? 
 
[1] The only thing that does happen is if I do get a pain that I'm not expecting, I immediately 
jump to cancer, I don't think, oh God, that might be trapped wind, or you might just have a bit 
of a headache because you've got a bit of a headache. I immediately jump to, oh my God, I 
wonder if I've got cancer there because, you know, when I did find, em, the cancer before, I'd 
been so well 
 
[2] And I'm speaking to the consultant on Monday anyway, and I know that I shouldn't be 
worried about [blood in urine], but immediately then it increases my uncertainty again. You 
know, almost knowing less is better. [Laughing] 
 
[6] It was, yes, I mean, it was, em, it was a thought was well why have I got sort of the blood, 
but my first thought was well is this yet another thing, a side effect from the radiotherapy, and 
it was, that was my concern, not that I'd got bladder cancer, that was, that was sort of the 







Time and death 
[1] When I got the cancer, em, I said to it, you can have a year of my life, and that is it, you 
know, you started with me in May 2018, May 2019 you're off, you're out of my life. It hasn't 
quite worked like that, em, but as far as I can I do try and think, I haven't got cancer now, I am 
cancer free, but it doesn't, it doesn't always work like that, you know 
 
[1] In my mind, I think if I had secondaries, I was going to die. So the question is probably the 
same. It's just how long will it take for me to die, I suppose – and how much help can they give 
me, so that, you know, so I do die comfortably, or that I can live for another few years, and 
see a bit more of what I want, you know, do a bit more of what I, what I want to do really. 
 
[2] I think because we've moved in different stages, em, from, you know, seeing it was a lump 




[2] Everything else, I'm still planning, I'm still talking about the future, still talking about 
holidays, but there's that little bit there that says, what about this? You know, don't you forget 
me! [Laughter] And, I'm, what I'm hoping is as time moves on, it will still be uncertain, and I 
know for the cancer I've got, it's going to be like that cos it's constant surveillance, em, but 
hopefully living between them, you go back to a normal life rather than spend three months 
worrying about it, which I'm doing at the moment 
 
[3] the initial diagnosis or the prognosis was very bad because it was stage four and they don't 
give you long for that , and I remember seeing a form being signed by the cancer specialist 
nurse off to the, em, PPI, PIP department saying less than a year to live and, em, although 
she said, em, don't Google anything, everybody's cancer's different, when you, and she said 
don't, before you even ask, don't ask how long you've got to live because everybody's different. 
 
[3] The biggest question I would ask is the one I was afraid of asking, was how long have I 
got? Really. Because it's, it's like everything, innit, if you're at work and you need to develop 
a project, and the first question you ask is, how long have I got to develop it, and then it'll come 
along, well what's the investment, what resources can I have, em, you know, and everything 
else. If I'm looking towards dealing with an illness, it's the same thing – how long have I got? 
Cos that'll help me decide whether I take early pension and get the caravan or, you know, we 
sell up the house and downsize, em, or whatever we do with our lives. And from a practical 
side of things, that's what I should have known, but from an emotional side of things, I didn't 
really want to know or ask that question. 
 
[4] I don't really think I'm going to make it into my forties, I'd like to, I'm 32 now, but, you know, 
I've gone through treatment after treatment after treatment, we're running out of treatments, 
the longer that it is detectable in your blood, the more likely there's a mutation which is 
treatment resistant, you know, there is obviously the chance of a bone marrow transplant, but 
I don't have any direct siblings that could help 
 
[5] that sort of sword of Damocles, I mean it's been nought point five, nought point six for, for 
two years, yeah? So that should be fine, but there's always that worry when the next one's 
coming up, well what if this time it had gone up, you know, what if it's this time? And em, I 
think well there's a 10 year mark, okay I'm two years into it now, does that mean I've only got 
eight years left? Maybe that's, maybe that's six, maybe that's 12, maybe that's, maybe that's 
forever, who knows? 
 
[6] towards the end of the sort of discussions, you know, I asked a very simple question – how 
long will I live if I don't have treatment? Em, you know, is, you know, if, if you don't treat me, 
you know, how long will I live? And they said well two, three, five, ten years – it's uncertainty. 
I said, right, well thank, thanks for letting me know, you know, I, I knew I had got the answer I 
wanted 
 
[6] At that point I was in a not, eh, I wasn't particularly bothered whether I lived or died at that 
stage in my life anyway, em, and it was just, eh, just a question I wanted to know the answer 
to, you know, was well, if I'm going to get, you know, 15, 20 years, and I was, em, what 63 at 
the time I was diagnosed, 63, 64, so, you know, I was of, hadn't got sort of a whole lot of life 
sort of in front of me, as I sort of saw it, I said well I'm not going to make it to 70 anyway, and 
I'm what 67 now and, em, yes I do want to live, em, a hell of a lot longer now, you know, cos 
188 
 
circumstances changed and, em, that, but it was always a sort of, it was a consideration was 
well if I can get a long time, why go through all the sort of treatment and everything like that 
 
Variability and unpredictability 
 
[1] Well, do you know what, my eye lashes never fell out. [Laughing] Whoop whoop! I mean, 
it's different for everybody, and the nurses were telling me, oh you know, maybe your eye 
lashes won't fall out, and I was thinking, oh, they're bound to, you know, I've... at my age, I've 
got a lot of friends who have had cancer, breast cancer, and I've seen them all with, you know, 
no eye brows, no eye lashes, but my eye lashes stayed there – how wonderful is that? 
 
[2] I had no doubt that I wouldn't see whether [my grandson] was interested [in music] or not. 
I'm sure I am now, because, you know, my diagnosis isn't, isn't terminal, you know, my 
diagnosis is such that I should potentially, you know, I think my, my particular prognosis is 
time to progression is only 11% of people, so I should be feeling happy [laughter], you know 
that I've got the best diagnosis of my sort of cancer, but I can't put myself in that place at the 
moment, other people are getting frustrated with me because I can't put myself in that lucky 
place. I know, I know it could have been a lot worse, but I'm, I'm predicting the worst of all the 
outcomes, well, I'll be that 10%, you know, so, and I'm frustrating everybody else [laughter] 
 
[2] And I'm putting the worst prognosis on it all, and you know, he says stop reading papers 
about it, because all I find is it's very subjective, so there is no right answer, I'm not wanting 
something else from the consultant really. I just want more clarity 
 
[2] I suppose the thoughts are re..., they do vary because when I get a comment like my 
consultant told me I'm more likely to be run over by a bus outside the hospital, I think yes, 
yeah, absolutely, of course it is, of course it is, that's what I've got, but why wouldn't I be that 
11 per cent, you know [laughter], so yes, that does make me feel better 
 
[4] The other thing with the, with the blood test results is they're just so all over the place. 
Because the PCR has a certain amount of variance, you just, you just never really know what, 
I think the variance can be as much as ten per cent sometimes, so it's kind of wild, because 
you can have all this anxiety and you want those blood results 
 
[4] my numbers have been going up, which is the wrong direction, have been going up 
recently, but then we looked at it yesterday or the day before, the day before, and, and they'd 
gone down again even though I'd come off medication, so, so then there's even more 
uncertainty of like, well am I getting worse or how does it come down off medication, that like, 
was the medication bad, like, like was it affecting stuff in a negative way or is the test just 
messing up again? Because there's a variance in it. 
 
[5] medically they think if you survive five years, you're cured of cancer, yeah? Cos that's the, 
the, the time horizon they, they, they work on. Cos they think, if you've gone for five years, you 
could die of something else in five years, so, eh, but, em, which is fine from a medical point of 
view, but from a, from a real point of view, seeing that, that, that, yeah, things, there seems to 
be a reoccurrence even in people who've had a radical prostatectomy at around the 10-year 
mark, some have had 15, still, still completely free, em, some haven't got to 10, you know, 
they've got about six or seven and it's come back with a vengeance, em, so, eh, so yeah, so 
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with that, sort of, because that had gone into my mind, you know, why would I want to waste 
any more time 
 
[6] it was the answer I suppose, em, was, I expect, you know, the kind of answer I expected, 
and I know that there is always this uncertainty, you know, that, em, you know, people, oh yes, 
you've got six months to live type thing, and then five years down the line, em, you know, 
they're still going, you know, there are, friend of ours was, em, diagnosed, em, at the end of 
May with, em, liver and lung cancer and within sort of two weeks of being diagnosed she was 
dead, you know 
 
Direction and recurrence 
 
[2] So acceptance, I think, and I think when I can accept that, I can accept the uncertainty of 
having to have regular, cos this apparently is the cancer that comes back most frequently, but 
mine I know is least likely to progress, so it's going to be a nuisance, and there's going to be 
anxiety before each scope, and I think I've got to accept that 
 
[3] I'm certain I've got it, and I'm certain that it's incurable. I'm not certain when it comes back, 
but I know whatever treatment I'm on, it will do, because I'm a member of this club, which I 
mentioned to you before, there's 300 in the UK have got this particular rare form of cancer, in 
the UK, more in the States, and I've been along to their forums, their meetings, and I've spoken 
with oncologists, and, eh, people from America, you know, cancer leading specialists from 
America come along and spoken to us as a group and, em, it sort of puts the, puts the cancer 
to bed, but the body finds a way to overcome the treatment, em, so often, when I go on to the 
forums, em, you know, someone would say, well my time's come, you know, me, me tumour's 
grown by this or I've got certain metastases come here and there so I've got to change me 
treatment and, em, I have to say, more often than not, the treatment that they move on to 
actually works and it gives them another new lease of life, but there are some very sad 
instances where it hasn't worked and, and we've lost them. 
 
[4] I've never gotten to near that undetectable stage ever and it kind of just goes slightly 
towards it and then comes all the way back to sort of a midline zero, and, you know, so I've 
never really gotten out of the uncertainty of what's going to happen with my health, I've never 
got to a stable position where it's just like oh, you know, it's like it's not there, which is what 
you're promised when you first start, you know, within a couple of years, we're not even going 
to be able to find it, so when you never get to that positive space where there is kind of this 
safety, em, it's hard to kind of think in a hopeful frame, you know 
 
[4] but then, when it's going the wrong way, you know, that, that result doesn't really make you 
feel better because it's just a mark on a bad path, and you have these questions of like well 
maybe it's continuing to get worse? Em, that's why the last blood test was really confusing 
because it said it had come down despite the fact that before that when I was on the 
medication it was going up. 
 
[4] So this idea of, okay when I look at a blood test I understand what's going on, this is fine, 




[5] it's stayed around the nought point six, nought point five, nought point six every six months 
now, but it's been stable, but as I get close to the date when I have my PSA test done, as I 
have it regularly done, and then have it done and waiting for the results, that's, that's not a 
great place to be because there's always a worry that if that number goes up, it's come back. 
 
[6] there's always the sort of the uncertainty, even now as obviously every time I have a PSA 
test, em, you know, there's always the uncertainty that, em, you know, it's, it's going to be, sort 






How has this happened to me? 
 
[2] I mean, I'm not 60 yet, em, I'm a never smoker, never been around smoking, em, I'm fit, I 
run, em, three times a week, we're walking 45, 50 miles, you know, during the... and running, 
we were, em, so I, whereas kind of 1% of women get it, well I'm less than that 1%, so to get 
something like that makes me angry, but it doesn't, would I feel better if I had breast cancer 
because that's a ladies' disease [laughter] and common? No, so it's a silly argument, but it 
makes me angry I've got something I shouldn't have had, you know, as someone's fit and 
healthy, and so, I can't put myself into that, em, I'm one of the lucky ones in my group, em, 
and so I think I will do, but at the moment I feel kind of pretty uncertain 
 
[2] we always used to say, you know, we've exercised for... since we were married probably, 
you know, regular runners, regular gym, I mean, even in the lockdown we've been walking, 
you know, miles. I had the procedure on the Tuesday, and on the Sunday I walked seven k, 
you know, em, so I think we all, in my mind, I almost thought I was invincible, I look after 
myself, I've never smoked, I exercise, I enjoy my job, I don't get particularly stressed 
 
[3] Well it's, I mean, it's a certain stigma about lung cancer anyway, everybody that gets lung 
cancer seems to be tarred with the brush, well you brought it on yourself because you shouldn't 
have smoked. 
 
[4] I think the not believing in bad luck is because, eh, sort of, eh, [sigh] if I was to believe in 
some kind of like existential reasoning around all the bad things that have happened to me, 
then I would have to subscribe to there is some master plan or something, some extraneous 
variable that has a direct influence on what's happening but I'm, you know, I have cancer, I'm 
homeless, all these kinds of things, but I've survived, barely survived a hate crime, em, had 
open chest surgery from it, abuse, child abuse, like all the, all these things that if I was to start 
believing in these sort of extraneous explanations of or machinations of reasoning around 
what's happened, I think it just pulls away from the reality that just bad things happen 
 
[6] As I say, the cancer, it was just something that, you know, I've, I mean, this is just prostate 
cancer, em, there's other cancers within the family, and eh, because I worked in the building 
trade from 1970, em, and we used to, em, use asbestos products, em, in the construction 
industry in those days still and, em, a lot of buildings where we used to go and survey, although 
I wasn't actually on the tools or anything, I would be in areas where Asbestolux and that was 
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being cut or spray asbestos was, eh, used for fire insulation on the steel work, em, even in the 
70s, it's like they were spraying the fibres, em, in a, a liquid onto steel works so I've always 
got, em, at the back of, eh, sort of, I suppose it's there that at some point I could end up with 






Side-effects and quality of life 
 
[3] cos one of the first things they did, well the first thing they did, they, they, they gave me 
some radiotherapy which took away this growth on me lymph nodes near me voice box, which 
meant I didn't have that irritating cough anymore and I could breathe a bit better, so that was 
good, but when I went onto the tablets, I mean the very first time I took them, I brought them 
straight back up, cos they was, they were, they, you know, I vomited them. They gave me a 
different anti-sickness pill but one of the side effects for these tablets was chronic, em, 
diarrhoea and it knocked me confidence cos I couldn't go out for fear of having an accident 
while I was out sort of thing and it took away me taste buds and me sense of smell, and I'm 
thinking to myself at the time, probably be, into me mindset at that time, well is life really worth 
living anyway if it's going to be like this all the time? 
 
[3] the other thing that happened was, as a result of taking the treatment, I started getting 
palpitations in me heart, and, eh, occasionally, I mean they weren't consistent, but I, I would 
have an, I'd have an affray[?] where it would happen, em, and when they did, me heart beat 
went up to over two hundred a minute, and the only way they could stop 'em was me going to 
hospital and having it slowed, you know, not, not by, you know, I, I did come close to being 
shocked once, but they've generally been able to administer a sort of drug and then it slowed 
me heart beat down, and then it stayed there, but I started having it quite frequently, about 
three times a week, sometimes, then I wouldn't have any for a fortnight, and then I'd have it 
again, and, so I didn't really want to go anywhere for fear of having to be rushed into hospital, 
you know, it's not a pleasant thought, and again it's saying in the back of your mind, you 
wouldn't enjoy it because all the time you're thinking, well I hope it don't happen. 
 
[4] if it stops working like the others have, then it's on to experiments, you know, so it's not 
even road tested stuff, and they've tried to put me on one before but it comes under the fact 
that I'm really unlucky when it comes to the side effects, I get like all the bad side effects, it's 
affected my mobility, I struggle to walk, especially up stairs and all this kind of stuff, em, and 
nap all the time and get dizzy, like, I can't drive anymore, can't work, em, and then they want 
to put me into trials and studies in the hope that that will be better for me but there's no certainty 
it's going to be better at all because each medication has been problematic, so instead they 
want to make me take a risk of another medication that could be just as problematic, but I also 
have to do bone marrow biopsies for investigation on top, so, and that's just, [sigh] it's, it 
doesn't seem worth it to me, it's just like, you know, because I've been pretty unlucky and I 
don't really like the idea of luck but [chuckle] you've got to put it on something 
 
[4] there have been times where I haven't been able to take the pills because they've really 
screwed me up, they gave me like a really big anxiety problem which developed into OCD, 
another pill gave me depression, you know, like they have really bad side effects beyond the 
mobility stuff 
 
[5] so the results of the treatment, which is I've had a radical prostatectomy, so they take away 
the prostate, they take away the seminal vesicles, em, they did take away all my lymph nodes 
in my pelvis as well, em, they tried to spare some of the nerves around the prostate, em, and 
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the surgeon thinks he has spared some, but it's sort of like, they say well it will be at least a 
year, maybe two years, maybe never before you start to get a natural erection back, eh, and 
get normal sexual function back, em, and I hadn't really thought about it before the operation, 
yeah, I was told some things that would happen, I knew, you know, so you can't have children, 
or I had a vasectomy 30 years ago so children was off the question anyway 
 
[5] So I'm getting to the point now after 24 months, 25 months now that I don't think it's going 
to come back. Yeah. Em, it's not, there's, there's, there's... yeah, I'm not going to get a natural 
erection again, that's not going to happen, so, I've moved through the hope, maybe it will 
maybe it won't, [inaudible] and I'm getting to think it's never going to happen again, so yes. 
Em, yeah. I suppose, like you know some sort of paralysis that you're hoping to get the 
sensation back in your leg or something and after this long, you think actually it's never going 
to happen. 
 
[6] after treatment, right, you've sort of various sort of side effects. I had, em, hormone 
treatment and radiotherapy and I started getting, eh, blood in my urine, so, em, I had, you 
know, I was, you know, obviously I was concerned about that thinking yes it's down to the 
radiotherapy, but, is it? So, so, this, the after effects, em, of the treatment that, em, were, eh, 
also, so, a concern. 
 
[6] I suppose the concern, you know, there's always that again[?], you know, you sort of, 
something like that happens now and, you know, you sort of, well is this a side effect, you 
know, a long-term side effect or is it, em, you know, is it something new, is that, you know, 
bladder cancer or bowel cancer, you know, and it's always that, you know, hence, you know, 
the concern about going to the doctor's about that, which is not something I would normally 
sort of do. 
 
[6] it was a thought was well why have I got sort of the blood, but my first thought was well is 
this yet another thing, a side effect from the radiotherapy, and it was, that was my concern, 





[2] What made me less uncertain, or more uncertain, is I should have had a one-off chemo 
wash in the bladder after the procedure, but basically because I had it done in a private 
hospital, there was no one available to do it – they didn't tell me that, but I through 
conversations with people worked that out. And that reduces its reoccurence by about 50%. 
Not progression, reoccurence. So I was annoyed about that. Em, but yes, I've got some 
questions. I don't think my treatment outcome will change 
 
[2] but then the more I looked at what mixed grade meant, and looked up, I could see there 
was no real consensus, and so when I saw the oh if it's less than five per cent you can ignore 
it or, I'm more tempted to, to ignore what the American says necessarily because a lot of theirs 
is promoting extra treatment. Or unnecessary treatment. And she'd already said we do not 
want to overtreat you, you know, we really don't want to, we want to be very careful about this, 
em, and when then I looked at the guidance, NICE guidance, and I saw the word multi-focal 
on, and thought well does that mean what I've got, you know, with two different sorts inside, 
or does that mean you've got a papillary and you've got one something else, or you've got one 
somewhere else. 
 
[3] Well obviously I spoke quite a bit to the oncologist and, em, on the first TKI he gave us, 
em, the initial results were fantastic. It more or less got rid of all the cancer, it certainly got rid 
of all the metastases and the, you know, around the lymphs and everywhere else. It was 
starting to grow in the other lung, that had gone, and the original tumour had gone down to a 
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fraction of its size, which is obviously very good news, em, so I said well, you know, how long 
will I be on these tablets then, knowing, sort of asking the question around the corner, because 
having done the research, I know that it does stop working, so if I knew how long I was on 
these tablets, I'd sort of know as a, at a minimum, how long I'd have, you know, before we'd 
ask the question again. 
 
[4] I'm on my fourth type of treatment and, because they keep failing, so that's the uncertainty 
element 
 
[4] Em, it's mostly the fact that each medication I've taken, they get less and less sort of, I 
guess, generic, in medical terms, em, so you're kind of aware as, as you go through treatments 
that they're getting a little bit more risky, a little bit more untested, a little bit more toxic, and 
then that impacts your health in different ways, you know, every different form you get for each 
new one has different levels of death and disease that can come out of it, and then with this 
one it's been even more pronounced because it's not even in a packet, you know, it's just like 
a printed out label, em, and, you know, this is the medication that normally goes to people that 
are sort of in last phase, like, you know, doing really badly, but because I don't tolerate any of 
them very well, to be honest, and also because they weren't really working, and it's been three 
and a half years, so, [sigh] to take that many pills for that long and to not really get an effect 
and now go onto ones that are just in a generic bottle because they are, em, it's weird, and 
then, and then what comes next is, if, because this, you know, if this works or not, if it stops 
working like the others have, then it's on to experiments, you know, so it's not even road tested 
stuff 
 
[4] again with those medication things like, no one really knows, and they, they've said those 
positive things for every new medication and every new medication hasn't worked 
 
[4] Is this new medication actually going to do what it's supposed to do? 
 
Weighing up (decision) 
 
[3] the side effects get on my nerves more than the fact that I've got cancer, because, em, 
that's quite limiting, you know, I do get short of breath, me legs swell up, I'm not as mobile as 
I used to be, em, I get very tired, very fatigued, so that side of it gets on me nerves, but then, 
I can't really complain cos I'm still here, ain't I? You know, I wouldn't give all them back and 
get the cancer back 
 
[3] we proposed to change the treatment, and we're going to try a different thing on Friday, so 
maybe some of these side effects will go away. Well let's hope. I'm not, em, giving up 
something that's working for something that's not working. That's the only thing I got on me 
mind. But I'm relaxed about it, I'm prepared to take a chance, because at the moment, an 
improvement in quality of life with me physical things, worth taking that risk, if I didn't think it 
was, then I'd..., but I know I'm putting on so much weight each month, I'm probably going to, 
I'll probably have a heart attack, or diabetes or something [laughter], I can't stop it. 
 
[4] when they changed the medication and they were like talking all about my side effects and 
how it's going to make me better, but I was looking at my blood tests and they were getting 
worse, only incrementally, but they were getting worse, I kind of had to ask them, it's like, but 
it's also because the last medication isn't working, and they were like yes, also because of that 
 
[5] The less radical treatments, so leaving the prostate in but attacking it with, em, eh, 
brachytherapy or, eh, em, there's ultrasound right now and all sorts of things, em, but they 
haven't got the, as good a proven prognosis as the physical removal of the prostate, as long 
as they get it all, so, so if I had caught it earlier, I might have had a different treatment, and 
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that treatment might be more risky from the treatment I've had. Yeah. Eh, but it wouldn't have 
left me with, em, erectile dysfunction, so. 
 
[5] Em, it was sort of a, that, making, making the decision had that sort of, em, pit-in-the-
stomach feeling that you sort of, eh, not nervous, no, it's a bit sort of, just leaden dread of is 
this the right thing to do or is that the right thing to do, and I don't know. Or I can make the 
wrong decision, eh – what is the right decision? It's sort of, yeah. Yes, so, so, em, sort of 
hollow, empty feeling, that's it. Hollow, empty and leaden, yes. 
 
[5] Em, well to make the decision, you had, eh, oh, the actual making of the decision, em, I 
think the decision was made when I looked across the information I had gathered [inaudible – 
3 seconds] ... that made me make one choice over the other was, em, that if you have a 
prostatectomy, [?] removal, if that doesn't get everything, you can have, em, eh, radiation 
treatment to catch what's been missed. If you have radiation treatment and that doesn't get 
everything, em, they can't do a prostatectomy at that point cos they've, they've stalked[?] you, 
it's, it, it can't be removed, so it's more radiation treatment and hormone treatment, and, yeah, 
and it goes on. Em, and I think that was the deciding factor, that, that if I took the operation, 
I'd get two, potentially two shots at it, yeah. 
  
[6] I'd gone to the doctors about erectile dysfunction, I didn't actually want to come away with 
it, I wanted it, eh, cured [chuckle], so, em, you know, just reading the literature, you know, it 
explained what the hormone treatment did, now I, I did reconsider, eh, when it came to, em, 
sort of finally, em, signing the consent form for treatment, I did actually say at the time, I've, 
eh, you know, I've changed my mind and then we started, em, doing the hormone treatment 
at that stage, which was, eh [sharp exhalation], it wasn't pleasant, you know, it's not, eh, 
something that's pleasant, em, I didn't get sort of the bad effects that some people have, I've, 
I mean again, I was sort of, I've been sort of lucky or maybe very stupid that I've just sort of, 
in a way I just sort of sailed through everything 
 
[6] I decided that, you know, reading it a bit more, going to it a bit further, I realised that once 
I stopped taking the hormones, things would change, that the hormones would sort of go away, 
and things would sort of, that side of things would sort of stop, em, sort of happening, although 
there were things from the radiotherapy and that that would never, you know, sort of come 
back, so the, you know, it's, eh, you don't, em, produce semen and things like that so that 
when you orgasm it's not as messy, em, so I just reconsidered, em, you know, I sort of look 
at, I reconsidered and decided that, em, you know, I might as well sort of do it and, em, you 








[2] I asked the nurse, and then she made me more anxious cos she said well I've been thinking 
about that, and when I asked her some questions, well what does it mean in the NICE 
guidance – you know, multi-focal, is that what I've got? – she couldn't answer me, she didn't 
know. Fair enough, she's a nurse, she's not a pathologist. I've looked into it and I have a 
question, so she said probably best if you spoke to the consultant. I don't think anything will 
change. You know, I haven't got any treatment planned. 
 
[2] I said to the nurse, I find it with pharmacy, I find people who have in their mind what they 
want, and they'll go two, three, four different consultants cos they will find someone eventually 
that will agree with them, and I don't want to be that person. I could probably go to somebody 
who would say yes, it should be treated as high grade and you should go on to have six 
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bladder washes. I don't necessarily want that, but what she told me was the majority of it is 
low grade, it's fine, the pathologist, really experienced she told me, has been here ages, very 
experienced [laughter], you know, pathologist, and I'm still saying that they just say the 
majority, that could be 51 per cent, is it one per cent? – oh they don't use percentages, well 
why don't they use percentages? She doesn't know. So that's why I'm speaking to the 
consultant. Will it change my treatment plan? No, because they've had an MDT and they have 
made a decision and I think I probably agree with them 
 
[3] I don't think it was very professionally delivered, if I was honest, and I found it, em, because, 
once I had the lung cancer diagnosed at the, em, doctor's, and they actually did, they didn't 
actually come out and say it. What they said was, we want you to go, eh, see a specialist, very 
urgently, there's something wrong there, I'm not a cancer specialist, but it might be cancer. 
That's all they actually told me at the time. And at that time they had a seven day promise 
where you could go to the NHS, em, and get, em, the, em, biopsies and the tests, or you could 
go private, and I thought to myself, well, let's go private on this occasion. 
 
[4] I know that cancer, specifically oncology in health, but also health in general is not prepared 
or suited for someone that comes in who's non-binary presenting, and I know that, you know, 
NHS statements say it is, and I know that there's the, you know, like there's legislation and 
everything that protects everyone, but when you walk in and someone comments on 
something that you're wearing or the way you look, all this kind of stuff, and you're already 
dealing with so much, you just shed that stuff to expedite your care, you know, because you 
can't face the uncertainty of the way people are going to treat you at a very vulnerable position, 
you know, and, and, and it's, I think it's a very big difference between you don't want to feel 
tolerated, you want to feel appreciated, you just want to be welcome in a space as opposed 
to, yeah, as opposed to it just being like a novelty for other people. 
 
[4] there's like a personalised care element but the reality is is you're with someone who is 
dealing with hundreds of people like you, you have five minutes and you just kind of get 
through it, and to one example, I mean like with my specialist, I don't really think he knows 
about my sexuality or gender, and there was one time, my CNS does, my CNS is great 
actually, I'm very lucky to have a good CNS but, the medication before this which they put me 
on, they were like oh well FYI, it can give you like persistent diarrhoea, and I kind of was trying 
to hint to them as well, I was just like, with my life and lifestyle and just, you know, trying to 
like hint, I was like, sexual impacts, vuh-vuh-vuh, and, and they just weren't, they weren't 
getting it, they weren't getting it, and it was that thing of like you know constantly having to 
come out et cetera, but you just kind of realise like, I don't want to fight this battle with you 
guys, like, if I'm leaving you breadcrumbs and you're just ignoring it because you just want to 
give me the medication 
 
[4] so my CNS is really good, really really good, and we get on on a personal level and I think 
because of that it's allowed me to sit in that uncertainty a bit because I know that I can trust 
her that if anything was particularly worrying, she would get in touch, you know, and, and 
because she's so caring, kind of above her role, I know that I have the safety to do that, but at 
the same time I know I don't have that all, because I don't have that personal relationship with 
other members of staff, you know, I don't feel that level of safety, of waiting for a result, em. 
 
[4] in the beginning, my specialist and I had to have conversations about the way he spoke to 
me because he was being very medical and, for example, with the first medication when it 
wasn't working, he's like you failed this and you failed that and you failed that, and I had to tell 
him like I haven't failed, the medication's failed me, and there's a difference, like I've taken it, 
I've done it, please don't say I've failed, and since then we've been able to talk a bit more 
levelly and I can ask him things like is it not working, em, so that's been good, but, but yeah, 




[4] trusting the people around you to do their job, you know, it's their job to keep you alive, 
they're not there to tell you anything that's not going to do that, so it's kind of placing that 
uncertainty and offset with certain environments or people I can trust, you know, if there's any 
other uncertainty around other things, I probably won't feel so strong about it, but I know I can 
sort of trust my health team, they know it more than I do and I just have to let that happen. I 
mean, there's, you know, but then that's, that bit, because I trust their expertise and, and, and 
I feel like I can trust them with the uncertainty, I can almost shift that responsibility and then I 
can just sort of be along for the ride. 
 
[5] so the way these things work is, is that you're given options, you're told, em, well, you, you, 
you've got cancer, we can operate to remove it or we can, you can have this radiotherapy, 
em, and sometimes you get other options as well, I only got those two, em, you decide! So, 
well, you're, you're the radiologist and the surgeon, why don't you know the right answer to 
this, surely? No, no, we can't tell you, you have to decide for yourself, we can't advise you on 
what your treatment should be, eh, cos they've both got different side effects and we don't 




[1] the surgeon was, oh such a delightful lady, such a delightful lady, and the nurse, the breast 
cancer nurse, but they never quite looked me in the eye once it was in my second breast, do 
you know, when they were doing the biopsies, they never quite looked at me, em, and they 
were very, very matter of fact about everything, you know, yes, you've got a lump here, we 
have found another one here, we're just going to do the biopsy, em, and we, we..., and they 
did those, em, and then, you know, just turn me over and said right we're going to biopsy you 
now, your, your lymph nodes, and it hadn't occurred, I knew they would biopsy my breasts, 
but it hadn't occurred to me that they were going to biopsy my lymph nodes, but they were just 
very matter of fact about it, there was no explanation or anything about any of that 
 
[1] You see, because you don't know these people, you don't know if that's the style they work 
in anyway, you know, and although I'm a nurse, em, I've never worked in the cancer arena, 
old people is, is my passion really, em, and I thought maybe that's the way they do it, maybe 
that's the way they work in cancer, but maybe, maybe they can't look me in the eye because 
they know it's bad news, you know, you do, you know, you're not sure why, quite why they're 
treating you like that really. That's how it felt to me. 
 
[2] being a scientist I would much rather people say I don't know but I'll find someone who can, 
or I'll find it out for you, very happy with that, I've said that, patients have asked me, what, you 
know, what would the side effects could this be, and I, I respect people that say I don't know 
but I can find out for you, so no, I didn't have any qualms about that. 
 
[4] again with those medication things like, no one really knows, and they, they've said those 
positive things for every new medication and every new medication hasn't worked 
 
[4] And, and I think maybe before all of the experiences I've had with my disease and 
treatment, I probably would have thought those kind of questions could be entertained 
because doctors would always say like, oh okay, you're going to do this, and this is how long 
you'll be on this for, and this is how it's going to work, but with so many assumptions not 
working out, I think that's also kind of another thing where it's like, I just feel like there is no 
answer. Like, even when I'm treated at the hospital, it's always a case of oh, that shouldn't 
have done that or that's not normal for that or that's not that and just like, okay [half-chuckle, 
sharp exhalation], so, and you become acutely aware that, you know, the doctors don't really 
know what's going on, they're just trying the tried and true method and hoping that it works, 
there's no, you know, deep individualistic understanding of your disease unless they do further 
investigations et cetera, so without that, not saying I want a bone marrow biopsy anytime soon, 
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but you know, it's just like, yeah, it just kind of has these other impacts, just, these questions 
that you know your doctors don't have an answer for, and you know they're just shooting in 
the dark and just hoping something lands and you hope it lands too 
 
[4] it's those bits that are almost like a stop-reset, to be like, okay, I kind of know where we 
are, but without those moments, and it's just numbers and just positive messages, it just 
doesn't feel as genuine as when someone sits you down and goes this isn't working. 
 
[4] the other thing is a sense of almost control and understanding, to be like okay, I know what 
the game plan is, because it just feels good to know like the reality of it, you know, like, rather 
than being told all these promises, especially because all these promises you've been told 
haven't come true, but then for it just to sort of, you know, for someone to tell you directly like 
that didn't work 
 
[5] Em, I then had to go and tell the consultants, so I had to go and see the urologist and say 
yes, I'd like you to perform surgery on me, go and see the radiologist and say I'm not having 
radio, radiotherapy, em, and it was only then that they volunteered that, or the radiologist said, 
yes, I thought you'd choose surgery because your, because of your age, and I thought, why 
has she said that? And then I found out afterwards it's because if you have a radiation therapy, 
you can expect in ten years to get a different form of cancer, but that piece of information I 
hadn't got when I was making the decision, cos I would, in that, if I'd have known that, I would 




[1] and it was just, right, okay, we should have the results in, you know, less than a week, we 
hope, and we'll, we'll give you, we'll give you a call when we get the results, and again that 
was like, there was so much uncertainty around that, when will they call? When will they get 
to see me? There was nothing, you see I'm obsessed with the bloody diary, there was nothing 
in my diary that says come and see us at three o'clock next Tuesday, em, and we will have 
your results, em, so it was all of that as well 
 
[1] I knew the only time I would get an answer would be when I next saw the consultant so 
she could give me my results really. 
 
[1] I suppose nobody can reassure you cos nobody knows if you are going to get an infection, 
if your blood, you know, if your blood levels don't recover after the chemotherapy, so that was 
a huge uncertainty for me, em, and the other thing, I was always, em, uncertain when they 
didn't give me another appointment for something. Do you understand? Say I went to have, 
em, all the little tattoos and things that you need for radiotherapy, they never gave me another 
date to go there to have my radiotherapy, so you're left then, I've been all prepared, but I 
haven't got a date to go, I just wanted to know that there was some point where it would be 
starting or, you know, that kind of thing. 
 
[1] And even if you have to change that appointment, at least the appointment would be there, 
you know, and somebody would contact me to change it, but I always wanted to know there 
was something, some other point where I would see someone, you know, about whatever 
pro..., cos there were lots of processes going on in there. Em. So yes, yes, that was a huge 
thing for me. 
 
[2] NHS for me has been great, and the consultant as well, very positive, you know, I'd be very 
surprised if this wasn't low grade, you know, very surprised, I see a lot of these, very 
reassuring, don't panic, it's going to be fine, so I came out very positive out of the operation, 




[2] So that's why I'm speaking to the consultant. Will it change my treatment plan? No, because 
they've had an MDT and they have made a decision and I think I probably agree with them, 
but I know it can be subjective, and I kind of want reassurance, that's what I'm looking for, and 
that will make me less uncertain, I think. And more confident going in, you know, he told the 
nurse, I'm not expecting to see anything at the three month scan, but somehow that's not good 
enough for me [laughter]. And that's what makes my husband annoyed, you know – it's good 
enough for the consultant, he's the expert, but you're still querying, and I think that's where I 
am at the moment, so I do feel very uncertain at the moment because, em, I still have 
questions in the air. 
 
[2] I just almost want more clarity and reassurance. Which [the consultant] was very good at, 
at the procedure. 
 
[3] in the UK at the moment it's so difficult to get a doctor's appointment, they don't make it 
easy for you, if you're anxious about something, to go get reassured, you know, quite often it's 
weeks in advance, more often than not they want to have a telephone appointment, em, and, 
and I can understand why people aren't bothering, em, and probably I was guilty of that, if I'd 
chased it a bit more rigorously earlier on in that year who knows, I might have got it at a lower 
stage and I might have had surgery and be cured, but I always have that in me mind, a bit 
guilty now. 
 
[3] Well up until the point of the Lake District, I thought perhaps it's me being a bit of a 
hypochondriac? Maybe the doctor's seen me and said that's, that's fine, that'll cure it, and not 
mention the fact that it's lung cancer, or even investigate for it, and he's the professional, I 
guess I thought at that time, well, it can't be cos he would have asked me about it or had an 
x-ray or something if he thought it was, so he can't think it is, so it's not. 
 
[5] the bit where I found out why she'd said because of your age, the cancer could recur, I 




Processes of care 
 
Accessing the right help/information 
 
[2] So that's why I'm speaking to the consultant. Will it change my treatment plan? No, because 
they've had an MDT and they have made a decision and I think I probably agree with them, 
but I know it can be subjective, and I kind of want reassurance, that's what I'm looking for, and 
that will make me less uncertain, I think. And more confident going in, you know, he told the 
nurse, I'm not expecting to see anything at the three month scan, but somehow that's not good 
enough for me [laughter]. And that's what makes my husband annoyed, you know – it's good 
enough for the consultant, he's the expert, but you're still querying, and I think that's where I 
am at the moment, so I do feel very uncertain at the moment because, em, I still have 
questions in the air. And I'm putting the worst prognosis on it all, and you know, he says stop 
reading papers about it, because all I find is it's very subjective, so there is no right answer, 
I'm not wanting something else from the consultant really. I just want more clarity [speaking 
slowly] who most people wouldn't need, I accept that. 
 
[2] I'm just hoping that if I get those answers to my questions, it will make me more confident 
going forward that that's all right, em, and I know, em, you know, this is a life long thing 
 
[2] I think I'd reached the end of her knowledge, you know, I think, I 'm asking her difficult 
questions that she doesn't know the answer to, and she knows that, and that's fine, and I don't 
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suppose they have many people like me, and my husband says I'm being silly, but in my mind 
I've got to get it all kind of straight 
 
[3] in the UK at the moment it's so difficult to get a doctor's appointment, they don't make it 
easy for you, if you're anxious about something, to go get reassured, you know, quite often it's 
weeks in advance, more often than not they want to have a telephone appointment, em, and, 
and I can understand why people aren't bothering, em, and probably I was guilty of that, if I'd 
chased it a bit more rigorously earlier on in that year who knows, I might have got it at a lower 
stage and I might have had surgery and be cured, but I always have that in me mind, a bit 
guilty now. 
 
[3] Well I pursued it, saw the doctor, the doctor said it's that, they didn't perceive that it was 
lung cancer, I didn't want to raise the fact that it might be lung cancer and ask the question 
because I was scared of it being lung cancer, and if the doctor's examined me and he hasn't 
seen it, that's good enough for me, well I can't have it then, can I? 
 
[3] But when I had the Lake District experience, I think I was more determined to push the 
doctor 
 
[4] in the beginning as well you're just a sponge, you just absorb all of these, eh, ideas and 
names of drugs and treatments and all this information around you from all these multiple 
doctors because you're seeing a lot of doctors at once and it's all very new, so you have to 
kind of just soak it all up and kind of process it later, you know, and I don't really have anyone 
around me that was coming to appointments with me or anything like that so I had to kind of 
like process everything at once 
 
[4] so my normal way of being would be to focus on the little individual things because... bit of 
a control freak, I also have a science background, not in oncology but enough to understand 
and read papers and all of that kind of stuff, so in the beginning the way that I would reckon 
with my health was actually to focus way more on that, and what that became was a sort of 
defence mechanism, that I would try and learn as much about my disease as possible, that I 
would, you know, understand things, and sometimes it's really beneficial to know like how 
much variance there is in a PCR test, like that kind of stuff, very helpful 
 
[4] And, the other thing as well, actually, the other thing is I find very frank conversations with 
my health care professionals very useful, so, you know, if those numbers are not going well, 
for example when they put me onto this new medication, and they were like oh, but you know, 
it might help your legs, and it might do this, and it might do that, and they were focusing a lot 
on the side effects, but I had to kind of ask them, be like, but it's also because it's not working, 
right? 
 
[5] you've got cancer, we can operate to remove it or we can, you can have this radiotherapy, 
em, and sometimes you get other options as well, I only got those two, em, you decide! So, 
well, you're, you're the radiologist and the surgeon, why don't you know the right answer to 
this, surely? No, no, we can't tell you, you have to decide for yourself, we can't advise you on 
what your treatment should be, eh, cos they've both got different side effects and we don't 
know what's important for you, em.  Eh, so that was, yeah, that was a difficult period, em, 
before I decided to have [inaudible] the surgery, em, because, eh, yeah, I, the, the, the two 
things have quite different prognoses and outcomes and it's sort of you have to work out your 
own age and how long you, what things are important to you in life and this sort of thing 
 
[5] which one do you decide? Do you flip a coin? What's the, em. And that's, that's when I first 
went to my first [support group] meeting, before I'd had the operation or made the decision, 
eh, to help make that decision because it was just, there were too many variables, and I 
couldn't, I couldn't work out, so I needed to hear what other men, what had happened to other 
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men and what decisions they'd made. No advice was given, but they just said, you know, I 
had this, this is what happened to me, this is how it's left me, I had that, these things happened, 
em, yeah, so, so, but in the end, I had to make the decision, and then having made the 
decision, you know, was it the right decision? 
 
[5] I just thought, okay, that's just, maybe I missed it in the reams and reams of information I 
had been ploughing through to help make the decision, maybe I hadn't spotted that, em, I 
hadn't really spotted the extent of the erectile dysfunction. That had passed me, you know, I 
hadn't paid, it was probably there, I hadn't really paid attention to it in making the decision. 
And of course I didn't realise it would turn out to be such a big deal for me, so, cos I didn't 
think it would be a big deal for me, but it has been. 
 
[6] there was nobody sort of there to support me, and, to be honest, I was happier actually 
doing that myself. Em, at the time I didn't know about, em, [the support group] em, because, 
eh, I'd not sort of looked for any support groups or anything like that. I must admit that nothing 
was particularly mentioned, eh, when I was having the consultation or anything, em, although 
I think that might actually be changing now, em, but nothing was mentioned about support 
groups, and I found out about [the support group], em, by chatting with, em, somebody, em, 
on Facebook , I think it was, em, about sort of life in general and that, and he mentioned, em, 
that his, em, his partner had had prostate cancer and actually mentioned the, em, the group 
[…]all the, the decisions, all the considerations, you know, were mine, based on the sort of 
information I had and everything. 
 
[6] You know, and I'd be asking my either the urology department consultant, em, if they hadn't 
put anything in the letter, I'd be phoning my GP up and speaking to them about it and saying 
right well, you know, this is the, the results, they're saying this, that and the other, em, right, 
what are we going to do about it, when can we start getting something, you know, sort of done, 
treatment or whatever about this, do you need to cut something out, am I going to have to 
have a, a bag or whatever? 
 
[6] if I felt I was showing any sort of symptoms, anything like that, then I would get straight to 
the, you know, I'd get straight down to the doctor's  and say I believe that, you know, because 
of past experience I'm getting this breathlessness or pain or whatever, em, you know, I'd like 
referring for, em, you know, x-rays or that because, you know, I've worked with asbestos in 
the past and it could be, I, and I also used to smoke, it could be, you know, cancer , I'd, you 
know, I'd do, I'd do something about it to control it, to be in control, you know 
 
Acknowledging the limitations of my role 
 
[1] I was not in control of that, she [the consultant] was in control of that, em, so there was 
absolutely nothing I could do about it, there's nothing you can do on your own. […] There is 
nothing you can do on your own about the secondaries, you know, if you've got them, you've 
got them 
 
[2] I said to the nurse, I find it with pharmacy, I find people who have in their mind what they 
want, and they'll go two, three, four different consultants cos they will find someone eventually 
that will agree with them, and I don't want to be that person. I could probably go to somebody 
who would say yes, it should be treated as high grade and you should go on to have six 
bladder washes. I don't necessarily want that 
 
[2] I know I'm reading too much, em, I never thought I'd be that person cos I read a lot of 
papers with my work, I work with GPs, and I, I, I sit on formulary committees and things, so, 
you know, I look at papers with evidence, and so I know what absolute risk and relative risk 
means, you know, I know the difference, so I know what I'm looking at, but I know I'm reading 




[2] So acceptance, I think, and I think when I can accept that, I can accept the uncertainty of 
having to have regular, cos this apparently is the cancer that comes back most frequently, but 
mine I know is least likely to progress, so it's going to be a nuisance, and there's going to be 
anxiety before each scope, and I think I've got to accept that cos, you know, that's, before 
anyone has anything done, even if you just go to the dentist, there might be some sort of 
anxiety, so I've just got to accept that, and I want to be into that place where I've acknowledged 
what I've got, that's life, you know 
 
[4] in the beginning I was sort of, at one point kind of mocked by one of my doctors for wanting 
to know what my PCR level was, what my blood was, all this kind of stuff, em, and you know, 
I like to be involved with my care anyway but then as it's gone on and you go through treatment 
after treatment, after hospital after hospital, you, you just generate this fatigue that just means 
that you just [sigh] you just have to go along, it's kind of like a small factor of learned 
helplessness, you know 
 
[4] I'm just trying to still get to that but just I don't know how to, I think that's the other thing, I 
don't know how to get to where they want me to be when my body isn't playing along, and 
there's nothing I can do about that. 
 
[4] so in the past I would have been very on top of it, you know like, want those results as fast 
as they came through, em, yeah, to the point where some of my doctors were a bit like, like 
we get it [chuckle], you know, like, you want to be involved, em, and now I just, I've sort of had 
to kind of stop checking so much because, I, I mean I still look at every single blood test 
 
[4] I think one way that I kind of deal with the uncertainty of the test is to remember the test 
isn't absolute, and I have to remember that it's about trends between it, and that's kind of 
where sometimes I'll, you know I'll look at the number and as long as it's not crazy high, I'm 
just like okay, got it, and then it's, you know, I'll kind of look back over them every now and 




[1] I always focused on other people but now the focus is going to have to be on me and 
making myself better, otherwise I was never going to get to the stage where I could help 
someone again, you know? So, I suppose, yeah, the focus is different, I have to take my focus 
off that, and just make sure I got all my chemotherapy on time, and you know, I got my 
radiotherapy on time, and after that year, I would be better, and I would be back to where I 
was before and focusing on them. 
 
[1] but what I did try and do was when I did think like that was to turn it around as I've said to 
you before, you know, you know so many people who've come through this, you know that, 
and you will too, you know and I tried very hard that week to be very positive about it 
 
[2] I want to be into that place where I've acknowledged what I've got, that's life, you know, so 
I'm going to live with that and I'm not going to let it impact on my day to day. I'm desperate to 
get back to running, absolutely desperate 
 
[2] what I'm hoping is as time moves on, it will still be uncertain, and I know for the cancer I've 
got, it's going to be like that cos it's constant surveillance, em, but hopefully living between 
them, you go back to a normal life rather than spend three months worrying about it, which I'm 
doing at the moment, you know, I've had one month already, and I've kind of spent that month 
worrying, so why am I doing that? So I'm hoping if I speak to him Monday, then I can at least 
have the next two months not worrying about what's going to happen in... [laughter] ...until the 
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week before when it would be natural to worry. I don't want to worry for three months between 
every, every appointment. 
 
[3] I sort of tried to strengthen myself, cos I knew they was going to chuck a load of treatment 
at me, I don't know how I was going to cope with that 
 
[3] between the oncologist and the group, and what the group says, em, that's how I gauge 
where, where I am really, em. And as I say, the group are very good at finding out what's 
happening with the latest drugs 
 
[4] probably it would be better mentally to kind of have the hope, but when you've gone through 
that many treatments in such a short amount of time, you know, and it's like this medication is 
going to do it, and this medication is going to do it, and this is going to work, it just, or even 
other things they've offered, you know like, oh we're going to find you someone that's a similar 
age with a similar disease so you can, you know, meet someone else with it, cos it's super 
rare, and then these things don't come through, they just don't, so, you know, you kind of learn 
to lose hope so that you don't end up giving yourself additional fatigue to manage. 
 
[4] I have to think on things in my sphere and trust them to do the stuff on their side because 
otherwise if I start second guessing every decision, it's not healthy for anyone 
 
[4] So I think that's almost in a way why I sort of focus more on these sort of larger scope 
questions of, you know, am I going to be alright, because if you focus too much on the details, 
it just overwhelms you. 
 
[4] in reality I kind of have to just let it happen and then if I'm doing that rather than focusing 
on details that I can't control, that will frustrate me, I should come to terms with the fact of how 
they're making me feel and try to share that with people rather than, rather than just tell them 
about numbers, that's not really what they're asking, you know? They want to know I'm okay, 
but, you know, I was sort of deflecting by sort of confusing them with the science of it. 
 
[4] I can almost shift that responsibility and then I can just sort of be along for the ride. 
 
[6] Em, you know, and so, try and look at it practically, you know, rather, but eh, let my head 
rule it rather than my heart and, em, you know, look at, if I'm doing something practical, I don't, 
I can't, I don't worry about things, it's the control, if I'm out, if I can't control things, I'm more 
anxious about them than if I can control them. 
 
[6] I believe that, you know, even with that, you know, people, you know, there's help and 
everything and they're getting support groups, I think support groups are very important, em, 







[1] we've moved back to [name of city], because I decided that after the chemotherapy through 
the winter, I couldn't do another year in the, in the [chuckle], in the countryside, I'm not a 
countryside person really, you know, so I wanted to come back to the hustle bustle of [the 
city], so my calendar is now fuller than it was before I had the cancer really, because all of my 
friends were still in [the city] 
 
[3] and then of course in your own mind you're thinking well how are you going to cope 
financially, am I still going to be able to work, em, and your mind paints all these things on, 
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you know, there, there comes through your mind at different times, you don't know, you don't 
even realise sometimes, then all of a sudden you say, crikey, what happens about that, you 
know, some people get mets in their brain and they lose their driving licence, and I'm thinking, 
well perhaps, supposing the next time I go, I'm going to lose me driving licence, how will I cope 
with that? 
 
[3] we're going to have to cut our cloth now, I only work 20 hours a week and I only work from 
home, [my wife] only works 20 hours a week now in the hospital, em, because I'm so damn 
tired all the time, I fall asleep every afternoon, em, but, we get on fine with it, em, so yeah, 
definitely more uncertainty after the diagnosis. 
 
[3] we've had lots of conversations because, life, life matters really because we've used a 
chunk of my, em, pension up, we've both gone short time work, we've spent all this money 
updating stuff, so we haven't got an awful lot of money left in the kitty, and what we're earning 
now is not allowing us to top it up very much, so we've had the house valued, we've got to 
make a decision as to whether we downsize, if we downsize we'll move nearer where our 
children are, em, obviously, then if anything happens to me, [my wife]'s got people local to her, 
family local to her. […] just recently one of her dear friends lost her husband suddenly, like 
very suddenly, em, and she has been going through the whole widow thing, em, and [my 
wife]’s been sort of comforting her, so it's almost like a practice run. She can see [her friend 
is] coping with it, she must realise that at some point, she'll have to cope with it as well, so I'm 
hoping that's going to be a good thing for her. 
 
[4] my health has made me homeless and I'm waiting for social housing, so it's the uncertainty 
of having no, yeah, no, no security. 
 
[4] Like, especially on benefits, like yes, I now have the disability one on top, but I can't afford 
to pay the London rent, I would have to leave London and I don't have a good relationship with 
my family, so that would leave me with no support, which is what the council were originally 
suggesting, I should leave, so it's really hard to have like [sigh] security in your health and this 
kind of goes back to the idea of hope, but like the mental capacity to think in a positive manner 
when you're still in survival mode of like I don't have a stable home, I don't have stable health, 
especially with coronavirus, I don't have stable access to food, you know, it's, it's nuts, so, and 
also to have to fight for it, that's the other thing, you know 
 
[5] I was off for six months with the operation and convalescing, and I knew there were going 
to be some redundancies where I was working, so before I, before I went off on the operation 
I knew that, so I said to my manager, I said if there's any redundancies coming up, you know, 
I'm going to be off for a long time, I don't know when I come back whether I'll be fully fit, yeah? 
I don't know what mental state I'll be in, so, em, if you, I, I, I'll take the redundancy, you know, 
keep the job for somebody else who needs the, who's younger than me, needs to feed their 
family, so, so I backed out at that point 
 
[5] why would I want to waste any more time, I don't, you don't have to work, em, and, and I 
stopped wanting to work, that was the other thing, yeah, it's sort of, this isn't relevant to me 
anymore, you know, I don't, don't, don't define myself by this anymore, it's not, not, I don't, 
yeah, it's not, it stopped being who I am, yeah? 
 
Socio-political/socio-cultural factors 
[1] I've never been terribly political, I do have views, but Brexit I was a very staunch Remainer, 
and I was so upset when, you know, we were going to... Leave won, em, and I think that was 
then exacerbated because if we were leaving with no deal, which it looked like at that time, 
em, and it would have been the end of March 2019, the uncertainty for me there was there 
was all this stuff about drugs are going to run out, we're going to have to stockpile drugs, but 
we can't stockpile radiotherapy drugs because they have a very short shelf life, and I knew, 
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and this is part of the uncertainty of the cancer experience, isn't it, if I couldn't do all my 
chemotherapies on time, if I got an infection or something stopped me having some of those 
chemotherapies, my radiotherapy would be put back 
 
[1] [The Brexit referendum is] the one thing, I think, in my life before this pandemic that has 
made me feel, oh my God, I really don't know what's going to happen, and uncertainty for 
myself, but uncertainty for young people as well. I think more for young people that what's 
going to happen to their futures, you know, if we get no deal and the economy and all of that 
kind of stuff and their jobs, em, so I think yeah, that did leave me with a huge uncertainty 
 
[4] I mean, you're 32, and I think being in the kind of queer world, like I think men that sleep 
with men can be very, very vapid at points. I think all cultures can, but I think there is a 
heightened value of it at, at, in certain spaces like bars and areas where you meet people so 
you can kind of feel excluded from that by having a disability, em, and I should say newly 
acquired disability, cos that's where the problem is, cos it's newly acquired it's getting used to 
that, em, and feeling with, with the mobility stuff but also with my health in general, you know, 
feeling undesirable, feeling like no one's going to want to put up with it or have to deal with it, 
and even when I have tried dating, they say they will but then there's always a problem around 
my doctor's appointments or they're annoyed that I can't go out or, you know, on holiday I 
spend half my day in bed, you know, it's just, you feel like a drag 
 
[4] it's tricky because, you know, people as well can sort of without meaning to devalue the 
whole thing because they're like oh but you look good, you know, you look fine, and like, well, 
it doesn't change anything [exhalation, chuckle], like, and it's also this really strange rubric that 
other people have of what a cancer patient should look like, and if you therefore don't have 
that, you don't qualify for their sympathy, instead you get their curiosity or disbelief. I mean, 
I've had it in bars where people who I know, em, will tell me, you don't look sick, I don't believe 
you 
 
[4] even now as an adult and the way I present, you know, unless I have nice earrings in or 
I've painted my nails, people don't believe it, which is a very strange thing anyway, I shouldn't 
have to do that [sigh], but it's still like this weird coming out thing, you know the cost-benefit 
analysis of it, of like how does it work, and that uncertainty of whether people will change the 
way that they see about you, whether they're going to close certain doors to you, you'll lose 
certain cis-passing privileges, like all those kind of things, so it's very weird on the queer side 
knowing that that level of honesty leads to more uncertainty, but then on the cancer side, 
where people, it's so much more complicated to understand, but people accept it like that [click 
fingers], I mean, aside from obviously, you know, looking healthy, em, it's this idea that if I 
share someone that intimate detail, it's just instant support, you know 
 
[4] people want to treat you like a cancer patient but they don't know how to treat you as an 
LGBT person, and it's kind of interesting watching those differences kind of play out 
 
Managing relationships 
[1] probably about a year before I got my cancer, [my daughter], eh, struggled a lot through 
depression and anxiety, which came to a head when she was doing her, her master's. I'd 
always spent a lot of time with [her], em, because her dad and I separated when she was 
eight, so our relationship is very close, em, but particularly after she went to [university], I was 
back and forth to [the university town] a lot, spending time with her, she comes home a lot as 
well, em, so obviously when this happened, there was a lot of uncertainty for me about how I 
would tell [her], how we would manage that process […] how am I going to feel through all this 
process, and how, how can I keep supporting [her] because I didn't want to stop supporting 
her or how can we set something else up, so she was my main worry off my list of things that 




[1] you don't know how long this is, this is, this is going to go on, and at what point do I tell 
people? Em, you know, because it was only my husband knew, and my niece cos I couldn't 
go and look after the baby while I was having all of this done, so it was only my husband and 
my niece knew, there was definitely a point where I was going to have to tell [my daughter], 
and I had no idea how I was going to do that, but I didn't have any inkling then of when I should 
tell her, em, because I didn't know what the real news was going to be, you know. So the, the 
uncertainty around the timing of a lot of stuff for me in this process was huge. 
 
[1] I didn't tell my husband in all that time that I was going to see the GP or, you know, that I 
thought there was something wrong with me. Em, and then the GP found a lump, and I thought 
I'm going to have to tell him now, and when I told him, he just looked at me and he went, well 
I'm telling you, you can't die before me [laughing], so it's like, oh, okay then – we'll have to 
make sure that I don't die before you, you know? 
 
[1] so I did tell her, just before we went to bed in the hotel, we shared a room, em, but I played 
it down, you know, oh [daughter’s name], I've got a lump in my breast, I didn't say breasts, it 
wasn't quite [chuckling] an untruth but it wasn't quite the whole truth either, em, and I'm sure 
it's going to be fine because you know we, we know lots of people who've had breast cancer, 
em, and I will be fine, and once we get the results, we'll know what kind of treatment I'm going 
to have, and it will be okay, you know, I'm almost certain I have breast cancer at that stage 
even though we hadn't had the results 
 
[2] that uncertainty is probably the key thing of having a grandchild, that I might not see him 
as I would have done grow up 
 
[2] And it's driving my husband mad – he's been very patient, em, and, you know, you can dip 
for blood, you know, in your urine, and I haven't had any, and I had some yesterday, he was 
like, it's, it's not even four weeks, you know, it's not going to be healed yet, why are you worried, 
for heaven's sake? 
 
[2] he says I want some time to myself, he's a [musician], you know, he wants to do other 
things, he wants to go and lecture at universities, things like that, em, and he wanted me to 
do the same, and I love my job, I love the people I work with, and I figured I would work til I 
dropped, and he didn't want that, and he's now saying maybe this will now show you that you 
can't take things for granted. We want to do travel, we want to travel, and I'm saying, well, 
maybe I won't be able to, you know 
 
[2] whereas my husband's always of the view, is you don't know what's round the corner, he's, 
you now, we've lost quite a few friends in flying accidents, one just last year, who crashed a 
plane in Dubai, em, and so, we, I think he's always been of that mindset, you've got to enjoy 
life, em, so I think he's now saying, well, if one thing's happened, it's made you think yes, I'm 
not going to do as much, but I haven't agreed to reduce anything yet. [Laughter] 
 
[2] it's really interesting to see your study because I think I'm affecting my husband, and I think 
it's really important that people would be able to manage that for the people around them. 
 
[2] I think I lived that life for so long, I was used to it, and in fact, whilst it was dangerous, you 
know, [husband’s name] was running air for NATO, so, you know, he had a responsible job, 
but for him, it was a job he wanted to do because it was almost like this is a real job that I've 
been trained to do, and I've had my whole career in preparation for, so, yeah, so he wanted 
to do it, and I've always told myself that if ever anything happened to him flying, it was, it's his 
life love, you know, so he was doing what he wanted to do, and I've managed that, you know, 
you think the anxiety that might come with that, I've managed that, you know, I've had many 
phone calls in our earlier married life, I'm okay, phone down, cos he's just telling me, I can't 




[2] And, and the one thing that did worry me was, em, my son had found a lump, and he'd had 
his own worries, em, eh, which turned out to be okay, but didn't want to worry me, and that 
worried me as a mum, you know […] he's always been somebody who wears his heart on his 
sleeve and will share how he feels with you since he's been a little tot, so it worried me that 
he couldn't tell me that he had worries, you know, em, his twin brother's always been a bit 
more inward and reserved, but em, no, he's always been heart on sleeve 
 
[3] I sort of realised, it was a couple of, three months that worrying about it intensely and 
nothing on me mind other than that, em, wasn't only affecting my state of mind, it was affecting 
my wife's, my children's, my friends', and everything, and by me being as I am, em, it's making 
everybody miserable and anxious and stuff, so I sort of, even though I had tablets and I had 
counselling at that time, I think what really got me out of it was this determination to get the 
best out of what days we've got left and make, make each day a good day, and we had this 
conversation, [my wife] and I, and we've tried to do that. 
 
[3] we just had a granddaughter and she's seven months old now, and I don't know how long, 
you know, I'll be around for her, but probably not when she's a teenager, so what I'm trying to 
do now is encompass all these good thoughts into a book, which would also be useful for 
everybody else that's left as well 
 
[3] at that time I probably wasn't a good person to be around [my wife] and the kids, which I 
regret now. 
 
[3] my counselling I felt I needed was how do you cope with this illness, how do you cope with 
the fact that some time, sooner than you want to or expect to, you're going to die, and how do 
you cope with your family around these times, how can they cope, what can I do to help them 
cope? 
 
[3] [my wife] started crying, em, and I didn't know how to cope with it. Thankfully the cancer 
nurse was very, very good 
 
[3] [My wife is] a health care assistant herself, she works at the [name of hospital], so she's 
trained in looking after people like meself, which was handy because she would me blood 
pressure, and me temperature, and me stats[?], stuff like that, so that I could keep an eye on 
things every day, and obviously administer me medication, make sure I took the right doses 
 
[3] people are afraid to mention the fact that, they won't come up and say well how's your 
cancer, how's your treatment, so quite often, you know, I'd do a little e-mail on the, on me 
Facebook, or I'd go around and talk to me sister, I make sure I give her an update. Sometimes, 
when I get an e-mail from me doctor, from Dr [name of doctor], eh, after a clinic visit, or after 
I've had a scan, I'm letting her have a copy of the e-mail as well, you know, just to make sure 
they understand, em, it's difficult, innit, I know, it's difficult for [my wife] to cope with, I think in 
some ways it's harder for her. 
 
[4] partly for me but partly because I had to tell other people, and you have to make space for 
their reactions, which is exhausting, you know, it's not their fault, but it's exhausting, cos you 
want to be able to be the one to freak out, but you can't because other people are freaking out 
so you have to deal with that 
 
[4] Em, so, with friends it's tricky because some friends don't want to talk about it, some friends 
are, em, sickeningly positive, which is fine, it helps them but it doesn't help me because they're 
not the ones dealing with it every day and going to these appointments and having all this bad 
news, they kind of take that blind faith thing of like, oh, it'll be fine, it'll be fine, this one will 
work, and it's like, okay [sharp exhalation / chuckle], you know, that's, that's where you're at, 
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em, and I have other friends that are just, I have one friend that's Swedish and just is way too 
Nordic about it, and just you know, she's always tells me that I'm dying so, it's, it's very weird 
the way that it impacts sort of friend personal things, and I almost feel like I can't talk to them 
about it, or if I do, I have to limit, eh, how to say this, I think what I, I think I tell them the things 
that I'm willing to be upset about, as in, upset about their reaction because I don't think they're 
very good at talking about it, so yeah, I have to kind of tell them stuff that I'm not going to be 
offended by because likelihood they're going to say the wrong thing and it's going to annoy 
me, to be fair. Romantic relationships don't really work [sigh] with cancer, I've figured out, you 
know, people I've tried doing it with, people are super involved with the care, and they still 
mess up, I started doing it where you kind of pretended like it doesn't exist, that doesn't work 
cos they get frustrated about why you're tired all the time, you know, I haven't really figured 
out a way to make the two things come together, to be honest. Em, eh, I don't really speak to 
my family about this stuff, my dad doesn't speak to me, em, don't know why, and em, my mum 
speaks to me once, once a week, which is a lot for her, to be honest, it's been since lockdown 
and she doesn't like to talk about the health stuff, like if ever anything comes up or goes wrong, 
she just kind of shuts down, always has, em, so the only people I really get to talk about it with 
is my CNS when I see her, but again that's an appointment, I don't really bother her outside of 
that cos she is so busy, and then other people are, em, well it's kind of been from setting up 
this […] peer support network, em, it's a lot of work, but it gives me the ability to speak to 
people in similar positions, you know 
 
[4] actually you don't have anyone that you can be completely open with, there's no person 
that you can, that you can relax around and tell them everything because you can't be sure, 
or certain, that they're going to handle it well 
 
[4] I think the biggest confusion actually is other people who know less about my health than 
I do are so certain that that is going to be fine, the future, you know, everything's going to work 
out, and I'm not [half-chuckle, exhalation], you know, and it's like a really weird thing because 
also they don't want to get on board with the way I'm thinking because they think they're 
helping in regards to sort of trying to keep positive, em, but I'm sort of, I think I see that rather 
than trying to take some kind of stab in the dark and some positivity and some projection of 
what I want to happen, instead I see it as an approximation of everything that has happened 
so far and that's why there's this huge grey area around it 
 
[4] I think for me personally it comes down to a lot of whether I can trust the person that I'm 
kind of going through it with, and em, and I trust my specialist and my CNS, they're both great, 
but do I trust my friends and family with my thoughts and feelings? No. Do I trust the council 
to appreciate my health and help me? No. Do I trust myself to be good to myself in this? 
Getting better. [Chuckle] So. Yeah, it's just kind of a, a learning curve of knowing where to 
place your energy so you don't burn out. 
 
[5] I started feeling a bit low, and, and, em, obviously people, you know, offer support and 
stuff, but em, the thing that I, that upset me, so, so I had a reaction and it really upset me, it 
really, really upset me, and it was from my [?]'s daughter, and she doesn't know she really 
upset me, but she said yeah, but you're still alive to tell the tale, and I'm thinking, well yes I 
know, but what you're saying to me is just, you know, man up, get over it, you, you, to me it 
feels like an amputation, yeah, I had something, I had part, if I'd, if I'd had a, a, a, a, em, 
gangrene or something, and had a leg amputated and I said I'm feeling low cos I'm, I'm, you 
know, I've got a, I have to deal with this amputation every day of my life, you wouldn't get the 
reaction yeah but you're alive, you'd get the reaction yeah that's a terrible thing, it's so hard to 
live with, but for this you don't, it's sort of, that's, you know, it's just dismissed, em, it's, em, 
and, and that, eh, makes the, the sort of, I suppose uncertainty, how do I react to this, how do 
I, do I get, do I show that I'm upset, do I, because they didn't mean it to upset me, they meant 




[5] that intimacy has stayed about the same level, em, both my wife and, and with, you know, 
like occasional other partners, em. What has happened though, is, is is, em, that their reaction 
to my sexuality has changed, so their perception is that I'm not interested in what we're going 
because I'm physically reacting to it, em, and that, that sort of, so the intimacy tends to, tends 
to be a one-sided thing where I'm giving and not getting, yeah? 
 
[5] I found that I couldn't really talk to a lot of people about it because they'd try and be helpful 
without having any knowledge, em, and what happens is they, they, they, they'd sort of try and 
say something helpful and I'd sort of bite their head off, you know [inaudible], obviously not 
literally bite their head off, but, but, but you know, sort of implying they were an idiot and they 
didn't know what they were talking about, which, they'd got completely the wrong end of the 
stick and they didn't understand, em, cos obviously they had no idea what was going on in my 
mental or emotional landscape at the time, no matter how well they knew me, em, so it sort of 
made me shut down a bit, yeah? 
 
[5] I think I pushed people away because, eh, obviously my wife and children were trying to 
be supportive, and they were supportive, they were very supportive, very helpful, em, but 
sometimes their concern, they were, sometimes they were more concerned than I actually 
was, and that was, that was difficult for me cos I got to the point where I felt, eh, am I now 
supporting you, cos you're, you, you're, you're taking this worse than I am, and, and I'm giving 
you emotional support, but I'm the one with the cancer […] and I actually said that to my wife 
at one point, I said I'm not sure if I can cope with this, cos I'm having to deal with this, but I'm 
having to deal with you dealing with me dealing with this, and that's really hard. 
 
[6] the one thing that sort of really concerned me, when you read through the literature and 
everything, em, is about, eh, you know, the sort of side effects from prostate cancer on your 
sex life, and really to me that was the only thing I was anxious about, I wasn't sort of over-
concerned about cancer or anything about that, em, I've sort of a philosophical view that, em, 
well I'm going to die of one thing or another, you know 
 
[6] I was more worried about the uncertainties of moving on, em, rather than the sort of the 
cancer. The cancer was just a health thing and that was really sort of, whether I survived life 
I'd still have sort of the other problems, you know, if I die from it, well, I wouldn't really, I'm 
dead, that's it, you know, I don't have to worry about that 
 
[6] after I finished the treatment, em, I did actually start, em, sort of meeting other people, em, 
having to explain that, you know, sexually I was, em, you know, I wasn't up for anything, if 
you're like that and, em, sort of just over 12 months after, em, meeting, eh, what's it, having 
been diagnosed, em, and having sort of gone through all that and everything, I actually met 
someone and, em, we eh had a civil partnership in November last year, so, you know, it wasn't, 
em, quite, you know, the worry about everything wasn't, you know, as bad as, you know, you 
sort of imagine. But the uncertainty of moving out, I went, until I actually met [name of partner], 
em, I'd still got that uncertainty, I wouldn't, em, stop out overnight, em, or anything with 
anybody 
 
[6] I enjoyed sort of being with people, I enjoyed cuddling, hugging and kissing, and that sort 
of compensated, that satisfied the sort of lack of physical sex, the lack of orgasm, em, 












An undetermined future 
[1] I suppose it makes you appreciate that you can't take how things are today, that that's how 
they're always going to be, and that's how you're always going to be able to behave, em, and 
that there are things that will happen to you that will impact on other people as well, other 
people around you, who you have relationships with, that you were helping out, or were relying 
on you, that you may not always be able to do that, or able to do it in the same way, I suppose. 
 
[1] I've seen a lot of death, obviously, as a nurse, and I suppose I try not to think about my 
own […] but I think as you get older you're much more aware of your own mortality, em, and 
certainly, you know, having cancer makes you even more aware, and I think you know, like 
I'm probably three quarters of the way through my life, I haven't got that much left, you know, 
em, I hope I live til I'll be 80 or 90, em, and I do think about it sometimes, and I suppose having 
cancer does make you think about death more, em, and I do think about it more in terms of 
my own death 
 
[2] I've got a nine-month-old grandson, and, who loves to make music... noise... and my 
thoughts were wouldn't it be lovely to see if he developed and had those same sort of interests, 
so I think the uncertainty is I might not be here to see it, you know 
 
[2] there was a lot of fun and family and good friends and a lot of social life, and that's a very 
happy time, and maybe it doesn't have to be the cathedral choir, but that's what came to me 
as something that was important to me, em, you know, whether he did do or didn't do that, but 
I wanted to be there to see him develop and maybe he would be interested in something like 
that, I have no desire to force it on him, I want to be there to see, you know, if that, if that 
happens, so I think that sort of uncertainty, em, is more difficult to put at the back of your mind, 
you know, you can live day to day, but that's more looking to the future. 
 
[2] I think the difficulty accepting it is, is because of that, I had assumed we would go into our 
seven… sixties, seventies, pretty healthy. That's not to say I won't be, you know, I feel fine, 
you know, I'm still me able to do everything I do, I've still got the same energy, I still want to 
go out and do the garden and, you know, that sort of stuff, so, em, I think that, that's more to 
do with it 
 
[2] Yes, let's go next year, but there's still a little bit that, that, that bit of me saying, why am I 
saying, why am I agreeing to book something, you know. 
 
[4] no one really knows 
 
[4] I think the answers to the questions I want are just not answerable 
 
[4] but the idea of the big questions that I'd want to know, just am I going to be alright? Because 
it doesn't feel like it, and it hasn't felt like it, and, and if I'm not going to be alright, even if it 
means I don't have a good quality of life and I'm still here, like, am I going to be happy? 
 
[4] my questions are based in the idea of a timeline that you obviously can't access, like, where 
are we going to go? And, and I think maybe before all of the experiences I've had with my 
disease and treatment, I probably would have thought those kind of questions could be 
entertained […] I sort of focus more on these sort of larger scope questions of, you know, am 
I going to be alright, because if you focus too much on the details, it just overwhelms you. 
 
[4] I personally think that there is a macabre level of human existence where you fantasise 
about what's going to happen, you know, as you get old, how will you die, will you die 
peacefully, I mean you see it even in media all the time, you know, like this kind of idea of gold 
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standard of death is dying peacefully at home, and, and I think a lot of people have those 
thoughts, and they have that kind of aspect of like, oh, you know how long will I last et cetera. 
Em, but then when you know pretty much that's not going to be you, I mean, who knows, there 
might be a tiny chance, who knows what's going to happen, but, but when you do kind of get 
to that bit where you're like, oh actually, this is an ongoing thing, and it's going to really mess 
up your body as time goes on, it's hard because you can end up feeling quite defeatist because 
that kind of yeah macabre wonder of what's going to happen is gone, which is also kind of 
slightly stupid because you could still walk out in front of a bus, you know, there's still all of 
that but I think it's just maybe, maybe that when you don't have that there's this kind of field 
of, eh, invincibility around you mentally cos you don't think you're going to get sick, no one 
thinks they're going to get sick, you know, nobody takes preventive medicine seriously, no 
one... so all this kind of stuff, so. So it's this idea that you have the freedom to fantasise about 
your health, em, and then when you lose that freedom to do so because you are not in this 
perfect bill of health to have the kind of privilege to think in that way 
 
[5] will I ever get back to normal? Will I ever, you know, lead a, a normal life where I'm not 
doing this cos nobody else does this, you know, you might see it in the odd weird porn video, 
but it's not a thing that people do normally, it's not the, you know, it's a, it's an odd thing. Em, 
and em, and I think, you know, will I be ever, will I ever be rid of it, so I'm, I'm 61 now, em, and 
em, you know, I wonder, well if this goes on for five, five more years or, or, when do I just give 
up? It's sort of, it's, it's weird, it's sort of, it's, it's a horrible feeling, em, that just sits there. 
 
[6] I could walk out of the door and get knocked down by, em, you know, a bus, you know, I 
don't worry about that, the chances of it happening I think, you know, the odds is just as great 
as, you know, getting the cancer or anything like that, so we'll just have to see. 
 
[6] There's always uncertainty in life, like I say, with like, you know, the possibility of, em, you 
know, side effects from working, em, in an environment with asbestos dust in it 
 
[6] I mean, there's, life, life is uncertain, everything in life is uncertain, you never know, even 
with, eh, things, oh, that's a certainty, nothing is, nothing is one hundred per cent certain, apart 
from death, so there's everything that you do in life has got some form of uncertainty, and it's 
how you deal with that uncertainty, how important it is, you know, it's like with a gambler, you 
know, it's the uncertainty of will the cards go for me, with cancer, you know, will the treatment 
work for me, this job interview, will I get the job? You know, everything, you know, within life, 
you know, a professional gambler, then the uncertainty of the cards coming up is far more, 
em, serious than, em, if you're just playing for match sticks, em, as a family, as entertainment, 
you know, so there's degrees of uncertainty and whatever uncertainty is within your life, em, I 
control, I, you know, I deal with it the way I've said, you know, by trying controlling or trying to 
ai-, you know, trying to aim things if I can't control or put it to the back of my mind. 
 
Questions of control and agency 
[1] it's all, it's all out of your control, you know 
 
[1] I suppose when things are uncertain, I like to put control in, which is what I was saying to 
you about my face and stuff, and I suppose what it's taught me that there are things that I'll 
never ever be able to control, things that might have a huge impact on me, that I'll never be 
able to control, and you just have to live with that, and find a way to live with it, really, however 
hard that might be. 
 
[1] but if you can't control it, you can't control it, you know, you've just got to find a way of 
dealing with it, haven't you really. 
 
[2] you can only do what you can do, you know, you can only eat reasonably healthy, we're 
not ma..., you know, and we drink alcohol, but we have three alcohol-free days, you know, a 
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week, all the things you should do, we exercise, we walk, you can only do what you can do, 
and it's almost, we've done everything we can do, but yet this has happened, and I think that's, 
that's the being annoyed thing, angry is probably too strong, irritated is more the..., how dare 
it, you know, when I've done all of this, and then this is, this is two thirds men, mostly 70 and 
over, em, and 50 per cent of diagnoses are smokers, so I'm something like between one and 
three per cent are women [laughter], so that, that's what I'm struggling with, I think 
 
[2] I think I was always a very positive person, I think I've been very lucky in my job that I've 
enjoyed it, and I've been appreciated where I've worked, and so I've always had that good 
feeling about working, em, I didn't feel it was uncertain whether I would carry on or not cos I 
thought I was in control of the decision, em, and the same with many other things in life, I 
mean I think it's put things in, a little bit more into perspective 
 
[3] I was sat there with me own thoughts really for a while, em, yeah, and, and then, you know, 
you're in that situation where you can't do anything about it, you've just got to deal with it, 
haven't you? Em, so I suppose it was almost like frozen shock, eh, for a while. 
 
[3] [The dreams are] always, always about work, and more often than not, they're more about 
people questioning my ability to do things, I even have to prove meself that we're on target 
and stuff like that, always seem to be someone challenging me, so that I'm having to, you 
know, convince 'em that I am working hard. 
 
[3] I mean, some people say, don't they, you know, crikey, you're unlucky, you know, of all the 
people to get it, how come you get it? But the same could be said of anybody in certain things. 
Some people win the lottery, you know, they get the luck on the other side of the fence, it's 
just destiny almost, innit. It's what's, what, what, what is, you know, down to happen to you, 
em, you've just got to live with it cos you can't change it. 
 
[3] Do I see myself as unlucky? No. I could turn it round, I could have died in that truck accident 
when I was 17, couldn't I, so I could say well I've been lucky to be around for another 50 years 
sort of thing. Em, you know, it's, I'm a great believer of what goes around comes around, and 
you get your fair share of luck and unluck, em, I mean, it's just how you deal with it, there's 
some people who are always bitter and moan the fact that they don't have any luck or, but 
that's probably the way they look at life really, em, so I've been, I've been lucky 
 
[4] so it kind of stems from like I don't really believe in good luck, I believe in opportunities and 
taking advantage of them, you know, like things just happen if you kind of work towards it. […] 
I think the not believing in bad luck is because, eh, sort of, eh, [sigh] if I was to believe in some 
kind of like existential reasoning around all the bad things that have happened to me, then I 
would have to subscribe to there is some master plan or something, some extraneous variable 
that has a direct influence on what's happening but I'm, you know, I have cancer, I'm homeless, 
all these kinds of things, but I've survived, barely survived a hate crime, em, had open chest 
surgery from it, abuse, child abuse, like all the, all these things that if I was to start believing 
in these sort of extraneous explanations of or machinations of reasoning around what's 
happened, I think it just pulls away from the reality that just bad things happen, and I think it 
gives you a false hope that things will get better without making them better. So yeah, it's just 
that thing of like when you've had so many bad experiences to believe that there's some kind 
of uptick when there hasn't been one, I think it's just safer just to think, you know what, it is 
what it is. 
 
[4] This big overarching question, especially because I'm not a person of faith, is just, it's very 
hard to feel okay about that […] it's hard to have blind faith that things are going to work out 
and I'm going to be fine and I know that's the standard for everybody else but going back to 
luck, like, even if I don't believe in luck, if bad luck believes in me, there's nothing I can do to 
stop that, like, just [sigh], like I want to be one of those people that can be certain things are 
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going to work out and be happy and be cool a bit and just think like it's fine, em, this is the way 
it goes, but with everything that's happened, it's harder to make that leap. 
 
[4] I just have to kind of find my own physically attainable and manageable milestones in the 
meantime that give me something to work towards because that end goal, who knows, who 
knows if it's going to work out? And there's nothing, there's nothing I can do to make it work 
better, you know, it's not like if I had a physical tumour where we have options, cut it out, 
radiotherapy, you know, whatever it is, em, it's, you know, it's in my blood, it's in my bones, it's 
just, it's there. 
 
[4] I start thinking about uncertainty, like with my future or whatever, something like that, and 
then, and then you get anxiety about it cos you're like, well what am I supposed to do, and you 
get frustrated 
 
[4] Also it's that idea of, you know, like, control and managing something and exerting that 
control over it, but at the same time it's hard to know how you're going to even deal with that 
tiny thing now it's become so ingrained, and then how you're going to get back to that huge 
one. 
 
[4] when those things happen and like when I get that kind of weight of like oh [sigh], this is 
my life, you know, I kind of have to just sort of try and stop thinking about it, or you know, 
although it's not the healthiest thing, just be a bit defeatist about it and just be like yeah, it is, 
because there is nothing I can control about it, and if I try and control it, I'm going to get stuck 
in an anxiety loop and, eh, and I definitely in the past would try to do that and like try to be 
healthy and physical and lead a normal life and it just got nowhere. 
 
[4] when I survived the hate crime, you know, I almost died, I had a collapsed lung, all that 
stuff, but that was a different thing because someone else had done it and it was a moment 
and it was done and then with this, it's just bad luck, it's just genetics, well actually it's not 
hereditary but it just, you know, happens in your body, and there's no blame or control to place 
on it, it's just something that exists and you kind of have to come to terms with, so I think in 
that way, that's been like a weird way to think about your mortality, that, you know, from 
previous experiences where you might have killed yourself or someone else was going to kill 
your self, now it's something deep in your body that you don't have control over that's trying 
to kill you, and inaction will kill you, you know it's kind of like the antithesis of what you would 
normally assume would happen. So that's kind of strange. 
 
[5] it's that bottomless dread that I used to get before an exam, eh before you got the results 
of an exam, not so much the exam itself, before you got the results of an exam when you're 
at school or college or whatever, em, and you worry about what if I haven't made the mark this 
time, yeah, em, yeah, and, cos there's nothing, nothing, there's nothing I can do about it, I 
can't, there's nothing I can change in my life that would make it more likely that, that I'll have 
a good result or less likely I'll have a good result, it's completely out of my hands. 
 
[5] stories are kind of beginning, middle and end, and, and then, em, but I don't think there are 
stories, I think things just happen, so, so, em, you know, it's [silence – 2 seconds], I find it 
[silence – 4 seconds], if something, if somebody suddenly dies, em, my reaction to it is often 
different to other people, so I'll pretend to have the same reaction, em, it can be sort of oh they 
were, they were taken away too early or this, you know, they hadn't realised their potential, 
but, but there's no, there's no, em, law that says there is an arc with a beginning, middle and 
end to your life. It can stop at any moment. And stop quite suddenly. And that is the end. 
 
[6] I've sort of learned that, well, if it's outside my control, I just have to sort of go with it and 
make the best of it, em, and, you know, I look for, if there are ways I can control things, em, 
like, you know, changing my mind about the hormone treatment was, you know, sort of sitting 
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down, and I will sort of sit down and look at things rationally, em, after the first impulse of, well 
I'm not doing that, sort of thing. 
 
[6] I think because I went into it voluntarily, it was my decision to do it, it didn't mentally affect 
me say as bad as like the chemical castration of Alan Turing did, where his was forced upon 
him mentally, I suspect it really screwed his head because it wasn't his choice, with me it was 
my choice, I'd made a considered decision to do that, and it made it easier for me to deal with, 
I knew that at the end of this, it had a time limit, I'd set the time limit of six months, em, after 
the last implant, even if they had said oh you need to do this, that and the other, it was still my 
choice, em, nobody could, you know, force that on me, I hadn't got any threats hanging over 
me apart from obviously dying, em, so it made it, em, you know, simple for me. 
 
[6] I'd do something about it to control it, to be in control, you know, I don't want to appear a 
control freak but I think that if you are in control, if you are, you know, if you, if you can't sort 
of control something, then you got to accept it, then you've just got to put it to the back of your 
mind as much as you can, and, em, get on with other things in life, you know 
 
Identity and meaning 
[1] I've never seen as many people as that, you couldn't see the end behind you, and you 
couldn't see the end in front of you, so you were just in this huge, huge body of people. You 
knew ultimately where you were going, but you couldn't see the end either way – that was 
incredible to me, all of these people, and all probably thinking the same way as I think, you 
know, em, and all the support, and it was very peaceful and you made, em, you made friends 
with the people around you, you know, there were kids on the march, there were people with 
their dogs, em, and there were people with musical instruments and they were singing as they 
were going along, eh, and it was just, I loved it, I loved the day […] the feeling of being part of 
this thing, and maybe we will change something, maybe something will change – you know it 
hasn't changed, but you've just got that optimistic feeling as well, I suppose, that yeah, you 
know, we can do this. 
 
[1] for me gardening, it's such an instant thing, you chuck a couple of seeds in, and it's instant 
gratification almost, isn't it? And like tomorrow they might have germinated and you've got a 
few little shoots, em, and you know the produce at the end, it's that kind of thing that I, that I 
like. And also I used to have an allotment, em, and I like the feeling of community there […] I 
have started volunteering in, there's a local cemetery, I know that sounds a bit morbid, but it's 
a very beautiful place, so, em, so I've started volunteering there and clearing away the graves 
and you can do very old graves, it's the oldest cemetery in [name of city], and you can do 
archiving as well, you know, so it's, cos I'm aware I'm 62 and I'm not always going to be this 
healthy, so I've started going there, em, and doing other things, so yeah, yeah, I do like being 
with people as well. 
 
[1] I thought oh, do you know, that might be a bit more interesting than just going and weeding 
in the park or, you know, sticking a few bulbs in, and it is actually, you know, there's a lot more 
and sometimes they focus on one of the graves, and they look into the history of that person, 
who is in that grave, and I suppose there's something, I, yeah, having said that, you know, 
death, and, I don't believe in the afterlife, you know, or anything, but it is nice that you can be 
remembered for stuff, I suppose, and that's what going to the cemetery does for me, is that, 
especially when you look at, em, you know, one grave, and sometimes it's a young person 
and, you know, what's happened to them. Em, so yeah, I suppose there is something that, 
that is carried on, your memory can be carried on. 
 
[2] maybe if I need that, I'll, I'll join in, but it's all a bit too chipper and good luck and all of that, 




[2] it almost annoys me when I hear people saying oh well, I'm still alive, you know, like you've 
got six months left, when I've had this [inaudible]... I don't want to be there, you know, I'm in a 
different place from that, cos they're being pleased that they've, they've lived six months, 
whereas I want to live 20 years. So I don't think I'm anything to do with them. 
 
[2] why can't I manage this?  I think because I've got my boys worrying about me now, whereas 
it's my job to worry about them, you never stop being a mum 
 
[2] Yeah, yeah, cos you don't stop being a mum, you're still worried about that, but he didn't 
want to worry me, and it kind of stops you 
 
[2] I do understand about suicide and that, and I think why are people doing that when 
everybody else is fighting to, to extend their life span, and people feel so bad that they have 
to, it's still a tragedy, and it's still an illness, I get that, but in a way it made me a bit irritated 
the other day, which I'd never felt before […] it made me irritated, and that's not me, you know, 
why are they, how dare they, you know, they're fine, em, and no they're not fine, so it, it's made 
me think of things which I wouldn't normally feel like. That's not me normally. 
 
[3] I've realised since I was diagnosed with the cancer that, em, something has changed inside 
of me emotionally and, em, there's so many songs there, I just burst into tears when they come 
on, it don't matter where I am, it just sort of hits, hits a nerve. Em, I don't particularly feel 
particularly sad when it happens, I just feel very sentimental and emotional. And it could be 
daft, I mean, I'm a rock music lover, but it could be, it could be Vera Lynn or it could be, you 
know, Land of Hope and Glory or something like that, it could be anything, you know, a Disney 
song, and I found, I found that sort of weird 
 
[3] I think it's because I'm a sentimental sort of guy and, em, since the diagnosis, I've not been 
looking forward so much, but I have been looking back a lot at me memories, and I think the 
songs try and, em, or tend to bring out the memories 
 
[3] on the whole, when you stop to think about it, you know, I had had a good life, we all have, 
and it was cheering me up to remember the days and the anniversaries and stuff like that, em, 
so much so that it's prompted me to start a project where I'm writing a book now because we 
just had a granddaughter and she's seven months old now, and I don't know how long, you 
know, I'll be around for her, but probably not when she's a teenager, so what I'm trying to do 
now is encompass all these good thoughts into a book 
 
[4] I think that in order to create sort of positive ideas of the future, you kind of have to have a 
level of comfort and security to have those thoughts, you know, like it's, your brain works very 
differently when it's in survival mode 
 
[4] I think in order to generate hope, you have to have a certain level of stability and comfort 
to daydream these positive things, and when you don't have that, your brain works very 
differently, like, you know, when you're in survival mode, that's all you can think about 
 
[4] in some ways cancer makes you sort of re-evaluate who you are, which is, you know, tricky, 
em, I mean, so for me it's like different factors, so one factor is, like, mobility, you know, like, I 
don't like walking with a stick, I'm embarrassed by it […] and then there's other things, you 
know, it kind of pulls out of the works of, like, gender and the way you see your body […] but 
then you add the cancer on top and it starts to make you really process your body and, kind 
of, there are certain parts of it I have come to terms with, which is better, I've been like, you 
know, non-binary and accepting what that is and still struggling with, you know, social 
standards of proving that, but, but then there's this other part which is the cancer, so that's 
completely out of my control really […] just a lot of stuff to fit together and sometimes trying to 




[4] it's been a process to let go of who I used to be, you know, and people find it strange when 
I say that cos, you know, you're the same person et cetera, but in reality people that know me 
well know that I'm a very different person. Your mood changes, your outlook changes, all that 
kind of stuff, but beyond that, from a personal aspect, your physical capacity, ability to move 
in the world changes. You know, I used to be very productive, have multiple projects on the 
go, walk everywhere, be very healthy, et cetera, so letting that go, it's tough, but then not 
knowing what the rest of your life is going to be is almost even worse, it's like am I going to 
get back to that? No, probably not. Em, am I going to survive this? Who knows? 
 
[4] when you're told there is no cure and the only "cure" can kill you, you know, it's, it's rough, 
and em, so instead the way I sort of process it is in that uncertainty of what's going to happen 
and not even knowing if it does go bad when it will go bad, just thinking like, okay, well let's 
use the time and energy I have, let's use the privilege I have to open doors for other people, 
let's try and do something good out of this, and not in a sense of some kind of moral duty, but 
just, just some way that helps me process everything that's happened and make you feel like 
there's a point to it, there's a purpose, and not in some sense of grand design, but just, it would 
be, I think it would be a waste if I was to go through all of this bad stuff and just sit at home 
and feel bad for myself, which I could do, you know like I'm signed off, I could just sit at home, 
just play games all day, stare out the window, but, but what's the point, like there's no point in 
me revelling in the uncertainty and letting it defeat me and become depressed. I just have to 
kind of find my own physically attainable and manageable milestones in the meantime that 
give me something to work towards because that end goal, who knows, who knows if it's going 
to work out? 
 
[5] I don't get erections naturally anymore, em, and that's sort of left me feeling with a sort of 
am I really still a man? It's a sort of weird thing, I hadn't, hadn't expected, em, so much of my 
sense of self to be attached to my penis, yeah? It's a sort of, it wasn't what I was expecting, I 
didn't, I didn't think, I didn't think I was that sort of man, yeah? But actually it's turned out to be 
a really big deal 
 
[5] it also affects how I think about myself in relation to other people cos I'll, I'll see someone 
that, that, em, I find attractive and for some reason, I mean I wouldn't have done anything 
about it anyway, be just oh that, that person looks really, really nice, em, but then it sort of 
immediately hits me, yeah, but not for you. It's, and it's that sort of all, constant unease that, 
that's always there. 
 
[5] how long is that going to go on, how long do I have to, do I have to constantly pretend that 
it's not a big deal when it is a big deal, but people then react to it saying, well it's, it can't be a 
big deal cos you're alive, and it's, but, yeah. So, so it keeps that sort of churn of, of, em, 
unhappy emotions and will this ever go, you know, will these ever, will I ever get back to being 
content with all of this? Or will I ever, or will I just have to be resigned to it as opposed to being 
content with it? 
 
[5] I stopped wanting to work, that was the other thing, yeah, it's sort of, this isn't relevant to 
me anymore, you know, I don't, don't, don't define myself by this anymore, it's not, not, I don't, 
yeah, it's not, it stopped being who I am, yeah? Em, so, so I thought I wouldn't be able to do 
the job as well as I did anyway, so [half-chuckle]. 
 
[5] we all build ourselves up out of a jigsaw of different bits and pieces, don't we, so, so, you 
know, eh, eh, father, husband, eh, senior manager, eh, [inaudible] things in the community, 
em, eh, bisexual man, em, you know, there's all sorts of bits and pieces, you think well, that 
was really, that was one of the big pieces, but actually it's not a big piece anymore, it's 





[5] so, yeah, so, so, so, it was a significant part of me, and I suppose the thing that, that, that 
possibly is surprising, and possibly surprised people at work was I was, eh it's over now [clicks 
fingers] – gone. 
 
[5] it's not, it's not a physical thing, it's just that knowledge of I'm a different person now, I'm a 
different man […] I just get a feeling of sort of inadequacy, that, that's it, that's the, yeah, that's 
the, that's the feeling, it's quite, it's, it's a horrible feeling, it's a horrible feeling. 
 
[5] there is no, there's, there's no sort of arc of stuff that, that people expect 
 
[6] we dealt with it in the way that we deal with these things, em, we sort of both deal with 
these things with the same thing, we turn it into a black humour. Eh, my tumour, my, you know, 
prostate cancer, had a name – I called it Donald. Because it was part of me and I thought, 
well, you know, he's been a part of me, he's going to have a name, it's what I'm trying to get 
rid of, you know, and we, sort of, we deal with things with, eh, the humour, this black humour 
that, em, you know, sort of making jokes about it and that, and sort of some people think you 
can't sort of do that, to which we say well it's my body, it's my cancer, I'll do what I bloody well 
like with it, you know, this is how I deal with it, I don't deal with it with tablets and things like 
that, you know, I deal with it with talking with friends and we deal with it with laughing and 
joking about it. 
 
[6] when I first said well I'll do the radiotherapy, I'd read what the side effects were, em, and 
the long-term sort of effects, and I'd read what the side effects were of the hormone treatment, 
what the long-term effects were for that, em, my heart, em, was saying well you want a sex 
life, em, and that, just go for the radiotherapy, the side effects are less effective, you know, 
not going to be as, em, bad for your sex life as the hormone treatments are, but then when 
the head kicks in, em, then it was a case of yes, but there's more to life than sex 
 
[6] there was the uncertainty from the cancer and everything, em, I th-, I think it was, I think 
the uncertainty with the cancer and I sort of dealt with that... helped me, you know, sort of 
make these changes afterwards, I mean, it was like I say, there was an event that happened 
that, sort of, switched me from uncertainty to certainty because when that happened, I was 
able to identify something that I hadn't been able to sort of work out previously, as to why I 
wasn't moving out, I knew I'd got to move out, and it was the uncertainty, the scared of moving 
out and that, and then the event of the cat dying, that was, ah, now that's why I was staying at 
the house, because now I know that I don't want to be here anymore, so that must be why, so 
I was able to do it, but the whole experience has really sort of helped me, em, organise my 
life, you know, a lot better. It's not that I don't get anxious about things still, but, em, you know, 
I do, I hope I deal with things, em, a lot better, you know, than eh, I used to. 
 
Living with the spectre of dying 
[1] I used to think sometimes, yeah, I think I will die, I think I have got, you know, especially 
when I had the pain, em, I think I will die, em, and I wonder how much treatment they can give 
me, I wonder if they can keep me going for a few years, em, and, em, I suppose in some ways 
I used to try and keep positive as well and think, look, you know lots of people who've had 
breast cancer, they've all survived, they've all survived, my best friend had breast cancer ten 
years before me, she was still here, she was building a job, she was, you know, and I can do 
this too. I used to, I used to, I suppose, em, flit from being oh my God, yes, I think I am going 
to die, to no, no, no, I don't know anybody, I know people do die of breast cancer, but I 
personally don't know anybody, and if they can all survive, then actually so can I. It might be 
hard work, but I, I think I, I think I will survive this. So I used to flit between total despair, I 
suppose, and total like, no, I'm going to do this, you know, I'm going to... I never thought, em, 
and you'd hear a lot of people say with cancer, don't you, don't call it a battle, don't say you're 
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going to fight this, and I never thought about it like that, but I did think I, I would survive it. You 
know, I used to flit from no, I'm going to die to I will survive this thing, em... 
 
[3] In my mind, it was almost like the brakes have been put on everything, and I ain't got much 
time now to finish off what I'd started, so that sort of affected me 
 
[3] when we look forward, I mean when we bought the caravan, I thought, well if we get two 
years out of it and the children want to use it with their children, em, hopefully, you know, even 
if I stop wanting to go down there because of my illness or, or for whatever reason, it'll still be 
with them, you know, still have it there to use, em, so, but we don't plan ten years in advance 
anymore, more like ten minutes. [Chuckle] 
 
[3] I'm not even particularly concerned about dying, I don't want, I don't want the pain, you 
know, I can do without that, if, so, as long as I get a painful death and it happens, it happens. 
 
[3] well is life really worth living anyway if it's going to be like this all the time? 
 
[3] at that time I'm thinking to meself, well, do or die really, I'll either go there and hate it and 
won't go out again or it'll be, em, something to boost me confidence 
 
[3] it was whilst the band was playing, after the third or fourth song, I sort of started thinking, 
well, I'm enjoying this, and it's probably, had been weeks before I can say I'd enjoyed anything, 
enjoyed me food, enjoyed doing anything, you know, em, and that's when I probably came 
around to the fact well, look, you know, this is daft, I'm going to have to get meself in order 
here, and, and, and, and this sort of traces back to that day in January, the 18th, I think, or 
something, 2018, so from September to January, that was me worst period. Including 
Christmas. And when you have things like Christmases and all the kids' birthdays, [name]'s is 
in November, [name]'s is in January, [name]'s is in January, Christmas, New Year, you can't 
be human if you don't think, well this might be me last one. And me son was due to get married 
the following June, and I'm thinking to meself, well, am I going to be around for that? 
 
[3] And from a practical side of things, that's what I should have known, but from an emotional 
side of things, I didn't really want to know or ask that question [how long have I got?]. 
 
[3] I can say, we've done a fair bit of far sightedness by future proofing a lot of the expense, 
you know, and cutting our cloth accordingly, em, but the focus really is day to day, week to 
week, month to month. 
 
[3] [Dying] seems more, it seems more concrete, more definite, I suppose, still can't, still can't 
actually say how definite because we don't know when it will be, em, but I suppose before the 
diagnosis, it would have been a flippant remark, well everybody's got to die sometime, 
whereas now since the diagnosis, thinking about it, yeah, and it could happen sooner rather 
than later, em, and that does, that is there's certainly an element of uncertainty that you get 
which influences the life-changing decisions that you make or even your life decisions. You 
know, em, but we're happy, put it that way, we're not, we're not unhappy, we jog along. 
 
[4] there's that idea that cancer makes you very aware of your mortality, and how much time 
you have left 
 
[4] even with my tattoos, like I don't like people asking me about them or talking to me about 
them, I didn't get them for anybody else, I got them cos it's an interest for me and it's something 
that I like, but at the same time I'm also acutely aware that you exist in the world and people 
have opinions, you can't avoid that, so [sigh], in the kind of context of sort of this uncertainty, 
it's almost like you kind of think, with the time I have left, what do I want to do with it, where do 
I want to go with it, like how, how, how does that impact the way you kind of want to move in 
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the world, and I'm getting better with it, you know [sigh], I've been using different pronouns, 
I'm sort of experimenting with like using different honorifics and stuff, but it's just, it feels like 
baby steps for a life that I want to be able to lead but I don't know if I have the energy 
 
[4] I think the really big shift of when I sort of came to terms with my mortality as it is now is 
the concept that the majority of people will live without knowing what's going to kill them, and 
then I now know what is probably going to be 90 per cent chance will be the thing that does it. 
And I am reminded of it every single day because I have to take pills every day, so you know 
I can't say for other treatments, you know, if they get that downtime between things, but for 
me it's, it's an oral medication every day, you know, and also the appointments et cetera, so 
these little things [rattling pill bottle] are a constant mortality reminder, and that's [sigh], it's a 
lot, and, and there's a fatigue that comes with consistently taking the pills, consistently having 
the blood tests, all that kind of stuff 
 
[4] there have been a couple of times in my life where I've come close to dying, at this point, 
em, and had to face that, and each one was different circumstances, it's about this kind of, 
you know, fine, whether it's domestic violence, whether it's attack in the street or now cancer, 
and I think the cancer's been the most, weirdly, the most impactful one because, because the 
other ones it's like, you know, it shakes you up, you know, it shakes you up to know that 
somebody could have killed you, and would have killed you if they had a chance, so that's a 
weird thing to get your head around, you know, it changes the way you see the world because 
that's a very big experience, but then when it's this cancer thing, you know, those things were 
a moment that you survived but you deal with after, but cancer is almost, this is going to sound 
really dark but it's the only way I can think about it right now, but especially with my kind of 
chronic cancer, it's just like a waiting room to death, like, not that I see the whole experience 
as that, but like, you're constantly talking in an elongated construct that ends with the finite 
aspect of death, that's what cancer is 
 
[5] I'm not particularly bothered about being dead, if that makes sense, a bit difficult to describe 
to people who say yeah but you're alive, but if I was dead I wouldn't care about it, em, so, em, 
cos I'm an atheist, I don't, if you're dead, you're dead, that's it, I have no, no fear of it at all, 
em, but I wouldn't like an unpleasant, the act of dying I wouldn't like to be unpleasant, yeah? 
And dying of prostate cancer is not nice, em, it's not a nice way to go at all. So it's that fear of 
that hideous decline, em, that, that would, yeah, I, I, I, and not knowing whether that's going 
to trigger at any point, em, and I'm thinking it probably will trigger at some point but, you know, 
as time goes on it more likely will trigger, you know, it's that, that sort of, em, but it doesn't 
make me worried, but it's just, it just sort of sits on a shelf, just sits there, looks at me. 
 
[5] when I say life-threatening, I, I, I, I don't mean sort of in the sense of this could kill me, but 
this could leave me in a, a, you know, a more diminished state or a crippled state, that, that's, 
that's of more concern to me than, than being dead, as I said before 
 
[5] the concern for me is the quality of life, how I'm going to live at any moment. So at the 
moment, I'm, I'm quite healthy and fit, em, and that's great, eh, but I'm also 61, so, so I know, 
I know it's going downhill, yeah? But I'll keep on trying to be healthy and fit as best I can, em, 
but I'm not, I'm not frightened of, of, of being, as I say, I'm not frightened of being dead, that's 
just the, that's just what happens. 
 
[5] I'd say none of [the uncertainty is] related to, to, to death. Some of it's related to the act of 
dying, yes, that's a, that's, yeah, yes, em, eh, yeah, because I don't, as I say, I don't want to 
go into that, that sort of, eh, unpleasant decline, yeah, where, where things just, yeah, lots 




[5] the uncertainty that disturbs me when I get a PSA score, or when I'm waiting for that PSA 
score, em, yeah, knowing I could get on that, you know, do I have to get on the treadmill this 
time, of the cycle of what to do next? 
 
[6] you know, life, you never get, you know, something you don't get out of alive, you know, 
you, everybody is going to die, and it, it helps me also deal with deaths in the family, when my 
parents died, when my son committed suicide, em, you know, death, death is all around us, 
you know, and, you know, you know you're going to die, why worry about it? 
 
Intrusion into awareness 
[1] there was no inkling that I was ill, or there was anything wrong with me and this is just like 
a bolt out of the blue, and I've always been a really healthy person, but now I suppose it makes 
me think, ah, it can happen again, it's happened once, it maybe can happen again 
 
[1] I'm a nurse, I've seen people die many, many times, I've seen things happen out of the 
blue to people, em, but I suppose there's an invincibility about yourself, isn't there, we all, you 
know, you all think you're invincible, especially when you're young, em, and you think it'll never 
happen to me, and in fact, all the friends I've had with cancer, I always thought it would never 
happen to me, I always thought, you know, em, that will never happen to me, you know, I am 
strong, and I'm healthy, em, so I suppose I wasn't as aware of the uncertainties around life as 
this has made me think now. 
 
[2] I think cos it's hit me that I... I'm not invincible, I think that's why. I thought I'm fit, I'm healthy, 
why shouldn't I go on, not forever, but you know what I mean 
 
[2] I suppose because it was unexpected, em, eh, and it puts your mortality into focus, which 
it probably wasn't, I was there thinking I'm fit and healthy, you know, I should be okay. Again, 
not living forever, but at least, you know, as I say, I'm quite good at compartmentalising, for 
the next five years, for the next five years, you know, we're going to plan this, we're going to 
plan that, and I think that's, that's what's brought into focus, my mortality, that we should be 
doing what my husband's saying, you know, we're lucky enough we can afford a nice holiday 
next year, we've had to cancel it this year so we were going to go and see our son, let, let's 
do that, let's travel 
 
[2] And I think it's kind of hit me with this, em, you know, I'll be working away, and then I think, 
oh, I've got cancer, you know – it was me. And then I just carry on again, you know, it's that 
kind of intrusive thought, but it's just a minute, you know what I mean 
 
[3] It's just a feeling, it comes out of the blue. 
 
[3] I've realised since I was diagnosed with the cancer that, em, something has changed inside 
of me emotionally and, em, there's so many songs there, I just burst into tears when they come 
on, it don't matter where I am, it just sort of hits, hits a nerve. 
 
[3] in me heart really, you know, it's just wow, in me mind, it's, eh, it is a, it is a feeling, I'd hate 
not to get that feeling, I'm not complaining about the feeling, em, I wish I had more control over 
when it would happen and when it won't , but em, yeah, it's just, and then I don't know if it's 
something to do with the chemo that's made me a more sensitive person, it might be the way 
emotionally I'm coping with it, em, and this is one form of release, em, it's very, very difficult, 
when you're, when you get diagnosed with something like this 
 
[3] Well, it's like a clock ticking, isn't it. You know. It's a warning to me to not get carried away 
because sometimes, like I said to you, I don't think about cancer very often, so I almost forget 
I've got it and it's only when I realise that other people have had a bit of bad news on their 
visits and then it's had the change or even worse, you know, it's got worse and they can't offer 
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anything anymore, it comes home as a, if you like, a warning sign to say, well look, just 
remember, you have got this. It gets you down for a bit, and then it gets you even more 
determined to get up and make the most of your life really. 
 
[5] I immediately get hit with that, even though there'll be no, you know, it's not like I see 
someone attractive and go chasing after them, I just, I see somebody attractive on the TV or 
I see somebody attractive on the street, and immediately I get that reaction about but you 
can't, not that I ever would, but you can't, and that, you know, you can't initiate a relationship 
with this person. Which is kind of weird because, as I say, I didn't think I was that sort of 
person. I would never think of initiating that sort of, eh, you know, engagement with somebody 
I just seen on the street or on TV or whatever, em, so I'm surprised that that's what's happening 
in my head. 
 
[5] the emotions hit me, and that, that just stays there, that, ‘til it, ‘til it sort of wears off […] it's 
emotion of loss, em, yeah? And em, eh, being, being less than, less than I was, yeah? Yeah. 
So it's quite odd. 
 
Embodiment 
[1] when I got the diagnosis, and breast cancer for women, it's quite a disfiguring thing, all 
about your body image anyway, isn't it, so for me it was more about this as well, em, and 
losing, I knew I'd probably lose my eye brows and my eye lashes and, it was, em, I tried to 
cope with it, I tried to control it, that's what I did with the uncertainty of it, em, I tried to put 
control in there […] so I did turbans, em, and I always thought that I would cope okay with 
being bald, but honestly for me that was the worst bit of it, that was the worst bit of the whole 
experience really, em, I kept a turban on 24 hours a day, seven days a week, I could not stand 
looking at my bald head 
 
[1] I was always certain it would grow back, em, I think, I'm saying that, but yeah, maybe deep 
down there was a little bit in me thinking, what if it doesn't grow back? And what if it doesn't 
grow back to be like it was before? I think it was the not growing back to how it was before 
that was worrying me more than, I did think it would grow back, em, but some people it grows 
very curly, some people it's wispy, and I've always had a huge lot of very thick hair, and always 
been very proud of my hair […] I knew I wasn't going to go back to, em, to how it was before, 
and I think that, it was more of that than thinking it wouldn't grow back. 
 
[1] I was thinking, yeah, I may not survive it, you know, I don't know anybody else who's had 
cancer in both breasts, em, I don't know anybody else who's had secondaries, you know, but 
this could be, it could be me, so that's when the uncertainty started, and I did get my results, 
it was just under a week, and that week I got such physical pain, em, like I've never had. I got 
pain under my ribs, like in my liver, I got pain in my head, very, very physical pain 
 
[1] I think physical pain is often a manifestation, isn't it, of your stress and your anxiety and 
that kind of stuff, and it was, it was so noticeable that as soon as [name of doctor] said to me, 
you have got breast cancer, you haven't got secondaries, I can treat this, and you will be okay, 
I never, ever had that pain again […]The pains never came back but yeah, I did feel something 
immediately, it was like this weight just went, do you know, it was like, oh my God, I said, I 
thought you were going to say I was going to die, you know, and I really did, when I went in 
there, I really did think, they're going to tell me I'm going to die, and as soon as she said that 
it was like this huge weight went from me and I could relax. I didn't think, oh my God, that pain 
is gone, because probably at that time because I was distracted, the pain wasn't there, do you 
know [laughing], if I was doing something else, the pain wasn't there, it was as soon as I was 
on my own or, you know, that's when all this pain would start, so I never thought about it then, 
oh my God, the pain's gone, but when I reflected on it, it was like after that point I never ever 




[1] but it still is like this uncertainty that you've got, oh my God, what if they don't, what if, you 
know, what if they forget about me? […] I suppose the anxiety would rest here, like your heart 
would go a bit more, em, and... I, I don't know, yes, it would definitely feel very anxious, you 
know I'd feel quite tense, em, and definitely, eh, like that sinking feeling in your tummy, like, 
oh God, they're not going to give me another appointment, they're not going to tell me when 
they want to see me again, so it would all like sink, you know? 
 
[3] it's sort of like a, a goose bumps, exciting feeling, but then me eyes just go, like I was saying 
before, as a side effect of me chemo, I do get the watery eyes, em, but I just can't stop them 
crying really, so it's not a bawling or it's not a, em, it's not like a child crying, it's just I'm silently 
crying, I get very, very watery eyes , and, em, and I feel, I don't particularly feel sad even, I 
just feel almost, almost happy because it's, I'm getting that reaction, because music means so 
much to me, but it can be a bit embarrassing at times [laughter], you know, if you're in mixed 
company and they might what's the matter with him, but, em, as I say, I can mask it often, say 
me eyes are watering. 
 
[3] I just had that real happy feeling of being at the band and actually hitting, getting the notes 
fit, you know, almost vibrating off me chest it was so loud and the adrenaline that you got from 
going to gigs, so I would say it's probably the songs bring back this adrenaline that I used to 
have, you know, cos it could be about that rocking song, and I'd still, you know, if there's a 
particular riff that I liked, it always used to give me, like, cold shivers or goose bumps, instead 
of that happening now, I sort of get tearful. 
 
[4] it's some semblance of precognition and the idea of like am I going to get better? You know, 
like, is this going to be it forever 
 
[4] one is obviously the emotional aspect, especially if it's bad news, to be like, ugh, that sucks, 
and you kind of feel like the pit in your stomach kind of go. 
 
[4] I guess there's two somatic markers, I suppose. One would be kind of like nausea, to be 
honest, like if I think about it, it's just, it doesn't feel good, like. But also, cos the anxiety 
problems I have, nausea is like the one symptom I have tied to my anxiety, so I feel like it's 
just related to that, but also it just then compounds it, cos when I think about my future, I just 
feel sick, I'm just like, and there was the kind of additional aspect, going back to what I said 
before about this isn't the kind of life I recognise or want, I don't want the life that's coming 
either. You know, what I really want is to go back to how I was, but I can't do that, so I have to 
fight and work towards a life that I'm not even happy with. Weird. The other thing is it just feels 
like a weight on your shoulders, you know, it just feels like, I guess a really weird parallel to 
make would be like sometimes I'm just sat there in bed and I think about it or I'm trying to go 
to bed and I'm trying to think about it, it would feel like I assume – I've never been under one 
– but what those weighted blankets are like, you know, just that whole idea of just your whole 
body and you just lose this energy and you just have this kind of weight on top of you of like 
[sigh], where are we going, what are we doing, you know. I think, I think a lot of it, a lot of that 
feeling comes down to the fact that I don't feel like I have control over my life at all, you know, 
I can't go where I want to go, can't take holidays I want to take, no control over my health, no 
control over my housing, you know, I don't have anything other than small things that I make 
manage myself, and when, when I think about that, that's when I just kind of have that weight 
over me, I'm just like [big sigh], you know, this isn't, this isn't fun. [Chuckle] 
 
[5] I'd use the word dread, but it, dread is far too big a word to describe the actual emotion, 
but it's that sort of empty, em, dismal is, is probably the, the, the emotion I'd say, it's sort of, 
it's a miserable thing 
 




[5] making the decision had that sort of, em, pit-in-the-stomach feeling that you sort of, eh, not 
nervous, no, it's a bit sort of, just leaden dread of is this the right thing to do or is that the right 
thing to do, and I don't know. Or I can make the wrong decision, eh – what is the right decision? 
It's sort of, yeah. Yes, so, so, em, sort of hollow, empty feeling, that's it. Hollow, empty and 
leaden, yes. 
 
[5] I think some of the decisions I've had to make at work have fallen into a similar mental state 
for me, or emotional state, sort of, you know, the stomach churning, you commit to this, this is 
a, this is a huge deal, what if I've made the wrong decision? What will the consequences of 
that be? Em, yeah. But of course none of those are life-threatening, yeah, so, but the emotions 
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